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Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our 
phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about 
phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged 
access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This 
means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely 
believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a 
metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we 
are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the 
backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound 
flaw.  
For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually 
assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are 
merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access 
view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that 
the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this 
approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a 
rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of 
the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. 
Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the 
philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of 
options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply 
having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the 
essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the 
controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which 
maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing 
ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution 
consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate 
ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious 
independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other 
hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of 
our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access 
intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance 
approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When Descartes published his Discourse on the Method in 16371, an outcry 
went through the philosophic community of the time. By introducing the famous 
cogito2 argument to ground knowledge, he provoked a flood of counterarguments 
against his view. Many philosophers, including David Hume and especially Pierre 
Gassendi, cast doubts on the Cartesian claim that there is something like foundational 
knowledge of the self. According to both authors, this knowledge is illusory and far 
from being as foundational as Descartes’s view holds. As a result grounding knowledge 
in this first principle fails. Over the centuries many others criticized this foundational 
knowledge claim.3 
Apart from the original intended goal, however, the Cartesian enterprise had an 
interesting effect. With the methodological investigation of 'what cannot be doubted', 
an intuition about our own mental life was introduced into epistemology, namely the 
privileged access. The privileged access claims that we are in a special epistemological 
position towards our own mental states. When we form judgments about these states, 
those judgments are especially epistemically secure or, one could argue, certain. We, 
therefore, obtain privileged self-knowledge about our mental life. This approach, even 
though applied by Descartes to ground knowledge in general, only needs to claim such 
an epistemic position with respect to self-knowledge. Being an intuition often thought 
to be entailed by folk psychology, the privileged access, in the beginning, was a great 
success. For a long time, this idea was quite popular in psychology, but also in 
philosophy. However, with the rise of behaviorism in the early 20th century, many 
scholars began to reject this view. 
                                                          
1
 See Descartes 1998. 
2
 Descartes introduced the Latin phrase cogito ergo sum in Principles of Philosophy. See Descartes 
1991. 
3
 For critics see e.g. Gassendi 1964 ,Hume 2000, Kierkegaard 1985 and Russell 1967. 
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In the last years, though, the idea experienced, at least, a partial revival. Due to 
the growing interest in consciousness, philosophers, psychologists and others from 
nearby fields, as they rediscovered the epistemic special notions of introspection and 
self-knowledge. This is especially true in the study of one of the key aspects in the 
consciousness debate, namely phenomenal consciousness, for here introspection and 
its resulting self-knowledge are of vital importance. In recent years, psycho-
philosophical studies about the reliability of those processes and judgments were 
conducted, with an ambiguous outcome.4 Even though this is not the desired result, 
the topic privileged self-knowledge is back in the philosophical and psychological 
debate. 
Introspection and self-knowledge constitute a vast area of research. On the one 
hand, it requires research on various aspects of both notions. This includes reliability, 
investigation of existing models/the possible introduction of new ones, or the analysis 
of relations with similar processes, e.g. perception. On the other hand, both ideas are 
closely connected to the study of consciousness, in particular to phenomenal 
consciousness. Without introspection and the resulting self-knowledge investigation of 
the metaphysics and epistemology of mind seems a difficult endeavor. This implies 
that there is or, at least, may be, a reciprocal effect between both research areas. The 
study of all these issues is, in my opinion, deeply intertwined, making it necessary to 
investigate more than one topic to gain an overall picture. 
Naturally, this cannot be covered by my investigation here. I will focus, 
therefore, on one key element, namely the privileged access intuition. As seen above, 
this idea was already employed by Descartes. It is, however, one thing to stipulate this 
kind of access; it is another to justify it. To generally embrace this view, we need an 
explanation. The reason is that it is usually widely accepted that a knowledge relation 
between an object and its corresponding judgment is contingent and causal.5 
Privileged self-knowledge, however, claims something profoundly different. It is 
thought to be epistemically more secure or even certain for some philosophers. For 
the privileged access to exist, this demands a solid justification. My goal, therefore, is 
                                                          
4
  See especially Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel 2007. 
5
 See e.g. Gertler 2011a and b. 
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to investigate possible explanations and their implications. I will focus mainly on two 
approaches6, namely acquaintance and revelation. 
In the first chapter, I will start my investigation by introducing the main 
elements. First, I will clarify what privileged self-knowledge is. We will see that the 
privileged access intuition is captured by two interpretation of the concept, namely by 
being especially well justified and by applying a special method.7 Assuming that most 
philosophers think that the method to obtain self-knowledge is introspection8, I will 
show that models of this kind of knowledge mostly depend on how they evaluate the 
privileged access’s epistemic claim. Those who believe in the intuition usually think 
that what makes self-knowledge special is that we have some sort of unmediated or 
direct access to the mental states in question.9 Others who deny this idea, split in two 
groups. On the one hand, there are those who believe that introspection is a genuine, 
independent process, but hold that it is basically analogous to perception.10 This 
means, knowledge obtained via this method is just as contingent and causal as 
perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, some propose that when we are 
introspecting, we are actually perceiving. For them, there is no genuine different 
process to grasp inner mental states. In the end, introspection is to look through our 
mental states to their outer, intentional objects.11 
After characterizing these possible models, I will determine the part of the 
mental best suited for privileged self-knowledge, namely the phenomenal. The reason 
is that whether or not the privileged access is a plausible view depends to a certain 
degree also on its target. Many philosopher and psychologists hold that a great deal of 
our mental life is far from being obvious to ourselves. The only plausible prospect is 
often thought to be conscious experience in general and their phenomenal aspects in 
particular. My focus will, therefore, turn to privileged self-knowledge about the 
phenomenal. 
Now, there are many intuitions we have about the phenomenal, the privileged 
                                                          
6
 I will shortly discuss other alternatives that will, however, be discarded quickly for their insufficiency. 
7
 See especially Gertler 2011b. 
8
 For exceptions see especially Gallois 1996 and Shoemaker 1988, 1990, 1994a, b. 
9
 See Gertler 2012a. 
10
 See e.g. Sellars 1963. 
11
 See e.g. Harman 1990, 1996. 
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access is only one of them. After listing the most important ideas, I will, however, 
explicate only two in greater detail. The reason is that both of these concepts 
constitute key aspects in the context of this discussion. 
The first intuition is transparency12. It deeply influences the ontology of 
experience. To defend the privileged access, I have to be able to assume a certain 
range of possible ontologies. If, however, strong transparency is true, then genuine 
introspection is not even possible. I, therefore, have to reject this implausible 
consequence and allow only for weaker interpretations of transparency. 
The second idea is for many contemporary philosophers the only way to ground 
the privileged access. Based on Russell's acquaintance approach to knowledge13, this 
intuition is supposed to explain the relevant directness relation with our phenomenal 
properties. This means, if this explanation is sound, then the privileged access is 
grounded. I will, however, conclude that this is not the case. The reason is that this 
form of explanation raises more questions than it answers and is, therefore, deeply 
mysterious. 
In the beginning of the second chapter I will clarify in greater detail what the 
conditions for the privileged access are. Even though I do not consider any specific 
account of introspection, it is necessary to defend that, at least, in principle that there 
is no problem with this notion. I claim that the main threat does not stem from any 
particular model, but rather from the fact that introspection may not be one coherent 
process.14 After concluding that one single target, particularly the phenomenal, 
involves a stable process of introspection, I will discuss the more important issue 
concerning the epistemic security of self-knowledge about the phenomenal. This 
entails the introduction and explanation of, at least, some ways knowledge can be 
epistemically special. The spectrum of those notions includes relatively weak and 
strong readings.15 The strongest pair, however, is infallibility and omniscience. The 
former states that we cannot form false beliefs about our experiences and the latter 
                                                          
12
 The transparency thesis stems from Moore's idea that experiences are diaphanous. See especially 
Moore 1903. 
13
 See Russell 1967. 
14
 See Schwitzgebel 2012. 
15
 See Alston 1971 for a detailed list. 
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that having those experiences is sufficient for knowing them. I conclude that only this 
pair constitutes certainty in the relevant sense, the condition that I am after. 
Since there is, so far, no explanation why self-knowledge about the 
phenomenal is privileged, I will consider alternative explanations at this point. The 
question, therefore, shifts to possible justifications for self-knowledge ascriptions. 
After considering possible candidates, the so called 'epistemic principles', I will 
conclude that only the revelation thesis16 has the potential to count as an explanation. 
Since this thesis states that by having an experience with phenomenal properties, I can 
know the essence of those properties, it entails a metaphysical component – contrary 
to any other explanatory alternative, including acquaintance. Revelation, therefore, 
has to be carefully qualified, so that it does not a) violate physicalism; or b) lose its 
explanatory power. Since there is a historical and natural relation between revelation 
and acquaintance, I will discuss this possible form of restriction already in this context. 
I will, however, conclude that qualifying the revelation thesis by introducing 
acquaintance as its essence claim is unsuccessful. This is due to the fact that such a 
thesis inherits all the problems of the acquaintance approach already pointed out in 
the previous chapter. 
The third chapter has two main functions. First, I will analyze different readings 
of revelation17. Second, I will investigate what revelation refers to and evaluate 
possible interpretations of the essence claim. My main focus will circle around the 
question how the essence claim of every version influences our epistemic position. 
This means, in one case, that we may know everything that is essentially true about 
the phenomenal, in another case, that we may know all the essential properties 
involved. A third, more specific interpretation, claims that we know the concepts that 
are essential in all possible worlds. According to this version, if a phenomenal concept 
is stable in every possible world, then we can know it. This knowledge puts us in the 
position to exclude all properties that are only accidental, leaving us with the essential 
ones. The task here is to assess the plausibility of those interpretations.18 
Now, analyzing the different readings of revelation, means to put forward the 
                                                          
16
 For details, see e.g. Johnston1992, Lewis 1995, Russell 1967. 
17
 See Stoljar 2009. 
18
 For detailed discussion on different accounts of revelation see Damnjanovic 2012. 
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different ways thesis can be understood. Three different issues come to mind: i) does 
revelation 'put us in a position to know' or do we simply 'know' the essence of the 
phenomenal by having an experience with the relevant phenomenal properties? ii) do 
we already need a concept of essence for the thesis to be true? and iii) what kind of 
knowledge do we gain, explicit or tacit? In this part of the chapter, I will clarify how 
one should understand the original, unqualified thesis. 
Before I will examine possible essence claims, there is a further aspect of 
revelation that needs illustration. Even though we consider a version of the revelation 
thesis that is about experiences, it is not clear whether it refers to the experience itself 
or the way we understand experiences. The main reason this concern arises is that, 
according to Stoljar19, revelation necessarily includes understanding naturally. I will, 
however, argue that this is not the case. By showing that understanding is not an 
epistemic, but a psychological principle, I will conclude that it is different from 
revelation. My view is, therefore, that the latter does not entail the former in the 
relevant sense. Revelation is, therefore, about experience itself. 
As a final task of this chapter, I will investigate different versions of the essence 
claim. Three interpretations come to mind. First, I will assume that revelation may 
claim that we can know 'all essential truths' about the phenomenal. This means that by 
having an experience with a phenomenal property, I can know all the essential 
concepts that describe this property. This idea is, however, implausible. It has the 
absurd result that by having an experience, and without empirical research, I could 
gain knowledge of the physical concept of a phenomenal property. This means, the 
experience itself presents me with the way it is instantiated in the brain.20 I will 
conclude that this version of revelation cannot solve this problem. 
A second account of revelation refers to knowledge of 'all essential properties 
or facts' that constitute the phenomenal. The advantage of this approach is that, 
contrary to the first interpretation, we only need to know all essential facts and not all 
essential truths. This means, we do not need to possess all essential concepts of the 
phenomenal property in question. At a first glance, this avoids the problem of the 
                                                          
19
 See Stoljar 2009. 
20
 Lewis 1995 discusses the issue in length. 
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former account. Damnjanovic, however, raises the suspicion that the latter approach 
may involve knowledge of all properties down to the last particle.21 In his view, this is 
an absurd implication. I, however, will lay the groundwork here, to develop this 
account in a qualified fashion in the last chapter. Before doing so, I will still discuss one 
further interpretation of the essence claim. 
The final version of revelation, discussed in that chapter, refers to knowledge of 
the 'counterfactual extensions of a phenomenal concept'. Knowing those extensions 
puts us in a position to eliminate all the accidental features of the phenomenal 
properties in question. This means, thanks to knowing the extensions of a phenomenal 
concept we can remove all properties that are not essential to the phenomenal. As I 
will show, however, this account fails. The reason is that the nature of phenomenal 
concepts is controversial. It is usually claimed that not the phenomenal is special, but 
rather the corresponding concepts. This, however, may be disputed.22 
In the fourth and final chapter, I will explain how my view of revelation can 
justify the privileged access to the phenomenal. I will claim that revelation primarily 
leads to ontological knowledge about the phenomenal. I will argue, however, that on 
this basis privileged self-knowledge about a particular phenomenal property can be 
justified. 
As a first step, I will introduce my interpretation of revelation, which I will call 
Q-me revelation. I will show that the resulting ontological view, based on 
considerations about experience stemming from adverbialism, gives credence to my 
claims. Since adverbialism is controversial, I will show that my notion, called 
phenomenal Q-me-ism, can sidestep the basic problems of the former view. The 
conclusion of my ontological account is that phenomenal properties are composed of 
subjective and qualitative properties. 
In a second step, I will show how Q-me revelation reveals phenomenal Q-me-
ism. The main reason is that experiential properties can be interpreted in two different 
senses. On the one hand, those properties can form part of the experiencing subject. 
On the other hand, they can form part of the experience itself. The former view holds 
                                                          
21
 See Damnjanovic 2012. 
22
 See especially Chalmers 2007 for his 'master argument'. 
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that we have experiences, the latter that something is an experience.23 Both 
interpretations of these experiential properties determine the ontology of experience 
and, therefore, the phenomenal. My claim in this chapter is that Q-me revelation 
reveals that both are the case. Since the experiencing subject and the representational 
qualities are revealed as part of the phenomenal, they can be integrated into one 
single account. This implies straightforwardly that an experience is exhausted by the 
phenomenal. The resulting ontology, phenomenal Q-me-ism, accounts for that fact. 
Apart from demonstrating that phenomenal Q-me-ism is a plausible ontology of 
experience, I will argue, in a third step, that Q-me revelation explains privileged self-
knowledge about the phenomenal. Primarily Q-me revelation reveals phenomenal Q-
me-ism, i.e. an ontological account of the phenomenal, respectively experience, in 
general. Since Q-me is present as a concrete phenomenal property, e.g. red-me, and 
constitutes only one property, I claim that we can know this fact with certainty. By 
carefully dissecting Q-me revelation, in implicit and explicit Q-me revelation, I will 
show that both types of knowledge are possible. 
In a final step, I will prove that Q-me revelation avoids the most dangerous 
pitfall of the general revelation thesis. I will show that my version, even though a 
strong account, is compatible with physicalism. Since strong versions of the revelation 
thesis need to reveal, to some extent, the physical structure of the phenomenal as 
well, I will argue that Q-me revelation clearly complies with this fact. To do so, I will 
employ the idea of embodiment24 and show that this view reveals that Q-me is 
embodied. Q-me revelation is, therefore, not prone to anti-physicalism. It is only a 
further argument against mind/brain identity. 
It is safe to conclude that if what I argue here is true, then important progress is 
in sight. We should have a solid justification to believe in the privileged access to the 
phenomenal/experience and a promising starting point for further research. Especially 
the investigation of introspection and phenomenal consciousness will profit from this 
result. But most importantly, my view justifies the Cartesian intuition that we can 
know certain things about our mind with certainty. Even though I do not believe that 
                                                          
23
 See Nida-Rümelin 2007a for this view. 
24
 See e.g. See Gallagher 2000. 
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this grounds all knowledge, we regain a very important tool for the philosophy of 
mind. 
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I. SELF-KNOWLEDGE, TRANSPARENCY AND ACQUAINTANCE 
 
I.1. Self-knowledge and accounts 
 
The epistemological specialness of self-knowledge, as mentioned above, is 
captured by the idea of privileged access. According to Gertler this means the 
following: “Self-knowledge may be epistemically special in that (a) it is especially 
secure or certain; (b) one uses a unique method to determine one's own mental 
states.”25 Of course both epistemologically special characteristics are not exclusive. 
Let's start with (a). In the case of self-knowledge the epistemically strongest 
ideas are infallibility and omniscience. Gertler explains these claims the following way: 
One is infallible about one's own mental states if, and only if, 
one cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a 
certain mental state. (In other words, one's belief that one is in 
a particular mental state entails that one is in that mental 
state.) One is omniscience about one's own states if, and only if, 
being in a mental state suffices for knowing that one is in that 
state. (In other words, one's being in a particular mental state 
entails that one knows that one is in that state).26 
It seems that these claims are particularly strong and therefore hardly anyone thinks 
this to be true nowadays. 
Restricting those claims means basically limiting their scope. Not all beliefs 
about our own mental states are infallible or omniscience, only the ones formed by the 
special method of introspection. We could put the weaker thesis as follows: “When 
one carefully, attentively employs the mode of knowing unique to self-knowledge, one 
will not form a false belief about one's own states.”27 This might be problematic for all 
                                                          
25
 Gertler 2011b, § 1.1. 
26
 Gertler 2011a, p. 61-62. 
27
 Gertler 2011b, § 1.1.1. 
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kinds of mental states, but at least for our current phenomenal states28 or properties 
this seems to be true. Introspective acquaintance theorists for example explore this 
idea. Of course those claims can be weakened event further, but for our purposes this 
short characterization is sufficient. 
Gertler also states another important idea. She says that “[...] infallibility and 
omniscience correlate the belief that p with p itself. But they are neutral between 
epistemic internalism and externalism.”29 While versions of epistemic externalism 
speak about infallibility and omniscience as the highest degrees of epistemic security, 
the highest degree of epistemic security in epistemic internalist models is certainty. 
“The claim that one can be certain that one is in a particular mental state applies to a 
single self-attribution, whereas the reliability-based theses of infallibility and 
omniscience concern a person's general accuracy.”30 Epistemic certainty is often tied 
to the idea of introspection as a special unique method of obtaining knowledge about 
our own mental states31. Still, there are stronger and weaker versions of both theories. 
Now, let's turn to (b). When we talk about the unique epistemic method to 
grasp one's own mental states we talk about introspection. In this particular case, we 
talk about introspection from an epistemic point of view. So, what makes introspection 
so special? According to Gertler, “[o]ne standard answer to this question is that we 
have epistemic access to our states that is direct, whereas our access to facts or 
objects external to us is indirect.”32 This directness can come in two forms (at least 
according to acquaintance theorists): 
In the first, epistemic sense, the claim is that we can grasp our 
own mental states without inference; we need not rely on 
reasoning from observation. The second sense of directness is 
metaphysical: there is no state or object that mediates 
between my self-attributing belief (that I am now thinking that 
                                                          
28
 'Phenomenal states' is how Gertler puts it. I want to note that this is far from clear. If something 
phenomenal is realized as a state is controversial. 
29
 Gertler 2011b, § 1.1.1. 
30
 Gertler 2011a, p. 65. 
31
 Since I want to explore what we can know about the phenomenal, or better what is the privileged 
access to the phenomenal, I will assume certainty. 
32
 Gertler 2011a, p. 65. 
 
12 
 
it will rain, feeling thirsty, etc.) and its object (my thought that 
it will rain, my feeling of thirst).33 
Acquaintance theorists therefore defend (a) and (b), even though that does not mean 
that they maintain the strong infallibility and omniscience thesis. There is still margin 
of error, for example by using another method or because reflection about our own 
mental states fails. 
This sort of interpretation is not only unique to acquaintance theorists. Inner 
sense theorists can also accept (a) and (b). According to Gertler, for those theorists 
introspection is similar to perception, but “[e]ven if introspection is similar to 
perception, our self-attributions may nonetheless be more secure than our other 
beliefs.”34 This may be the case because we use certain abilities to obtain knowledge 
about a restricted class of mental states, namely our own, but they “[...] will deny that 
the difference between self-knowledge and other types of knowledge have deep 
philosophical significance.”35 
However, there is still another class of philosophers. Those would claim that 
“[...] we ascertain our own thoughts by looking outwards.”36 This so called 
'transparency principle' says “[...] that one looks ´through´ the mental state, directly to 
the state of the world it represents.”37 It becomes obvious, at this point, how 
important certain epistemic features are in constituting an account of self-knowledge. 
There are different ways of arguing for the specialness of self-knowledge (some 
accounts are epistemic and some are non-epistemic). I will focus exclusively on 
standard epistemic accounts of self-knowledge.38 Standard accounts include: the 
unmediated observation model (acquaintance model), the inner sense model and the 
                                                          
33
 Gertler 2011b, § 1.1.2. 
34
 Gertler 2011a, p. 66. 
35
 Ibid., p. 66. 
36
 Gertler 2011b, § 1.1.2. 
37
 Ibid., § 1.1.2. 
38
 One epistemic non-introspective account is the rationality model. Proponents argue that self-
knowledge is based on rationality rather than introspection. The account is closest to the later 
explained transparency model of introspection. The models basically differ in their explanation for 
justification. While the former is internalist, the latter is externalist. The biggest problem for the 
rationality account is its strong rationality condition. A problem like self-deception is hard to grasp 
for this account. In addition, requiring an excessive high degree of rationality makes the model 
trivial. An excessively strong rationality criteria leads to less need for justification of self-knowledge. 
See especially Gallois 1996 as a proponent. See Gertler 2011a and b for discussion. 
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transparency model. 
The unmediated observation model – often attributed to Descartes – is most of 
the time based on what is called acquaintance. Such a model holds that there is a 
direct access to a given mental state; that means that there is no mediating state and 
the knowledge obtained is non-inferential. This involves therefore directness in two 
senses, an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Such states are often described 
as self-presenting mental states. According to Gertler self-presenting properties imply 
certain psychological and epistemic characteristics: 
Specifically, (i) no one who has a self-presenting property 
directly self-attributes its negation […]; (ii) anyone who has a 
self-presenting property and considers whether she does, will 
self-attribute that property; and (iii) a direct attribution of a 
self-presenting property is certain, in the relative sense.39 
This is usually secured by the acquaintance principle, which states this kind of 
directness. 
The inner sense model denies the specialness of self-knowledge. This model 
tries to construct introspection in analogy to perception. Gertler puts it the following 
way: 
In contrast to the Unmediated Observation model, the 
connection between the introspective (scanning) state, and the 
introspected (scanned) state, is causal and contingent.40 
This analogy can be modeled in different ways, but the basic idea stays the same. In 
contemporary philosophy of mind a lot of the proponents of inner sense theory think 
that this model helps to solve the problem of consciousness. Therefore most of them 
defend the so-called HOP (higher-order perception) theory. According to this theory, 
what makes a mental state conscious is the fact that there is a higher order state 
attached to it. For proponents of the inner sense model this claim is basically a direct 
consequence of the model, since – if the inner sense theory is correct – conscious 
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 Gertler 2011b, § 2.1. 
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states are grasped by an inner sense. 
The transparency model portrays yet another approach to self-knowledge. In 
contrast to the other models just described it emphasizes the 'looking outward'. Self-
knowledge is therefore only a form of perceptual knowledge, which can only be 
acquired by referring to non-mental objects.41 Not everyone agrees with this form of 
transparency. Consequently there are different versions of the transparency model. 
Some claim that self-knowledge is inferential (perceptual), while others do not. The 
more common claim by now is that “[o]ne's own beliefs are transparent to one in that 
one does not notice them as beliefs, but instead looks 'through' them directly to their 
objects.”42 This is basically exploiting the epistemic principle of transparency, which 
means: when I introspect on my own mental states, by transparency, I look 'through' 
the mental state to the object of the outward world. 
So far we have seen what the basic criteria for privileged self-knowledge are 
and in what accounts they result. The crucial aspect behind the idea of privileged 
access is the epistemic position we are in. We are in position to know something with a 
special certainty or security. There are different ways of spelling out this position, but 
independent of whether someone chooses to be an epistemic externalist or an 
internalist about mental states, she relies on a view about what kind of epistemic 
features43 she deploys. The resulting accounts of self-knowledge – most of them tied 
to introspection as unique method – are depending on those principles as well. The 
key issue in the debate about privileged self-knowledge lies therefore in an 
examination of the key epistemic features. 
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 Gertler 2011b, § 2.3. 
43
 This is to say whether someone favors acquaintance, causality or transparency. 
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I.2. Knowledge about the phenomenal 
 
In the debate about the mystery of Consciousness, conscious experiences play 
the key role. The so called hard problem44 places the phenomenal properties of 
experiences in the focus of attention. Also I would argue they are the corner stone to 
privileged self-knowledge. We should ask therefore the following: what do we know 
about our experiences with certainty45? This question is of course primarily an 
epistemic one but not exclusively. It is also about the ontological structure of 
experience. I do not want to imply that we are necessarily able to decide whether 
physicalism or any other metaphysical view is true, but we are capable to know some 
matters about the structure of experiences and I will argue that there is reason for the 
intuition that we know the phenomenal properties of our experiences with certainty or 
that we have privileged access to them. 
As a first step, it seems wise to have an initial characterization of phenomenal 
properties at hand. Since I do not want to endorse any metaphysical claims at this 
point, I will identify phenomenal properties with an intuitive Nagelian account46: 
 
There is something that it is like for someone to have an experience. 
 
As a second step, we should take a closer look at the most important intuitions 
about epistemic features related to phenomenal properties. Here is a list of those 
features47: 
1) Acquaintance: knowledge about phenomenal properties is not 
merely inferential, it is direct and unmediated. 
2) Asymmetric epistemology: phenomenal knowledge is direct, while 
knowledge about the world is mediated. 
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 See Chalmers 1995 for discussion. 
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 Not all philosophers allow for certainty. See especially Unger 1975. 
46
 For detailed discussion of this account see Nagel 1974. 
47
 Inspired by Balog 2009. For an extensive list of semantic epistemic features see ibid. 
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3) Infallibility or incorrigibility: Our knowledge about our phenomenal 
properties cannot be false and no one else can correct us. 
4) Transparency (weak): When we turn our attention to conscious 
perceptual experiences the features perceived are those of the 
object. 
5) Transparency (strong): When we turn our attention to conscious 
perceptual experiences the features perceived are only those of the 
object. 
6) Experience thesis: knowledge about phenomenal properties can only 
be acquired by having the relevant experience. 
7) Fineness of grain: phenomenal properties are extremely fine in grain. 
Closely connected to these features are intuitions about metaphysical 
knowledge of phenomenal properties. Those intuitions are usually seen as the most 
controversial issues in the consciousness debate. Any epistemic theory in philosophy of 
mind should at least be prepared to have an answer to them. 
8) Zombies48: The conceivability of a zombie scenario cannot be ruled 
out a priori. 
9) The explanatory gap49: There is a principle gap between physical 
descriptions of a person's experience and a phenomenal description 
of that experience. This gap is supposed to be unbridgeable. 
10) The knowledge argument50: Even if we have all physical information, 
e.g. about colors, when we experience colors for the first time, we 
learn something new and therefore not all information is physical.51 
This list is far from complete52. It represents however the spirit of the Materialist – 
Anti-materialist discussion. Such metaphysical conclusions are of secondary 
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importance in my discussion of the privileged access to the phenomenal, however, I 
want to stress that the consequence of proposing a thesis about it has almost direct 
influences on that debate. 
As we have seen in 2) and 3) privileged access for phenomenal properties is 
assumed. Now, 1) is a relational explanation for this access; 4) is a feature to 
determine the content of a perceptual experience; 5) is the representationalist 
explanation of phenomenal properties; 6) states the difference between knowledge 
about phenomenal properties and knowledge about statements; and 7) states that 
phenomenal properties outstrip our conceptual apparatus in the sense that even if we 
learn a concept at a particular time t, we are not able to reapply this concept at t'. 
These epistemic features of phenomenal properties are very close to what has 
been said about self-knowledge so far. The only difference is that no intuition seems to 
point to a higher-order theory. There seems to be no contingent knowledge relation 
involved. This however follows directly from our intuitions. It is assumed that we have 
privileged access to our phenomenal features. We will see that, in the end, even a 
theory that claims that there is no special epistemic relation to the mental has its 
merits. First, we will turn to acquaintance and transparency. Both features have a 
decisive influence on the epistemology and ontology of phenomenal properties. 
 
I.3. Acquaintance and transparency 
 
The importance of acquaintance and transparency lies in their explanatory and 
constitutive claims. The other epistemic features, however, simply name 
characteristics of phenomenal properties. This means, 2) and 3) state the fact that we 
are supposed to have privileged access to the phenomenal; 6) is the condition under 
which we can form knowledge of phenomenal properties; and finally 7) states that, like 
other qualities, phenomenal qualities are extremely fine in grain. 
Now, what exactly do these decisive features bring to the table? The short 
answer for transparency, on the one hand, is that – depending on whether one 
subscribes to the weak or the strong version – this feature ontologically restricts the 
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constitution of conscious experiences and therefore the scope of the phenomenal. On 
the other hand, acquaintance determines the special epistemic relation we are in 
when obtaining knowledge of phenomenal properties. Both features are obviously not 
incompatible, but as we will see there are different interpretations. 
 
I.3.1. Transparency 
 
For knowledge about the phenomenal the epistemic position we are in is 
crucial. However, transparency will have influence on whether acquaintance even 
makes sense, and if so, how to develop the respective model. It is important to keep in 
mind that if transparency is true – and our intuitions arguably suggest that it is – then, 
at least, part of the knowledge of experience is dependent on objects of the outer 
world, and, in my opinion, therefore cannot count as privileged in the traditional 
sense. 
To get a better understanding, let us have a look at what we are talking about 
here. Transparency53 was famously presented by G. E. Moore in his article 'The 
Refutation of Idealism' (1903).54 This feature is not necessarily exclusive to self-
knowledge or introspection, it is rather often applied to perception – just as Moore 
suggested. According to transparency, introspecting a conscious experience leads to 
the conclusion that we are not aware of the conscious features of our experiences. 
Rather we are aware of the features of the objects – which do not depend on our 
consciousness itself – those experiences are about. To put it in Moore's words:  
[...] the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness 
and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as 
if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to 
introspect the sensation blue, all we can see is the blue: the 
                                                          
53
 I will only talk about transparency of experience here and not about transparency of belief. This is 
due to the fact that I am examining experiences and not beliefs. 
54
 I take Moore's original thesis to be an excellent example for a weaker version of transparency. We 
will see, at the end, of the illustration why. 
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other element is as if it were diaphanous.55  
He also tries to show that this does not mean that consciousness does not exist, rather 
that there is a unique relation to the mind-independent object. For Moore, this 
relation can be described as in any other case of 'knowing'. He writes: 
To have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue is not to have in your 
mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content. To be 
aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental 
image – of a “thing,” of which 'blue' and some other elements 
are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass 
are constituents of blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness 
of blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the 
same sense.56 
Even though Moore's theory about consciousness is highly controversial – to say the 
least – transparency seems to be true. Modern versions normally assume two basic 
claims: 
(1) When we introspect we are aware of mind-independent objects of 
experience. 
(2) When we introspect there is no awareness of intrinsic features of 
experience.57 
Moore himself argues for transparency in the context of refuting idealism. 
What he basically argues against is the idea idealists hold. He thinks, “[i]dealists […] 
must assert that whatever is experienced, is necessarily so. And this doctrine they 
commonly express by saying that 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from 
the subject.'”58 This theory however is self-contradictory. According to Moore, 
philosophy of necessary truths is analytic and this disqualifies self-contradictory 
propositions, but the idealist theory leads to the following contradiction: “(1) 
Experience is something unique and different from anything else; (2) Experience of 
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 Moore 1903, pp. 21-22. 
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 These claims are taken from Crane 2014. 
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 Moore 1903, p. 10. 
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green is entirely indistinguishable from green; two positions which cannot be true.”59 
Even though he grants that some Idealists do not insist on the identity of an 
experience of a certain object and the object, he still claims that according to Idealists 
they form an 'organic unity'60. Moore does not want to allow such a unity, since 
“[w]hatever is experienced must be experienced”61 is a self-contradictory claim. For 
Moore the consequence after analyzing sensations is that, on one hand, there is a 
common element, namely consciousness; on the other hand the object of 
consciousness is where the difference lies. The conclusions he draws from this, is that 
a) sensations have a common element and a distinctive element and b) that 
consciousness and its objects have to be separated. 
What follows, for Moore, is the question whether both elements exist and he 
answers positively. He interprets the object of consciousness as “content” which 
stands in relation with consciousness to form a mental fact.62 This relation is special. It 
is a relation of “[...] 'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something.”63 
Moore believes that the reason why other philosophers have not seen this distinction 
is because consciousness is diaphanous. At this point, he admits that it even might be 
true that awareness itself is e.g. blue or red, but that this simple is not the crucial fact 
introspection shows. 
The conclusion is that, what Moore calls “content”, is actually the object of the 
sensation. The argument shows that there are objects in the world, which are mind-
independent and therefore I am aware of those independent objects. On the contrary 
to Idealism, Moore makes the following claim:  
I am as directly aware of the existence of material things in 
space as of my own sensations, and what I am aware of with 
regard to each is exactly the same – namely that in one case 
the material thing, and in the other case my sensation does 
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 Moore 1903, p. 14. 
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 This is only Moore's conclusion. For further discussion on “content” see Moore 1903. 
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 Moore 1903, p. 21. 
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really exist.64 
In my opinion, Moore clearly supports weak transparency. It is doubtful whether he 
would subscribe to the stronger thesis. This leafs plenty of room for the uniqueness of 
consciousness. 
Certainly Moore's thesis had its impact on the history of philosophy of mind65, 
but it was not until Gilbert Harman66 that it reached its full potential. Harman picked 
up the argument and implemented it in the contemporary debate. His version of the 
structure of experience and the relation to the objective world are the corner stone to 
representational theories of the mind.67 Analyzing an experience of seeing a red, ripe 
tomato Harman concludes the following:  
When you think about visual representation, it is very 
important to distinguish (A) qualities that the experience 
represents the environment as having from (B) qualities of 
experience by virtue of which it serves as a representation of 
the environment. When you see a ripe tomato your visual 
experience represents something as red. The redness is 
represented as a feature of the tomato, not a feature of your 
experience.68 
But he goes further. He does not only conclude that the feature red is represented as 
being in the world, it is also that you cannot know whether or not your experience has 
an intrinsic quality of redness. Since you cannot consciously access those qualities you 
cannot know anything about them and therefore introspection fails. Due to this fact 
one can only obtain the concept of red in the world. Harman makes the distinction 
between properties of the object of experience and properties of the experience of an 
object69 explicit. He also denies explicitly the conscious access to the latter, making 
phenomenal qualities nothing other than representational qualities. This version of the 
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view still has numerous supporters70 and critics71. 
Early critics include philosophers like Broad72, who acknowledges the 
transparency of conscious experiences, but interprets the consequences differently. 
While Moore insists on the existence of mind-independent objects and sees no 
evidence that introspection tells us much about consciousness itself, Broad is inclined 
to argue that the second part of Moore's statement is not true. He has two arguments 
in favor of his claim. 
The first argument is based on an analysis of the relation between the 
constituents. To do so, Broad starts with the distinction between introspection and 
inspection and argues that transparency theorists seem to mingle these two different 
acts. A transparency theorist, he argues, seems to deny that when introspecting e.g. 
pain that I can really grasp experiencing the pain. Instead the proponent seems to 
claim that all I can apprehend or inspect is only the pain itself. Broad, however, thinks 
that the introspection relation is essentially different. He argues: 
If there is such a […] situation it must presumably consist of at 
least two constituents, related in a certain specific way by an 
asymmetrical relation so that one of these constituents 
occupies a special position (viz., that of objective constituent) 
and the other occupies a characteristically different position 
(viz., that of subjective constituent).73 
He assumes now that if we are introspectively acquainted to the whole sensation, it is 
clear that the relation between the two constituents is not obviously presented to us 
like the two constituents. To explain this Broad gives the following analogy: 
When I look at a pattern composed of three dots, A, B, and C, 
arranged in that order on a line, I know intuitively that B is 
between A and C. But I do not “see” the relation of “between” 
in the sense in which I “see” the dots; though it would be quite 
in accordance with the usage to say that “I see that B is 
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between A and C”.74 
What he wants to show is that no one assumes that, even though “seeing” only the 
dots, that they are not in a “between” relation to each other which I can know directly 
and non-inferentially. So, someone using this argument against introspective 
knowledge of sensations is demanding something introspection can never fulfill. The 
relation of the two constituents of sensations is known to us directly and non-
inferentially, just as the relation “between”. He goes on that if we want to know 
further characteristics of the constituents, we have to inspect them. From this position 
however no conclusion can be drawn about the whole sensation. It seems, however, 
that we know about the structure of sensation when we introspect them.75 
The second argument Broad employs is that inspecting is not enough for 
introspection. For the sake of argument he assumes that it is really like the 
transparency theorist says: when we introspect our sensations there is nothing more 
presented to us than the object of that particular sensation. So there is no direct and 
non-inferential knowledge of something more. To show that this seems implausible, 
Broad asks us to distinguish between two constituents of an experience. The first 
element is sensed and available for selection. The second component, however, may 
only be sensed and is not available for inspection. If this is true, then introspection 
would only point to the object of the sensation, since it is the constituent which is 
inspected. Broad thinks that this is a mistake because the second constituent is still felt 
or sensed. This leads him to believe that we can know, with certainty, that what we are 
inspecting is not the whole sensation and this means that introspecting a sensation is 
more than inspecting the sensations object.76 
Almost as a response to Harman's proposal, Block introduces his famous and 
improved version of an inverted spectrum argument77. The argument is primarily 
intended to defend qualia realism and refute functionalism, but it also denies the 
intuition that one cannot introspect the intrinsic qualities of our experiences. 
According to Block, Harman's representationalism stipulates “[...] that in experience 
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we only are aware of properties of what is represented, not the vehicle of 
representation.”78 Block's first reaction is that this is simple false because Harman's 
view of introspection is wrong. To show this, he applies intuitions about the inverted 
spectrum. A second problem is that Harman does not distinguish between awareness 
and attention. Finally, a third issue is that Harman does not consider the possibility 
that there are phenomenal properties of our experiences that do not represent 
anything.79 
The first question is whether we can know something introspectively about the 
phenomenal properties of our experiences. Block thinks that Harman's argumentation 
is the wrong way around. The idea behind it is that we should agree that is better to 
“[e]licit simple intuitions about complex cases rather than complex intuitions about 
simple cases.”80 For Block, just looking at a red tomato and consequently answering 
the theoretical question of the existence of intrinsic qualities of experiences, on the 
basis of introspection alone, is not acceptable. He thinks that his version of the 
inverted spectrum argument clearly shows that intentional content and qualitative 
content are independent of each other and that this will settle the issue of “whether 
there are intrinsic mental features of our experience.”8182 
Block's second argument draws attention to the fact that Harman does not 
distinguish between awareness and attention. Harman claims that when we try to 
introspect our perceptual experience all we can attend to is the represented quality of 
the object in world. In the case of the red tomato – when introspecting the features of 
that experience – we can only attend to the redness of the tomato and not to the 
qualitative character of our experience. Block argues the following against this view: 
Harman relies on the diaphanousness of perception (Moore, 
1922), which may be defined as the claim that the effect of 
concentrating on experience is simply to attend to and be 
aware of what the experience is of. As a point about attention 
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in one familiar circumstance — e.g., looking at a red tomato, 
this is certainly right. The more one concentrates on the 
experience, the more one attends to the redness of the tomato 
itself. But attention and awareness are distinct, and as a point 
about awareness, the diaphanousness claim is both 
straightforwardly wrong and misleading. One can be aware of 
what one is not attending to. For example, one might be 
involved in intense conversation while a jackhammer outside 
causes one to raise one’s voice without ever noticing or 
attending to the noise until someone comments on it — at 
which time one realizes that one was aware of it all along. Or 
consider the familiar experience of noticing that the 
refrigerator compressor has gone off and that one was aware 
of it for some time, even though one didn’t attend to it until it 
stopped.83 
This means, according to Block, when Harman talks about attention he seems to 
propose an appropriate account. However, this picture does not tell us anything about 
awareness. According to Block, this is the mistake. 
The third and final issue concerns the problem of whether all phenomenal 
properties are representational. Block advocates for two possibilities. On the one 
hand, phenomenal properties represent – e.g. in the red tomato case. On the other 
hand, the same phenomenal properties do not represent anything – e.g. in the case of 
an orgasm. The former is known as mental paint and the latter as mental latex.84 This 
way of constructing representational features, is different from Harman's way. Block 
distinguishes the following three attributes of experiences: 
1. The intentional content of an experience. I am currently 
looking at a tomato and my experience represents the 
tomato as red. 
2. Mental properties of the experience that represent the 
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redness of the tomato. This is mental paint. According to me, 
the phenomenal character of the experience is such a 
mental property: it represents the tomato as red. According 
to me, one can have introspective access to this phenomenal 
character. Harman denies both claims. 
3. Mental properties of the experience that don't represent 
anything. This is mental latex. I don't know whether there 
are any such properties in the case of a normal experience of 
a red tomato, but I do claim that such properties are 
involved in orgasm-experience.85 
Block believes that we have introspective access to mental paint. Harman denies this 
on the basis of his representationalist account. Block tries to show what the 
consequences of this view are. Imagine a hallucination, where no intentional objects 
exist. A veridical perception of a red tomato and a hallucination of a red tomato have 
at least two commonalities. First, both are introspectable and second, both should 
refer to the intentional content. Block, however, thinks that this is not what the 
representationalist claims. In his view, Harman insists that we are aware of the 
intentional object and not the intentional content. In the light of this idea, it seems, 
however, difficult for Harman to explain his position. Even though Harman does not 
appeal to the intentional content, Block insists that if he were, he had to admit that 
introspection would lead to awareness of some mental properties.86 However, Block 
does not even agree with that view. He is a phenomenal realist and thinks that “[t]he 
conception according to which the content of experience is the same as the content of 
believe sounds even stranger when we think of what makes the two experiences 
experientially similar.”87 For him there is a difference between qualitative content and 
intentional content and that is what the inverted spectrum argument shows. Mental 
latex offers a story for possible experiences that do not attend to the intentional 
content. All they attend to is the qualitative content. 
Apart from Block's arguments, there is another convincing reason why, at least, 
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strong transparency is false. Those who argue in this line88 claim that the transparency 
theorist depends on a perceptual view of introspection. Transparency of experience, in 
the strong sense, depends on the assumption of a perceptual model of introspection 
from the start. To put it in Nida-Rümelin's words: 
[...] [an] analysis of various formulations of the transparency 
claim already suggest[s] that these claims follow from the 
undeniable phenomenological insights associated with the term 
'transparency' only under false presuppositions. […] [It is] quite 
plausible that these false presuppositions are somehow linked 
to the misleading perceptual model of phenomenal awareness 
and of phenomenological reflection.89 
The way the argument works is that it makes explicit how the transparency theorist is 
hiding this implicit assumption and tries to show, on these grounds, what is claimed. It 
can be cashed out in different ways. According to Nida-Rümelin, one way is “[...] to 
show that the criticized reasoning implicitly uses certain assumptions that (a) are 
natural if one's thought is guided by the bad metaphor I called the perceptual model or 
if the opponent is interpreted along the lines of that metaphor and that (b) these 
assumptions are not otherwise justified.”90 
Another way is to show that there is a mistake in steps. Stoljar argues that 
strong transparency claims the following steps in reasoning: 
Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic 
features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that 
the only features there to turn your attention to will be 
features of the presented tree. 
[...][to:] 
In introspection, one is or becomes aware of the intrinsic 
features of one's experience by attending to the objects and 
properties represented by that experience. 
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[...][to:] 
In introspection, one is not directly aware of the intrinsic 
features of one's experience.91 
This, however, can be doubted in two manners. Stoljar thinks that in general a qualia 
realist has to deny this reasoning and suggests the following to possibilities: a) analyze 
the direct awareness; or b) investigate the meaning of awareness.92 
Still today, the debate between proponent and opponent continues. It is a 
debate about whether phenomenal properties are something more than simple 
representational properties and therefore about the question if they form part of the 
representational content or not. If strong transparency is true, the consequence is that 
there is no privileged access to those phenomenal properties, meaning no epistemic 
special relation to them, or that there is a special relation to a bunch of different kinds 
of properties93. At this point, one should be able to see how transparency strongly 
influences the overall acquaintance relation to the phenomenal. One might think, like 
Moore, that there is not necessarily an incompatibility, but be suspicious about the 
access to consciousness94. Still, one can follow Broad, who believes that the essential 
relation to the whole of our experiences – via introspection – is more than only 
inspecting and therefore opens the door for some form of acquaintance. Even further, 
one can deny, like Harman, that we have privileged access to our phenomenal 
properties, whether or not acquaintance is true or not95. Also, one can ask, like Block, 
whether or not experiences always represent or whether there is a difference between 
awareness and attention. And finally, one can accuse the transparency theorist of 
assuming an implausible perceptual model of introspection. With this discussion in 
mind, I will now focus on acquaintance. 
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I.3.2. Acquaintance 
 
In analytic philosophy, acquaintance was famously endorsed by Bertrand 
Russell. In his book 'The problems of Philosophy'96, he distinguishes knowledge by 
acquaintance from knowledge by description. For Russell “[...] knowledge by 
acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically 
independent of knowledge of truths [...]”, whereas “[k]nowledge of things by 
description, on the contrary, always involves […] some knowledge of truths as its 
source and ground.”97 For Russell knowledge by acquaintance constitutes an infallible 
knowledge and allows for no margin of error. Following Fumerton's interpretation, 
“[k]nowledge by acquaintance […] involves a relation between a subject and some 
entity or feature of the world that is either a truth maker, or a constituent of a truth 
maker.”98 To clarify this idea Fumerton introduces the example of pain. One can have 
knowledge by acquaintance with the feeling of pain, but pain itself is neither true nor 
false. Fumerton writes: 
Knowledge of truths, in contrast to knowledge by acquaintance, 
is then characterized in such a way that it always involves the 
application of concepts. That, in turn, is sometimes supposed to 
introduce the possibility of error, a kind of error that 
knowledge by acquaintance cannot encounter because that 
knowledge does not involve characterizing or conceptualizing 
(describing) the objects with which we are acquainted.99 
Russell never provided an elaborated analysis of what knowledge by 
acquaintance is. However, he did give a characterization: 
We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which 
we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process 
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of inference or any knowledge of truths.100 
Not giving a detailed account is of course problematic, but at least Russell provides 
basic instructions on how his approach might work. According to Gertler, Russell claims 
that if you want “[t]o determine whether you are acquainted with an object […] you 
should consider whether you can doubt the object's existence. If you cannot, your 
awareness of the object is direct; you are therefore acquainted with the object.”101 At 
this point, one can already see that acquaintance is a somewhat hazy concept or 
explanation. It does not result in a 'deep inside' about the special epistemic relation, it 
rather gives a name to an intuition. 
The original scope of the Russellian theory of acquaintance is much broader 
than contemporary versions. Russell thinks that “[a]ll our knowledge, both knowledge 
of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation.”102 Apart 
from introspected or perceived sense-data103 or mind-dependent appearances, he 
considers memories of those appearances and maybe even the self as adequate 
candidates for knowledge by acquaintance. To those particular things Russell himself 
also adds universals. Nowadays, most contemporary philosophers think that the 
original scope is too broad. They would agree, however, that the best candidate is 
introspective self-knowledge about the phenomenal properties of one's conscious 
experiences.104 This is often called the unmediated observation or acquaintance model 
of introspective self-knowledge. Needless to say, that this model – and therefore the 
restricted account of acquaintance – is controversial. While Russell was concerned 
about the foundation of knowledge, contemporary proponents are rather engaged in 
showing that this kind of knowledge is direct. 
General attributes of acquaintance, however, imply the following claims: 
epistemological and metaphysical directness. In Gertler's view105 epistemological 
directness means that the resulting knowledge is non-inferential and depends for its 
justification solely on awareness. According to her, metaphysical directness refers to 
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the idea that there is no mediating state or process present when accessing the object 
of awareness. She concludes that three elements of Russell's approach are 
fundamental to any theory involving acquaintance. The first idea states that an 
introspective judgment is directly – in the metaphysical not simple causal sense – tied 
to its truthmaker. This means that an experience is somehow directly involved in the 
judgment's content. For Gertler, this implies the following:  
Any judgment that is directly tied to its truthmaker will be true. 
But this fact carries no immediate epistemic implications. After 
all, any judgment causally tied to its truthmaker will also be 
true, though such judgments sometimes fall short of 
knowledge.106 
This claim is about metaphysical directness only. There is yet no epistemic directness 
involved. 
According to Gertler, the second constituent claims epistemic directness. It 
states that some introspective judgments are justified simply by the subject's 
conscious state at the time of the judgment. This implies that an object is “[...] 
immediately present to consciousness, where such presence is an epistemic matter.”107 
This means that acquaintance depends epistemically only on criteria available in 
immediate consciousness. Gertler explains that this is the reason why knowledge by 
acquaintance usually targets mental objects and why external objects epistemically 
rely on criteria external to consciousness. 
The third and last element is about the epistemic security of knowledge by 
acquaintance. According to Gertler some introspective judgments have stronger 
justifications than empirical judgments. The reason is that empirical judgments are 
either not directly tied to their truthmakers or depend on criteria, external to the 
subject's conscious state at the time of the judgment. This means that any knowledge 
relying on the first two requirements – knowledge by acquaintance – is epistemically 
more secure than any other kind of knowledge. Defending this idea does not commit 
the acquaintance theorist to certainty; it only requires a special epistemic status. 
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Acquaintance is often seen as ambitious epistemic thesis and therefore 
rejected by numerous philosophers. One main criticism is based on the non-
analyzability of acquaintance. The argument was most famously defended by Wilfrid 
Sellars108. Sellars argues that the so called “given” is a myth ('The myth of the given'). 
This also includes foundationalist views about knowledge like Russell's theory of 
acquaintance. The basic problem, according to Sellars, is that classical foundationalist 
knowledge is based on “non-inferential knowledge of facts”109. What is sensed 
however are particulars. This leads Sellars to conclude the following: 
For what is known even in non-inferential knowledge is, is facts 
rather than particulars, items of the form something's being 
thus-and-so or something's standing in a certain relation to 
something else. It would seem, then, that the sensing of sense 
contents cannot constitute knowledge, inferential or non-
inferential;110 
This basically means that imagining some fundamental relation or acquaintance with 
facts or particulars, will not lead to knowledge of truths.  
According to Ali & Fumerton the more general problem for the acquaintance 
relation is that in more sophisticated views “[...] acquaintance is only a constituent of 
the ground of propositional knowledge.”111 As a consequence, this idea is, in those 
theories, not analyzable but simple and not definable.112 Therefore, “[...] acquaintance 
is not by itself an epistemic relation.”113 Since a definition of acquaintance is not 
possible, one can at least try to characterize it. Fumerton's attempt is based on an 
example about pain. Imagine you are in pain and have a conversation with someone. 
This conversation is so interesting that you forget that you are in pain. And when the 
conversation is over you realize you return to feeling you are in pain. There are two 
possible interpretations. One is that the pain stopped during the conversation and 
returned afterwards. The other is that the pain was always there but you were not 
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aware of it. Assuming that the latter is true, awareness constitutes the relation to 
pain.114 Therefore, the acquaintance theorist will“[...] argue that analysis requires 
conceptual “atoms” - simple ideas out of which other ideas are built.”115 This strategy, 
even though highly controversial, may lead to a solution. The solution however 
depends on whether or not one thinks that she understands acquaintance in the first 
place. 
The second famous criticism is the so called 'problem of the speckled hen'. It 
was first suggested by Gilbert Ryle to A. J. Ayer.116 It was later discussed in detail by 
Roderick Chisholm117. The problem can be stated as follows: one is presented with an 
appearance118 of a speckled hen, a hen with 48 speckles. Supposedly that person is 
acquainted with the appearance. The question is whether one is justified in judging 
that the appearance contains 48 speckles rather than 47 speckles. If direct 
acquaintance with the truthmaker cannot provide sufficient non-inferential 
justification for one's believe, Russell's theory might be at stake. Ayer already 
anticipated an answer. His solution was that when we sense a certain appearance, 
“[...] then, if the sense-data [appearance] do not appear to be enumerable, they really 
are not enumerable.”119 According to Chisholm however, this solution is flawed. 
Chisholm thinks that Ayer's proposal has two interpretations. He says: 
First, we might interpret him to mean the law of excluded 
middle does not apply to the given, e.g., that it is neither true 
nor false to say that the datum has forty-eight speckles. […] 
[Second] [h]e may be intending to say that, although the datum 
does not comprise many speckles, there is no definite number 
of them; and further that, although there are assuredly more 
than three, four, or five, there is no answer to the question, 
how many more.120 
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The first interpretation is quite problematic. The reason is that this might be true for 
48 speckles but not for two or three, and the solution therefore seems ad hoc. The 
second interpretation basically states that it is not true or false that the appearance 
has 48 speckles; it claims that it is false. Chisholm proposes therefore the following 
similar solution: 
It is well known that indistinguishability, as applied to sense-
data, is a non-transitive relation. That is to say, it is possible to 
find three sense-data such that, with respect, say, to hue, the 
first is indistinguishable from the second, and the second from 
the third, while the first can be distinguished from the third.121 
He further suggests that by thinking about identity, we usually assume a transitive 
relation. Chisholm concludes that “[...] in order to know that A and B are identical with 
respect to hue, it is not sufficient to know that they are indistinguishable (or match) 
with respect to hue.”122 Saying that A and B are identical means, for Chisholm, that C123  
must be excluded, since a basic judgment is not due to the fact that it involves more 
than the compared two data. His solution for the 'problem of the speckled hen' 
therefore suggests that “[...] the possibility that the proposition, which expresses one's 
estimate of the number of speckles, is not epistemologically basic, but, like judgments 
of qualitative identity, refers beyond the given presentation.”124 The idea behind this 
solution is that basic propositions are imprecise. This is the classical answer to the 
most popular conclusion of the argument. This so-called argument from 
Indeterminacy125 is traditionally connected to the existence of sense-data. The 
foundationalist can, according to Fumerton, easily avoid the problem of the speckled 
hen. He writes: 
If sensation, like belief, really were a kind of intentional state 
then I'm not sure how the problem of the speckled hen even 
arises for the foundationalist who claims noninferential 
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knowledge of appearance grounded in acquaintance with that 
appearance.126 
The reason behind it is that one can believe that the hen has many speckles without 
believing that it contains a determinate number of speckles. 
In a newer version of the argument, Sosa127 evaluates the speckled hen 
independently of sense-data. He characterizes the foundationalist approach – via 
acquaintance – as a problem of awareness. Recall, knowledge by acquaintance means 
that when we are acquainted with something we are directly aware of it. Sosa points 
out that there are two different kinds of awareness. The first kind is a sort of noticing 
awareness, characterized by believing something about a present object or fact. The 
second kind is experiential awareness. In this case, one becomes aware of an 
experience simply by undergoing it.128 He thinks that the distinction between noticing, 
or n-awareness, and experiencing, or e-awareness, makes an important difference for 
the foundationalist view of knowledge. He writes: 
From the fact that one is e-aware of something it does not 
follow that one is n-aware of it. To notice a fact about one's 
experience at a given time is to belief correctly that is so, but 
just a guess will not do: the correct belief must also be at a 
minimum justified, or reasonable, or epistemically appropriate, 
or some such thing.129 
As we have seen, acquaintance theorists appeal to direct awareness of things 
and n-awareness cannot explain this directness. According to Sosa, “[...] the concept of 
“noticing” is itself epistemic in a way that unsuits it for explanatory work that it is 
asked to do.”130 Directness requires a non-inferential, foundational explanation 
because its role is to ground the epistemic status of certain believes. The only way this 
can be done is to rely on e-awareness. At this point, the 'problem of the speckled hen' 
arises because there seems to be a gap between e-awareness and n-awareness. Since 
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the character of an experience is not always noticed or might even be characterized 
falsely, the question is how one is able to decide whether the experience contains 48 
speckles rather than 47. According to Sosa, the foundationalist needs to spell out “[...] 
which sorts of features of our states of consciousness are the effective ones, the ones 
by corresponding to which specifically do our basic beliefs acquire epistemically 
foundational status.”131 48 speckles do not seem to be a good candidate, three on the 
other hand might. Sosa continues to claim that, as a foundationalist, one might think 
that the 'given' are indexical concepts and phenomenal concepts. Indexical concepts 
are very basic concepts which can be described as “[o]ne's believing that this is 
thus.”132 Such a concept however is not sufficient for having a perceptual concept. The 
prior lacks the recognitional aspect. That is where phenomenal concepts come into 
play. They are characterized as some sort of “[...] sensitivity, when appropriately 
situated, to the presence or absence of the feature.”133 According to Sosa, these 
'thicker' perceptual and the thin indexical concepts have a certain reliability 
guaranteed since they hardly depend on flawed application conditions. He thinks that 
problems only arise when moving beyond these concepts. Applying simple geometric 
and arithmetical (SGA) concepts for example, one can already easily be mistaken. Sosa 
describes the problem as follows: 
Classical foundationalists need some such beliefs with 
arithmetical and geometrical content, since from purely 
indexical or phenomenal concepts very little could be inferred, 
even allowing some explanatory induction from the given to 
the external.134 
How then, based on a sensory experience, does one explain the outside world? Sosa 
thinks that the foundationalist cannot provide us with an answer. Since acquaintance 
with conscious experiences, by itself, fails, one needs to appeal “to some causal or 
counterfactual connection between the character of the experience and the 
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propositional content of the judgment.”135 
The acquaintance theorist is however left with options. One solution she can 
exploit is, according to Poston, that Sosa's argument assumes the correspondence 
between the experience of an object and the related belief in consciousness. Following 
Bonjour's reply to Sosa136, Poston thinks that “[t]he subject lacks […] an initial 
acquaintance with the correspondence between the belief and the experience.”137 
Even if true, it is however difficult, for the foundationalist, not to defend this 
correspondence – both, Fumerton and Bonjour seem to think so. 
Another way of defusing Sosa's worry is to follow two arguments due to 
Feldman. The first is to focus on the distinction between two types of concepts. Sosa 
assumes that there are indexical and phenomenal concepts, even though some do not. 
Feldman138 however insists that exactly the difference in concept explains why most 
people are not able to distinguish 48-speckles from 47-speckles. The key is the 
phenomenal concept. In general Feldman follows Sosa thoughts about phenomenal 
concepts. According to Fumerton, Feldman's characterization of a phenomenal 
concept is the following:  
[A phenomenal concept] [...] allows one to categorize an 
experience as being of a certain kind, where the justified 
application of the concept involves nothing other than one's 
awareness of the relevant phenomenal character of the 
experience.139 
To answer Sosa's problem about the difference between 3-speckles 
experiences as foundationally grounded and 48-speckles as not, Feldman employs a 
distinction made by Sosa himself. Both think that having a phenomenal concept of a 
certain property means that one is sensitive to the presence or absence of that 
property. Feldman, on the contrary to Sosa, however concludes that, even if true, 
knowledge about that property is not implied. The idea behind it is that some sort of 
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sensitivity does not necessarily mount to knowledge of a certain property. That means 
one can lack the phenomenal concept of forty-eight or the phenomenal concept of 
being speckled. 
Feldman thinks that since phenomenal concepts are primitive, not a lot follows. 
For us there is no difference between forty-eight speckled images and forty-nine 
speckled images. When we believe that we experience a 48-speckled image, Feldman 
argues, we employ a different kind of 48-speckled concept. This kind of concept is 
what Sosa calls the SGA concept. This is “[...] the complex concept constructed out of 
the simpler concepts of “forty-eight” and “being speckled”.”140 The case of three-
speckles is similar. Feldman thinks that there is a distinction between a primitive 
phenomenal concept and the complex SGA concept, in this situation however we can 
grasp both concepts. Based on this concept distinction Feldman argues that 
foundational justification is restricted to indexical and phenomenal concepts only. The 
foundationalist therefore does not have to argue for foundationally justified SGA 
concepts as well. 
Feldman's second argument refers to Sosa's distinction between e-awareness 
and n-awareness. According to Sosa, e-awareness is something passive. It is only 
concerned with the presence of certain properties of one's experience. N-awareness 
on the other hand, “[...] involves justified true beliefs about their presence.”141 
Feldman thinks however that this may not be true. In a story about the red light of his 
telephone, he states that when somebody calls and nobody attends, a right light blinks 
on the side of the telephone. Since this state of the art telephone system does not 
always lead to the ringing of the phone, and Feldman is sometimes working hard, he 
will only notice142 the red light at some later point in time. However, he realizes that 
he is aware of the light in a way in periphery of his visual field, but does not notice it at 
the time. That means, he was only peripherally aware of the red quality and therefore 
did not notice it.143 Feldman concludes that Sosa overlooked a different kind of 
experience. He characterizes it as follows:  
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[...] [It is] something that involves more than mere experiential 
awareness but less than, or at any rate different from, noticing 
as he's described it. We can attend to features of experience. 
We can focus on them.144 
 This form of attending to properties of experience is different from Sosa's n-
awareness. A belief about a quality can also be caused because someone points out 
the quality. But usually one attends to the quality and this causes the belief. According 
to Feldman this Form of attention is not intentional, but spontaneous. The 
foundationalist is now in a position to argue that if one cannot attend to the 
phenomenal properties, one cannot form the corresponding phenomenal concepts. 
So, if one cannot generate the phenomenal concept of being forty-eight-speckled, one 
cannot attend to this property of one's experience. Feldman concludes, therefore, that 
there are properties present in e-awareness that are not epistemically relevant. We, 
however, only attend to the epistemically relevant properties.145 
A further argument against the 'problem of the speckled hen' is given by 
Fumerton. It suggests that there is a distinction in the nature of properties. Fumerton 
suggests: 
[...] [W]e can make a distinction between perfectly determinate 
properties and the many determinable properties that 
supervene upon those determinate properties.146 
For clarification he refers to a color example. A bright shade of cherry red can be 
described as cherry red, red, dark-colored and colored. In an important sense, 'the 
nature of properties' is phenomenological.147 Fumerton therefore concludes: 
On the sense-datum theory, we are directly acquainted with 
the datum's exemplifying the property of being many speckled. 
On the appearing theory, we are directly acquainted with our 
being appeared to many-speckled-ly. We are not, however, 
directly acquainted with the datum's containing exactly 48 
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speckles, nor are we acquainted with our being appeared to 48-
speckled-ly. It is not that the more determinate properties 
aren't exemplified – it's just that we are not directly aware of 
them.148 
He thinks this is due to evolution. It seems advantageous to be able to keep a certain 
level of generality and escape a world of hyper fine grained property exemplification. 
Apart from these classical solutions to the 'problem of the speckled hen', there 
are other conclusions to be drawn from the argument. A short overview, according to 
Fantl and Howell149, includes imaging alteration, eliminativism and introspective 
fallibilism. Imaging alteration states the following: 
Images are not stable and they can change in subtle ways. Thus, 
the image one contemplates upon closing one’s eyes and 
introspecting may not be the same one as when one is 
confronted with the picture of the hen. What’s more, the image 
might change as one is counting the phenomenal spots.150 
This view was defended, for example by Franck Jackson151. 
Eliminativism advocates for the following picture: 
There is nothing there to be introspected. If there were an 
image in one’s head, that image must have a determinate 
number of phenomenal spots, and given the strong epistemic 
access associated with such images, one must be able to have a 
highly justified belief about the image. One cannot have such a 
justified belief because of the accidental nature of any correct 
belief about the hen, so there must not be such images.152 
This is a fairly radical option which e.g. Armstrong153 defended. 
Introspective Fallibilism claims that “[t]here is a spotted hen image, with a 
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determinate number of spots, but epistemic access to one’s images is not so strong as 
to guarantee an accurate report with respect to all facets of the image.”154 This is the 
view Fantl and Howell prefer. Gertler picks up the argument and follows the 
conclusion. She thinks that the speckled hen argument does not have to concern 
knowledge by acquaintance, “[...] since the acquaintance theorist (a proponent of the 
acquaintance approach) need not claim that every experience is introspectible […].”155 
The 'problem of the speckled hen' is a challenging argument against 
foundationalist epistemology and cannot be defused so easily. In philosophy of mind, 
acquaintance theorists do not necessarily try to lay the foundations for knowledge in 
general, their approaches are usually weaker. Since the problem concerns primarily 
appearances or sense-data, implications for phenomenal properties are manageable 
but not deniable. A strong transparency theorist might invoke the argument. For her, 
phenomenal properties are nothing other than representational properties. They form 
part of the experience's representational content. Since one might not be able to 
distinguish whether the experience represents 48 or 49 speckles, one also might be 
wrong about its phenomenal properties and therefore does not possess knowledge by 
acquaintance. 
This, however, is not entirely true. It depends on how one interprets knowledge 
by acquaintance. As mentioned above, Russell believes that knowledge by 
acquaintance is essentially simpler than knowledge by description and, on the contrary 
to it, logically independent of knowledge of truths. Whether or not Russell's test156 is 
sufficient prove for the existence of this relation is questionable, but for him, 
acquaintance is the foundation for knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. 
Following this interpretation, the transparency theorist should deny acquaintance and 
claim that the 'problem of the speckled hen' succeeds. 
One can certainly interpret the situation differently. Assuming that 
acquaintance is not the foundation for knowledge in general, but just another type of 
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knowledge157, the strong transparency theorist does not have to deny the existence of 
acquaintance.158 Even in this theory, acquaintance is in big part the motivation for the 
experience thesis (6) above. What is denied is that acquaintance is the foundation for 
all knowledge. For propositional knowledge, according to this interpretation, it is 
sufficient to have a description of the relevant experience. To know something in a 
direct sense or by acquaintance, one needs a type of familiarity, that is to say, one 
needs to undergo that experience and be directly aware of it.159 The strong 
transparency theorist however claims that knowledge by acquaintance does not affect 
propositional knowledge. Only propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts and 
truths, therefore acquaintance, also existing, does not add anything essential. 
Both moves force the acquaintance theorist to an answer. To block the success 
of the first move, the best thing she can do – as seen above – is to deny the overall 
representational character of phenomenal properties.160 To block the second, she may 
insist that to form propositional knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance is already 
required.161 
For Gertler162, there are a variety of further challenges to the acquaintance 
approach of self-knowledge. She argues that one first argument against this approach 
follows directly from the perceptual account of introspection or the inner sense model. 
The basic idea of this model is that introspection works essentially like perception. This 
means that the relation between the scanning state and the scanned state is causal 
and contingent.163 
Another problem, according to Gertler, is that the acquaintance intuition might 
be wrong. Schwitzgebel, for example, argues that how we form knowledge about our 
experiences depends to a large extend on considerations about the world.164 
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A third objection insists that even if introspective self-knowledge is especially 
epistemically secure, conscious states do not provide sufficient justification for self-
knowledge. According to Gertler especially defenders of epistemic externalism claim 
that part of “[...] justification or warrant […] consist in certain regularities.”165 
Conscious states do not consist in such regularities and therefore acquaintance “[...] 
implies that justification does not always consist in such regularities.”166 Acquaintance 
theorists rather rely on the idea that dispositional properties of the subject are not 
necessary to justify self-knowledge. This, however, seems to undermine the fact that 
phenomenal concepts partly depend on recognitional dispositions.167 
A last objection, according to Gertler, is the anti-physicalist concern many 
opponents raise. Physicalists should therefore not engage in introspective self-
knowledge by acquaintance.168 Anti-physicalist philosophers, however, defend that 
knowledge by acquaintance is the accurate approach for knowing one's own 
phenomenal properties.169 
 
I.4. Knowledge of phenomenal properties: acquaintance and transparency 
 
As stated so far, phenomenal properties are often considered to be the best 
candidate for privileged access. This is due to intuitions we have about those 
properties. Apart from intuitions about enabling conditions and other characteristics, 
the two determinable factors are the transparency thesis and the acquaintance thesis. 
The former intuition has great influence on the composition of an experience and 
therefore on the constitution of its phenomenal properties. The latter specifies the 
special epistemic and metaphysical directness relation we have with those properties. 
By having a closer look at both theses, it became clearer, what they try to explain and 
where the problems lie. So far, however, I have not been specific enough how this 
influences our knowledge of phenomenal properties. To start this quest, it seems to be 
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reasonable to investigate what acquaintance accomplishes to explain about the 
knowledge we obtain from the phenomenal and if the results are compatible with the 
transparency intuition. 
Now, we have seen that whether or not the 'problem of the speckled hen' even 
concerns the acquaintance relation with phenomenal properties depends on certain 
considerations. The consequences, even if the argument can be applied, are 
manageable. It seems therefore that in this case the acquaintance theorist does not 
have to fear the issue raised. There are however the remaining worries to consider. Is 
introspection essentially like perception? Does knowledge about phenomenal 
properties depend to a large extend on considerations about the outside world? Do 
conscious states provide sufficient justification for self-knowledge? And, does 
acquaintance lead to anti-physicalism? 
We can argue back and forth whether we should prefer introspection to be like 
perception or even, whether the strong transparency model170 is true or not. Most 
theories that do not rely on acquaintance cannot explain the intuition of an 
epistemically substantial privileged access. I believe in the privileged access to the 
phenomenal and acquaintance provides the best explanation so far. 
Also, I agree that considerations about the outside world play an important 
role, especially when we entertain perceptual experiences. I however think that their 
importance lies in considerations about the objects and context of experience, not the 
nature of their phenomenology. Especially regarding personal feelings, like love, it 
seems implausible that the outside world tells me something about its phenomenal 
constitution. 
Further, I think that it is true that conscious states do not justify, with epistemic 
certainty, recognitional phenomenal concepts171. However, phenomenal concepts do 
not have to be construed as recognitional concepts; they can also consist in e.g. 
demonstrative concepts172. In the latter case, conscious states clearly can justify 
knowledge with certainty. The reason is that justification here is not based on 
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regularities, but rather on the particular, phenomenal conscious fact. 
The real problem for the acquaintance theorist, I believe, lies in the 
compatibility with physicalism. Levine, while introducing his materialist constraint, 
writes the following: 
[...] Materialist Constraint: […] no appeal [can] be made in the 
explanation to any mental property or relation that is basic. […]  
Acquaintance itself is not given a materialist explanation, but 
appealing to it, let us say, removes the mystery of the gap with 
respect to phenomenal properties. […] [However,] it does the 
materialist no good to explain away the gap by violating her 
own doctrine – that is, by admitting into her ontology a mental 
relation that is basic. Thus, in our examination of the various 
proposals, it will be crucial to note that violation of the 
Materialist Constraint immediately disqualifies a proposal 
because it ceases to be a materialist explanation of the gap.173 
The Materialist Constraint basically states that theories can only count as a form of 
physicalism if they do not entail primitive mental properties or relations. Acquaintance 
is represented by the latter. According to Levine, the acquaintance theorist does not 
necessarily violate the idea that phenomenal properties are physical, but she claims a 
relation that is basic and cannot be reduced to physical relations.174 Even though 
Levine expresses doubts about such a possibility, I think he raises a fundamental 
problem. The issue seems to be related similar ideas. As seen above, Sellars is 
convinced that an acquaintance relation cannot lead to knowledge of truths.175 Ali & 
Fumerton state that acquaintance may only be one component of justification for 
propositional knowledge. Such a relation is not analyzable and has to be taken as 
simple.176 Fumerton concludes, therefore, that the acquaintance relation by itself may 
not be an epistemic feature.177 
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Now, assuming that acquaintance is an epistemic feature and acquaintance 
leads to knowledge, where does this fundamental criticism come from? I think the 
answer can be found in intuition itself. In the list of epistemic features related to 
phenomenal properties we find the following: 
2) Asymmetric epistemology: phenomenal knowledge is direct, while 
knowledge about the world is mediated. 
3) Infallibility or incorrigibility: Our knowledge about our phenomenal 
properties cannot be false and no one else can correct us. 
This is more or less the intuition that we have privileged access to our phenomenal 
properties. Epistemology however does not work that way, and an intuition is not 
enough. There needs to be an explanation, especially when one is convinced that in a 
particular case knowledge is epistemic secure or certain. At first glance, acquaintance 
seems to ground 2) and 3) smoothly by claiming: 
1) Acquaintance: knowledge about phenomenal properties is not 
merely inferential, it is direct and unmediated. 
So, acquaintance explains this kind of knowledge by claiming an epistemic 
relation that secures privileged knowledge. However, this relation is absolutely 
mysterious. In the case of phenomenal properties, it is, as Levine thinks, a primitive 
relation and it seems to me ad hoc at best. Furthermore, unless one believes that it is 
the bases of all knowledge, just as Russell intended, it is difficult to see when exactly 
this special relation appears. We can only follow Russell's guideline: if one cannot 
doubt the existence of an object, one is directly aware of the object, and therefore 
acquainted with it. There is, however, little agreement on what can be doubted and 
what not in the history of philosophy alone178. We might want to ask for something 
more tangible, therefore. 
As I pointed out in the previous paragraph, simple presenting acquaintance to 
maintain the intuition that we have privileged knowledge of our phenomenal 
properties seems mysterious and incompatible with physicalism. What options does 
the acquaintance theorist have? Let us leave compatibility with physicalism aside for a 
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moment. I will get back to the issue, after explaining what move is left open to the 
acquaintance theorist to enlighten this profoundly basic and mysterious relation. 
Without discussing a special thesis, the key element contemporary acquaintance 
theorists defend is that in some judgments about current, conscious experiences, 
phenomenal reality overlaps with the apprehension of this reality.179 
The important question concerns when exactly this is the case. To achieve this 
task, one needs conditions that instantiate the acquaintance relation. Those 
conditions, according to Gertler, are the following: 
Acquaintance Approach: Some introspective knowledge consists 
in judgments that 
1. are directly tied to their truthmakers; 
2. depend, for their justification, only on the subject’s conscious 
states at the time of the judgment; and 
3. are more strongly justified than any empirical judgments that 
do not meet conditions (1) and (2).180 
To meet condition 1) and tie the judgment directly to its truthmaker, the acquaintance 
theorist has to limit the scope of knowledge about phenomenal properties. This is due 
to considerations about epistemic and phenomenal appearances. Since, according to 
one argument181, introspective judgments are not about phenomenal, but epistemic 
appearances those judgments are not tied directly to their truthmakers. Gertler thinks 
that, while this might be true, the acquaintance theorist has to maintain that in some 
circumstances both forms of appearances converge. Also, according to this 
argument182, one has to keep in mind that background knowledge can alter epistemic 
appearances. Therefore the acquaintance theorist has to be even more careful about 
claims of convergence. A key issue for knowledge by acquaintance, according to 
Gertler, is to secure this convergence. 
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Gertler describes a practical strategy that achieves its success “[b]y adopting a 
scrupulously cautious doxastic attitude towards one’s own experiences [...]”183 To make 
the two appearances converge both appearances, one restricts the epistemic 
appearances so much that they are entirely depending on the phenomenal reality. This 
leads to the result asked for by the acquaintance theorist. On the one hand, those 
appearances shape how objects seem to a subject. On the other hand, since they are 
directly determined by phenomenal reality, they are directly tied to their truthmaker. 
Concerning conditions 2) and 3) about the justification of those epistemically 
special judgments, Gertler proposes that 2) can be justified in two ways. In a 
demanding reading184 of acquaintance, higher-order awareness solves the problem. 
The solution presupposes that “one must be aware that the experience (of which one is 
aware) bears the truthmaking relation to the judgment (of which one is also aware).”185 
Further, one needs to have higher-order awareness of the first-order awareness to 
justify the acquaintance relation in the first place. On a less demanding reading186 
however, the second step does not apply. It is enough to argue that solely conscious 
awareness of an experience is appropriate to justify knowledge by acquaintance of a 
phenomenal property. 
The demanding reading of acquaintance already includes more than condition 
3) requires. Gertler argues therefore for a less demanding way. She spells out the 
presuppositions involved to meet condition 3) the following manner: 
 The judgment’s justification is immune from certain 
defeaters to which the justification for empirical judgments 
that do not meet (1) and (2) is vulnerable; and 
 The judgment’s justification is not vulnerable to any 
defeaters from which the justification for empirical 
judgments that do not meet (1) and (2) is immune.187 
This basically means that knowledge by acquaintance is immune to defeaters about the 
                                                          
183
 Gertler 2012a, p. 110. 
184
 See e.g. Bonjour & Sosa 2003. 
185
 Gertler 2012a, p. 113.  
186
 See e.g. Feldman 2006. 
187
 Gertler 2012a, p. 114. 
 
49 
 
causation of the experience. Whether or not a mad scientist caused a sensation has no 
impact on the knowledge about the phenomenal properties of that experience. In the 
case of perceptual knowledge however, the causal relation – whether or not a mad 
scientist caused a sensation – can defeat the justification. The justification of 
judgments obtained by acquaintance is therefore stronger than in perceptual cases. 
Now, it is entirely unclear to me how this strategy is supposed to dissolve the 
claim that acquaintance seems mysterious. Gertler states that usually the line of attack 
against acquaintance with phenomenal properties is to deny the core thesis in this 
form. Leaving aside arguments that suppose that acquaintance conducts to the 
impossibility of communicating phenomenal concepts188, one problem for the theory is 
that it leads only to insubstantial demonstrative reference. This means, direct 
demonstrative judgments about the phenomenal reality do not represent any 
substantial epistemic grasp of this reality.189 According to Gertler, this stems from a 
special view about phenomenal concepts. As explained above, this view maintains that 
we need to have recognitional dispositions190 to apply the concept. I, on the one hand, 
maintain that this argument is already on shaky grounds since our intuitions about 
phenomenal properties tell us that they are extremely fine-grained. Gertler, on the 
other hand, argues the following: 
[…] the acquaintance theorist can do justice to the intuition 
that one who possesses a phenomenal concept (who grasps a 
phenomenal property) will have certain dispositions, while 
maintaining that this grasp consists in conscious states. For she 
can claim that conscious states explain these dispositions. (One 
way to do this is to say that a pain grounds the disposition to 
recognize pains; that is, the conscious state is the categorical 
basis of this disposition).191 
This however does not solve the problem for the acquaintance theorist, namely that 
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this relation is amazingly mysterious. On my view, one should analyze what is said in 
conditions 1-3). Again, one has to keep in mind why we allegedly need acquaintance: it 
is because of the intuition that we have privileged access to our phenomenal 
properties, and that needs explanation. 
Condition 1) states that judgments about our phenomenal properties are 
directly tied to their truthmaker. The strategy to accomplish this however, is just as 
obscure as the one introduced by Russell himself. In a practical manner, by 
entertaining a scrupulously cautious doxastic attitude, one is supposed to obtain the 
proclaimed result, namely converging phenomenal and epistemic appearances. In the 
end of this process, the epistemic appearances are solely depending on the 
phenomenal reality, therefore assuring the direct relation to that reality. Even though 
noble in thought, it seems very doubtful how this can be of help to accommodate the 
condition. Being as careful as one may be, how does one know that she fully 
converged both appearances? Or, to state it differently, how does someone know in 
practice – and theory – that such a convergence is possible? Unless the directness 
condition is already assumed, one does not undertake the practical task to converge 
the two appearances. This act, based on a scrupulously cautious doxastic attitude, is 
supposed to show that the directness condition can be met. We do not have to go so 
far and assume some form of circularity here, but we cannot call that an explanation 
either. To be perfectly clear, I think that what happens is the following. We have the 
intuition that we have privileged access to our phenomenal properties, so we claim an 
asymmetric epistemology with a directness relation to those properties. This 
directness relation we call acquaintance. To achieve knowledge by acquaintance we 
claim one of the above stated strategies. So, we come from intuitions about our 
ongoing phenomenology, claim acquaintance and practically investigate our 
phenomenology to show that what we said from the start is true and explained. I think 
that true or not in this case, is nothing more than the choice to believe one's own 
intuition. The acquaintance explanation is nothing more than restating that intuition. 
Therefore, it seems to me that acquaintance cannot explain the intuited privileged 
access. 
This is, however, not enough to show that acquaintance is not true. By itself, 
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condition 1) is somehow just a restatement of our intuition of an asymmetric 
epistemology. Now, if conditions 2) and 3) can justify this intuition then maybe 
acquaintance is saved after all. I, however, do not find this to be a promising endeavor. 
Let me start with condition 3). I think that there is no problem with this statement. All 
it says is that if some kind of knowledge is special, then it is better justified than any 
empirical knowledge. In my opinion, this means, if there is privileged self-knowledge 
which meets condition a,b,c, etc., then it also has some superior form of justification, 
i.e. it does not fall prey to the same defeaters as our empirical knowledge. Again, this 
seems nothing more than restating our intuition. Privileged access does not only 
depend on the direct access intuition, but also on the intuition of epistemic security or 
certainty. Condition 3) therefore only reclaims some form of justification that we ask 
from the beginning. Condition 2) therefore seems the most promising candidate to 
demystify the acquaintance relation. Before exploring this possibility, let me get back 
to condition 1) for a moment. As we will see this is important for the discussion of 
condition 2). 
As I have argued so far, condition 1) and 3) are only restating intuitions about 
phenomenal epistemology. This is especially true for 3). In the very beginning of the 
first section, privileged access to some mental state was defined as being (a) 
epistemically secure/certain; and (b) employing a special method.192 Condition 3) 
therefore corresponds clearly to (a). It might weaken the original statement by 
claiming only stronger justification, but that does not change the underlying intention. 
Now, condition 1) however does not directly correspond to (b). While (b) states that 
there is a unique method, namely introspection, 1) claims that to obtain introspective 
knowledge, the involved judgments are directly tied to their truthmaker. So 1) seems 
to be an explanation for (b) after all and therefore the acquaintance relation for 
introspection as a unique method. But is this really what happens? According to the 
argument above, the directness condition, or acquaintance, explains why introspection 
is epistemologically special. To obtain this direct tie to the truthmaker, however, we 
use an introspective scrupulously cautious doxastic attitude. We do not have to go so 
far to claim a vicious circle, but we cannot call this an explanation either. To state the 
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acquaintance relation as an explanation – and not a mystery – for the privileged access 
the acquaintance theorist, I think, can therefore drop her suspicious practical 
investigation to converge phenomenal and epistemic appearance. To maintain this 
convergence – and therefore the direct tie of the introspective judgment to its 
truthmaker – she has to find a solution which grounds the acquaintance relation in a 
different way. 
A possible solution might be included in condition 2). In Gertler's interpretation, 
this requirement has only justificational purposes for introspective judgments. I think 
however that it is the acquaintance theorist's best option to explain the acquaintance 
relation. The condition states that the justification of privileged introspective 
knowledge depends only on the subject's conscious state. This means, if I form a 
judgment about an ongoing red experience for example, for that judgment to count as 
privileged introspective knowledge, it will depend only on the current red experience 
in itself for justification. In part, the condition is used to setup the epistemically better 
justification in condition 3). It draws its power from the special epistemic situation that 
one can justify an introspective judgment only by the current conscious experience. 
Assuming the weaker interpretation of acquaintance, the reason is that only conscious 
experiences are appropriate to fulfill this task. In my opinion, there are basically two 
main lines193 that one could follow to explain how conscious experiences manage that 
function. One line is to follow strong transparency. Since we are talking about 
knowledge of phenomenal properties, this ontology suggests that they form part of 
the experience's representational content. In this case, conscious experience justifies a 
judgment via its representational content. This is to say that the introspective 
phenomenal judgment about an ongoing red experience depends on the experience's 
representational content red. Since the representational content however depends 
entirely on the experience's object, the phenomenal judgment does as well. Even 
though this is a viable theory, the acquaintance theorist should resist it. The problem is 
that phenomenal judgments according to this view may depend solely on current 
conscious experiences, while the phenomenal properties of those experiences 
however depend on the experience's objects. So, justification of those judgments also 
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depends on the experience's object. According to many proponents194 of strong 
transparency the qualities or properties of those objects are representational in 
character and therefore determined externally. 
A second possibility for the acquaintance theorist is to deny strong 
transparency and insist that this is not the right kind of ontology. In this case, 
phenomenal properties do not simply form part of the representational content of 
experiences.195 Without discussing possible ontologies196 in detail, acquaintance, here, 
will only depend on phenomenal properties or phenomenal reality. Since the 
phenomenal properties have independent ontological status, judgments about those 
properties will only depend on them. I think at this point, another important door has 
opened for the acquaintance theorist. It seems to me that one can avoid the dubious 
strategies for condition 1). If one can argue – via the weaker interpretation of 
acquaintance – that only conscious experiences are capable to justify judgments about 
phenomenal properties, one should also be able to argue that, because of their 
ontological status, phenomenal properties of experiences – as truthmaker – are tied 
directly to those judgments. This seems to me an appropriate and elegant solution for 
the acquaintance theorist. First, the acquaintance relation seems no longer be 
mysterious and second, all that is needed to explain this epistemic specialness are 
conscious experiences. Therefore, condition 2) may solve acquaintance as a substantial 
and appropriate explanation. 
Such a view however comes with a trade-off. Until now, I left acquaintance's 
compatibility problem with physicalism aside, only to bring it back with greater force. 
To explain the epistemic special acquaintance relation, it seems that one is tied to an 
ontological status for phenomenal properties. They have to be basic properties in the 
Levineian sense. So, either acquaintance is mysterious and basic, or it depends on 
mysterious and basic phenomenal properties. To see the problem, let us remember 
Levine's Material Constraint again: “[…] no appeal [can] be made in the explanation to 
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any mental property or relation that is basic.”197 Unless, the acquaintance theorist can 
demystify both – the acquaintance relation and phenomenal properties – she always 
runs into a problem with physicalism. It is my opinion that, without an answer to this 
issue, acquaintance cannot be seen as an appropriate explanation for the privileged 
access. In the remainder of this section, I want to explore further what possibility the 
acquaintance theorist has, to solve this problem. 
What comes to mind is something similar to the solution for Jackson's famous 
knowledge argument198. Now, the knowledge argument claims that physicalism has to 
be wrong. Based on the intuition of Mary the color scientist, Jackson claims the 
following: 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced 
to investigate the world from a black and white room via a 
black and white television monitor. She specialises in the 
neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the 
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on 
when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 
'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-
length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and 
exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the 
contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the 
lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is 
blue'. (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle possible to 
obtain all this physical information from black and white 
television, otherwise the Open University would of necessity 
need to use colour television.) What will happen when Mary is 
released from her black and white room or is given a colour 
television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just 
obvious that she will learn something about the world and our 
visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her 
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previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the 
physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and 
Physicalism is false.199 
The argument comes in two versions200, a stronger and a weaker version. Since this 
issue does not affect my argumentation, I will not discuss this distinction here and 
maintain the original, stronger conclusion that physicalism is false. The argument 
therefore can be formulated as follows: 
1) Before her release Mary, the color scientist, acquires all physical 
information about color vision. 
2) When released, Mary learns something new about color vision, 
namely about our visual experiences. 
Therefore: 
3) There is some other information that is not physical information and 
physicalism is false.201 
The new information about color experiences Mary learns is often interpreted as 
information about phenomenal properties or as Jackson calls it “[...] raw feels, 
phenomenal features or qualia.”202 For my purposes, phenomenal properties will do. 
For my case, the interesting consequence of this argument is that one physicalist 
reaction is to deny that Mary acquires new factual or propositional knowledge, but 
knowledge by acquaintance. 
Conee203 introduced this approach, insisting that, apart from propositional 
knowledge and knowing-how204, knowledge by acquaintance constitutes a third, 
equally important, type of knowledge. Conee's characterization follows the one of the 
acquaintance theorist closely. To obtain this kind of knowledge the subject has to be in 
a maximal direct relation with its experience. The strategy Conee chooses is to agree 
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with Jackson's intuition that Mary – before being released – knows only some abstract 
facts, but lacks lively experiences. After leaving the black and white room she learns 
about a new property of her color experiences. While Jackson thinks that this is due to 
new information and therefore a new fact about experiences, Conee claims that 
knowing properties is becoming acquainted with them. Conee states: 
A person is ignorant of a property when the property is 
unfamiliar to the person. In order to be ignorant of a property, 
it suffices to lack acquaintance with the property. To come to 
know a property is to become acquainted with the property, 
just as to come to know a city is to become acquainted with the 
city, and to come to know a problem is to become acquainted 
with the problem.205 
This means for Mary that when she learns what the experience is like for her, she 
becomes acquainted with the experience. Conee's version concedes similar restrictions 
as other contemporary acquaintance theories do in general. It restricts acquaintance 
only to ongoing conscious experiences. His approach may therefore be exactly what 
the acquaintance theorist wants. The only further issue that has to be solved is the 
following: is this approach compatible with physicalism? And Conee answers positively. 
The idea behind this claim is that knowledge of facts does not include knowledge by 
acquaintance. Conee puts it the following way: 
[One objection against this acquaintance thesis]  […] depends 
on the assumption that when someone has a familiarity with 
phenomenal qualities that is acquired by knowing all of the 
facts about the qualities, the person is acquainted with those 
qualities. The acquaintance hypothesis that we are considering 
denies this. The view has it that someone becomes acquainted 
with a phenomenal quality only by noticing the quality in 
experience. Knowing every fact about phenomenal qualities 
does not imply experiencing them, and thus on the present 
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account it does not imply being acquainted with them.206 
Knowing phenomenal properties by acquaintance is therefore knowledge in its own 
right and cannot be reduced to any other type of knowledge. Since it is neither the 
basis for knowledge of facts nor knowing-how, it does not violate physicalism. This 
means, assuming that phenomenal properties are physical properties, a subject can 
know all those physical facts without being acquainted to those facts. Therefore, Mary 
could have known all the facts about the phenomenal properties of a given color 
experience – before released –; she simply was not acquainted with those properties. 
Only after her release she becomes acquainted with those properties, without learning 
a new fact about them. Solving the compatibility problem with physicalism, this 
approach seems to be a viable solution for the acquaintance theorist. Or is it?207 
Whether or not the acquaintance theorist can accept this solution also depends 
on her willingness to accept its implications. A contemporary theory of acquaintance 
with phenomenal properties, according to Gertler, aims for a convergence of 
phenomenal and epistemic appearances. To manage the task, it claims that the above 
discussed three conditions can be applied. 1) states the directness relation, 2) the 
solely dependence on current conscious experiences for justification and 3) the 
epistemic supremacy of this justification. As argued earlier, the best option for the 
acquaintance theorist to obtain the wanted result is to depend on the specialness of 
ongoing conscious states, not only in the epistemic sense, but the metaphysical sense 
as well. The reason I gave is that an acquaintance relation that does not depend also 
metaphysically on conscious experiences is mysterious or basic, therefore violating 
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Levine's Material Constraint. However, I also pointed out that this move leads to the 
same result, since mysterious or basic phenomenal properties disregard the same 
constraint. Now, assuming that the acquaintance theorist wants to explain her 
proclaimed relation and does not want to violate physicalism, and therefore moves to 
Conee's strategy, she has to pay a price most proponents probably would not accept. 
Claiming that knowledge by acquaintance is no basis for propositional knowledge, 
leaves very little weight to any acquaintance theory.208 According to Balog, 
acquaintance with our phenomenal properties should lead to the following: “We know 
our conscious states not by inference but by immediate acquaintance which gives us 
direct, unmediated, substantial insight into their nature.”209 This means, because of an 
epistemologically direct and metaphysically unmediated relation to our phenomenal 
properties, we should obtain substantial knowledge about the nature of those 
properties. Since this is not only an epistemological but also a metaphysical claim 
about the nature of things, it is particularly strong. 
Acquaintance usually claims epistemic specialness. The intuition that it may 
lead to insights about the metaphysical nature of phenomenal properties shows that 
the acquaintance theorist is convinced about the substantiality of her knowledge 
claim. A disconnection from factual knowledge, however, leaves the acquaintance 
approach only with a minor role. To get to know new facts, acquaintance is not 
required. Of course, we can only know intimately how we experience our phenomenal 
properties by having them and being acquainted with them, which however does not 
give us any special insight, since we know all the facts about those properties without 
being acquainted with them. Until now, the acquaintance theory was strongly 
connected to intuitions about the privileged access or epistemic asymmetry (2) and 
infallibility or incorrigibility (3). It was supposed to explain these intuitions. An 
acquaintance approach in Conee's spirit however, seems to be tied to the experience 
thesis (6). This thesis states that knowledge about phenomenal properties can only be 
acquired by having the relevant experience. This is of course not an explanation, but 
rather a motivation for a (necessary) condition. Acquaintance therefore is degraded 
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from a substantial theory about knowledge of phenomenal properties to a motivation 
for a condition. A serious acquaintance theorist should not be able to accept this 
implication. 
But it gets worse. In my opinion, even if an acquaintance theorist bites the 
bullet and accepts this weak account, acquaintance is in serious trouble. Since I have 
already shown that to demystify the acquaintance relation one needs ontologically 
basic phenomenal properties in the Levineian sense. The Conee solution however 
assumes the contrary, namely phenomenal properties are physical properties. So, 
apart from the consequence that there is no substantial knowledge involved, it seems 
again unclear how the acquaintance relation can be explained or what it can explain. 
Again the theory seems to be nothing more than a restatement of a different intuition 
about phenomenal properties or mysterious and basic. To see this, the following 
distinction made by Conee himself is helpful: 
[…] [I]n order for someone to know Cambridge, it is sufficient 
for the person to be thoroughly familiar with Cambridge by 
sensory observations. There is no substantially more intimate 
sort of awareness of a city that a person can have. But in order 
for someone to know a phenomenal quality, it is not sufficient 
for the person to know facts about the quality, not even all 
such facts.210 
The cited passage is supposed to show the difference between two types of familiarity. 
While knowledge about all facts is sufficient to be familiar with a city or a house, to 
intimately know our phenomenal qualities it is not. There is the need for something 
extra, namely a direct or acquaintance relation with those qualities. This means in my 
opinion, to correctly account for 'being familiar with a city', one only needs to attend 
to the factual content of that observation. To know one's phenomenal properties 
however, it is not enough to consider experiential facts, one must instantiate or 
undergo the experience itself. According to this interpretation, instantiating an 
experience is the most direct way of assessing phenomenal properties. This however, 
is basically what the experience thesis (6) states. One can only acquire knowledge 
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about phenomenal properties by having or instantiating the relevant experience. Now, 
if a directness relation – and therefore acquaintance – is nothing more than being 
instantiated, then knowledge by acquaintance is identical to the experience thesis. 
To overcome this difficulty the acquaintance theorist can maintain that a 
directness or acquaintance relation is not simply instantiation. In this case, apart from 
being no basis for factual knowledge, this relation remains a mystery. If phenomenal 
properties are physical properties and physicalism is true, then current conscious 
experiences depend on their representational content and their objects. Justification 
of knowledge of phenomenal properties therefore does not depend on ongoing 
conscious experiences alone and therefore acquaintance fails. There is, however, yet 
another move open to the acquaintance theorist in arguing211 that, via strong 
transparency, we have a direct, acquaintance relation with the objects of our 
experiences. This however seems to me a claim at best. I cannot see how this assertion 
explains anything. My suspicion is that one tries to protect the privileged access 
intuition at all cost, even if that means to introduce an obscure acquaintance relation. 
Now, I should allow the acquaintance theorist to answer. One should agree212 
that Conee's account of acquaintance leaves out an explanation. Also, one might agree 
that taking away knowledge by acquaintance as the basis for propositional knowledge 
is by itself already a denial of a substantial knowledge account. The above cited 
paragraph about Conee's distinction between 'familiarity' with a city or a house and 
the 'familiarity' with ongoing conscious experiences leaves this difference unexplained. 
It is not clear what makes phenomenal properties so distinct. The needed explanation, 
acquaintance theorist might argue, stems from the difference between phenomenal 
and physical properties. This of course violates again Levine's Materialist Constraint, 
but the acquaintance theorist can insist that phenomenal properties are essentially 
experiential – just as the knowledge argument claims – and therefore ontologically 
different from physical properties. Gertler concludes therefore that this ontological 
difference “[…] is a substantive explanatory hypothesis.”213 
This final explanatory attempt of the acquaintance theorist leaves me to 
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conclude three things about the acquaintance approach. First: An extremely weak 
version of acquaintance is synonymous with the experience thesis. Everyone can agree 
with this idea since it is not an explanation, but simply a condition to produce 
knowledge about phenomenal properties. It is compatible with physicalism, but has in 
the end nothing substantial to it. Second: A substantial account of acquaintance can 
only be defended if one is willing to accept mysterious or Levineian basic phenomenal 
properties, which violate the Material Constraint, or it is simply a restatement of the 
privileged access intuition. The acquaintance theorist however may have good 
arguments to explore this account. It is hard to deny this approach an immediate 
attractiveness. Therefore we should not – on the basis of its incompatibility with 
physicalism alone – disallow this approach. Third: However anti-physicalism always has 
something mysterious to it. Unless there are especially convincing arguments, it seems 
appropriate to look for an alternative. I therefore suggest looking for an alternative 
explanation for intuitions about the privileged access to our phenomenology. 
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II. SELF-KNOWLEDGE, PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO THE PHENOMENAL AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
 
II.1. Self-knowledge and the privileged access to the phenomenal 
 
So far we have seen that the epistemic specialness of self-knowledge is 
guaranteed by the privileged access to our conscious mental states. Further, privileged 
access is usually constituted by two dimensions: 1) special epistemic security or 
certainty and 2) a unique method or introspection. Both are in general intimately 
connected. Until now however nothing has been said about how these conditions can 
be understood. First of all, when we talk about self-knowledge, what needs 
explanation is the intuition that it is epistemically superior to knowledge about the 
world. A way to accomplish this is to introduce statement 1) above. Privileged access 
guarantees epistemic supremacy. As seen in the last chapter, Gertler argues that 
acquaintance can ensure exactly this. Consider her condition 3) again: it states, more 
or less, that acquaintance leads to introspective self-knowledge, where judgments 
depending on it, are epistemically better justified than empirical knowledge. The 
simple explanation is that this kind of self-knowledge is not vulnerable to the same 
defeaters as empirical knowledge is. That means, whether a mad scientist is playing 
with the causal nexus of a sensation has no impact on this sort of self-knowledge, 
while it clearly defeats knowledge about the world.214 I concluded in the last chapter 
that Gertler, however, does not really explain this fact. Rather, she restates what we 
assume from the start. Still, for an analysis of the self-knowledge intuition this 
approach is quite helpful. Implementing Gertler's thought into the self-knowledge 
intuition means that what needs explanation is not self-knowledge, but why certain 
defeaters impact knowledge about the world, but not self-knowledge. At a first glance, 
the self-knowledge intuitions, then, demands for epistemic specialness, it is not 
necessarily concerned with a unique method, e.g. introspection. In other words, self-
knowledge asks for privileged access in the sense of 1), leaving the function of 2) open. 
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What then is the function of introspection? The short answer is that introspection is 
the process involved when we target the mind. It stands in contrast to perception, the 
process involved when we target objects in our surroundings. To understand the 
involvement of introspection in the quest for epistemic privileged self-knowledge 
about the phenomenal, it seems that a characterization of this process is in order. 
 
II.1.1. Introspection 
 
Introspection may basically be characterized by the following three traits: 1) the 
necessary features of introspection; 2) targets of introspection; and 3) the products of 
introspection.215 This means that, since introspection tells us something about our own 
mental states and processes, introspection has to first meet certain minimal 
conditions. Some requirements are considered uncontroversial, others, however, are 
not demanded by all philosophers. 
One first minimal condition is the mentality condition. According to 
Schwitzgebel, the idea behind this condition is that it requires that introspection be 
directed inward and therefore primarily tells us something about our own mentality 
resulting in judgments which may or may not result in knowledge. A further 
requirement is the so-called first-person condition. It basically states that introspection 
is only about one's own mental states and not, at least directly, about the mental 
states of others. Introspection can therefore only count as direct method, when 
applied to one's own mind. Whether or not it has any influence about judging other 
minds is controversial. Most philosophers would attribute such a judgment at least a 
non-introspective component. A last uncontroversial condition is the temporal 
proximity condition. It states that a cognitive process only counts as introspection, if it 
is about current or instantly past mental episodes. Therefore pure instances of 
introspection only appear in a very short time frame. Imagine, for example, one thinks 
about a mental state from yesterday morning. In that case, the current self-reflective 
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thought does not only depend on the current introspective process, it depends also on 
one's memory.216 
According to Schwitzgebel, however, some philosophers require further 
conditions for introspection. One further requirement is the directness condition. This 
condition basically states that a cognitive process can only count as introspection, 
when it is direct. This view is closely connected to the acquaintance approach. This 
idea assumes, at least, that processes which collect information about the outside 
world and infer from this information facts about mental states do not count as 
introspection. Strong transparency theorists, however, have to reject this claim. A 
further requirement of this type is the detection condition. This requirement claims 
that introspection has to detect an already pre-existing mental state. The yielded 
knowledge is therefore only causally dependent on that state. This means, when 
introspecting, the introspected state and the introspecting state are ontologically 
independent. Their connection is merely causal. Therefore, introspection cannot be 
involved in creating the target state. Most perceptual theories of introspection assume 
this condition, while the proponents of acquaintance may deny it. A last controversial 
requirement is the effort condition. This condition maintains that introspection is only 
achieved by effort. It is therefore not an automatic cognitive process. This means, we 
are not constantly introspecting; rather introspection requires intent. It is a special 
kind of reflection about one's own mental states. The disagreement about this 
condition stems from the claim that having a conscious experience – and having a 
conscious experience can be seen as relatively constant – needs introspective 
monitoring of the mental life.217 
 When talking about the targets of introspection, on the one hand, one may 
consider all kinds of different mental states. Even though not all of the mental life is 
available to introspection – especially unconscious desires or character traits –, there is 
a considerable number of possibilities. Schwitzgebel considers attitudes and conscious 
experiences as the most viable candidates. Sub-categories of conscious experiences, 
like the phenomenal properties and the content of those experiences, should also be 
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included. Products of introspection, on the other hand, are, however, a badly explored 
subject. Schwitzgebel puts it the following way: 
Most philosophers hold that introspection yields something like 
beliefs or judgments about one's own mind, but others prefer 
to characterize the products of introspection as “thoughts”, 
“representations”, “awareness”, or the like.”218 
Knowledge, judgments or believes are therefore also entailed. In my opinion they 
deserve a special mention. First of all because I am discussing here the involvement of 
introspection in the formation of self-knowledge and second because the general 
philosophical interest often focuses on them. 
  
II.1.2. Introspection and self-knowledge about the phenomenal 
 
Now, let me consider privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal again. 
As stated above, the self-knowledge intuition that needs explanation is privileged 
access as a form of epistemic security or certainty. Introspection is usually considered 
to be the unique method that guarantees this epistemic privilege.219 Since any theory 
of introspection is bound, at least, to the uncontroversial characteristics above, an 
introspective theory of privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal needs to be 
developed within this kind of framework. Keeping therefore these restrictions in mind, 
introspection may be investigated from two different angles. Either a theory of 
introspection defines epistemic justification, or the other way around. An example for 
the latter is clearly the acquaintance approach. As we have seen, the acquaintance 
theorist claims a special epistemic relation – a direct relation to its truthmaker, in this 
case to the phenomenal properties of an experience – therefore already shaping the 
corresponding theory of introspection. The resulting obvious, essential conclusion is 
that introspection cannot be like perception. An example for the former approach is 
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the inner sense model of introspection220. The radical standard version of this model 
claims that introspection is analogous to perception. The relation to the target – here, 
phenomenal properties – is causal and therefore one should not assume a special 
epistemic status. Often though, it seems not entirely clear how to separate those two 
positions. The question about epistemic specialness and the “unique method” of 
introspection seem intimately entangled. However, in an implicit sense, one always 
has to decide what she wants to explain. 
Wanting to know the reason for the epistemic specialness of knowledge about 
the phenomenal, primarily asks for an explanation of the privileged access in the sense 
of 1). Only secondarily it is a question of a detailed theory of introspection. 
Nonetheless, one has to, at least minimally, secure reliability and compatibility with 
the above claimed conditions. Also, since the phenomenal – even though an excellent 
candidate221 – is one particular target for privileged self-knowledge, one should 
remove obstacles that may stem from arguments against introspection as a whole. 
One radical idea – that affects all accounts of introspection – is to argue that 
introspection is not one single process, but rather a plurality of processes.222 If this 
assumption is correct, then one could argue that introspection may not be a reliable 
process to obtain privileged self-knowledge. In short this means, what we call 
introspection is in reality not a single cognitive process but a bundle of different 
processes. Our cognitive apparatus uses any of these processes according to its needs. 
This is not only the case when we introspect different targets (between-case claim), 
but it also applies when introspecting one and the same target over again (within-case 
claim). 
For privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal the between-case claim is 
of no particular interest, since this kind of knowledge relies only on one target, namely 
the phenomenal properties of conscious experiences. Whether or not attitudes imply 
the same introspective process as conscious experiences may not have consequences 
for the within-case claim. Consider e.g. Christopher Hill's idea. Hill thinks that certain 
target mental states are more similar to each other than to others. For example, 
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conscious experiences share a greater resemblance with each other than they share 
with attitudes. Hill concludes from this circumstance that the faculties involved to 
detect the former are probably in general more similar to each other then they are to 
the latter to the faculties involved in the latter case.223 What Hill is basically arguing is 
that introspecting different targets may imply different capacities as well. Since 
introspective judgments are based on different faculties, one unified account of 
introspection may seem problematic. This seems to me a valid and reasonable point, 
but no threat to an introspective account as a whole. Introspection applied to only one 
particular target (within-case claim) is not touched by this view. Since one does not 
have to claim that an introspective account of phenomenal properties is valid for 
different targets or valid in general, the between-case claim can be disregarded for our 
purposes. 
Circumstances for the within-case claim are different. This version of the thesis 
assumes that even for one particular target there might be different introspective 
mechanisms involved. Schwitzgebel endorses the following: 
[I]ntrospection is the dedication of central cognitive resources, 
or attention, to the task of arriving at a judgment about one's 
current, or very recently past, conscious experience, using or 
attempting to use some capacities that are unique to the first-
person case […], with the aim or intention that one's judgment 
reflect some relatively direct sensitivity the target state. It by 
no means follows that from this characterization that 
introspection is a single or coherent process or the same set of 
processes every time.224 
To see what is meant let me consider one of his examples:  
I look out the window and reach the judgment not only that 
there's a tree outside but also that I'm having a visual 
experience of that tree. I have greenish visual experience of the 
leaves, and the tree's spreading branches seem to dwarf the 
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mountain in the background. It has just rained, and in the 
reemerging sun, the tree sparkles strikingly. Focusing my gaze 
on the rightmost branches, I notice a fluttering indistinctness in 
my experience of the left side of the tree. I cross my eyes, 
thinking it might make the tree double, but instead the tree 
only swims around my visual field, blurring and flattening.225 
According to Schwitzgebel, one can draw three immediate conclusions from this 
example. The first conclusion is about the greenish visual experience. Assuming that 
someone is standing next to the 'Schwitzgebel' of the example, we may suppose that 
the other person can arrive at the same conclusions about 'Schwitzgebel's' greenish 
visual experience as well as Schwitzgebel himself. For all the other person knows is 
that, one, 'Schwitzgebel' is in front of a tree with green leaves with good the viewing 
conditions, and two, 'Schwitzgebel' is not colorblind. Even though this case does not 
have to assume that some sort of knowledge about outward objects grounds 
'Schwitzgebel's' knowledge about his greenish visual experience, one may still think 
that knowledge about the world enters, in combination with 'Schwitzgebel's' capacities 
for getting to know his own conscious experiences, to justify judgments about the 
greenish visual experience. According to Schwitzgebel, this is in general the case, since 
it may be supposed that we know different things about our environment and that this 
knowledge influences not only our experiences, but also our expectations about those 
experiences. Therefore it influences the willingness to make judgments about a 
particular experience and those judgments themselves. The consequence, then, is that 
often judgments about an experience – especially when visual – reduce to judgments 
about the outer, perceived object.226 According to this description, when we introspect 
our visual experiences we do not employ one singular process. Since there is no 
process of perceiving the outer object and apart from that a process of detecting, both 
the perceiving and the detecting process overlap. 
A second conclusion, according to Schwitzgebel, is that there is more to those 
judgments than just knowledge of external objects. It also forms part of the cognitive 
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process that dissects a visual experience that it fails to discriminate between certain 
properties of the tree. Even though we are willing to allow this experience to be a 
greenish visual experience, we are not so confident in ourselves to assume that we can 
differentiate between all shades of green present in that experience. Failing to 
discriminate those properties, therefore, forms part of the cognitive process which 
produces certain judgments about this greenish experience. 
A final conclusion Schwitzgebel draws is about cultural influences. For him, to 
see the tree occult the mountain (like in a snapshot) or the beauty of the tree for 
example, depends on certain cultural concepts, or is at least culturally influenced. In 
general, Schwitzgebel therefore thinks that what we assume to be obvious 
introspective judgments are often judgments which are, at least in part, constituted by 
non-introspective cognitive processes. This means that those judgments entail 
cognitive processes which are clearly not a form of introspection.227 
Now, as long as we talk about descriptive knowledge about conscious 
experiences as a whole228, I think that Schwitzgebel's argument is quite convincing. It 
seems true that certain features – like knowledge of external objects, cultural 
influences and so on – form part of the cognitive processes we use to obtain 
knowledge about particular experiences. That being said, however, the question still 
remains as to whether it applies to all cases of introspective self-knowledge. To 
examine whether the plurality thesis works as an argument against introspective 
reliability of judgments about the phenomenal, we may want to consider the method 
of phenomenal contrast229. 
The method of phenomenal contrast has been brought forward by Susanna 
Siegel to determine the content of visual experiences. I will not engage in the debate 
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about theories of content of experiences230, nor will I explain the method of 
phenomenal contrast in detail. What matters for the current context are the bearings 
of this method on the issue of introspecting phenomenal properties. The concept 
behind the method of phenomenal contrast is that we are not capable of 
distinguishing certain hypotheses about the content of experiences by introspection 
alone. Introspection is capable to already rule out certain contents – due to their 
phenomenal properties – it is, however, not able to decide about correctness in other 
cases. 
To get an idea about why introspection is limited, we may want to consider 
Siegel's following example: 
Suppose you are looking at a bowl of expertly designed wax 
fruit. You have a visual experience when you see this scene, and 
we can ask which properties your experience represents as 
instantiated in the scene before you.231 
According to Siegel, we have two options to evaluate this example regarding the 
representational content of the experience. The first – the so-called color-shape 
hypothesis – states that your experience represents colors and shapes but nothing 
more. This means that your visual experience does not represent them as fruits. The 
second hypothesis is the cherry-content hypothesis. It claims that your visual 
experience actually represents the fruit as being a fruit and also that they are fruits in a 
bowl. It seems that introspection is of no help when deciding between the first and the 
second hypothesis. Introspection is therefore limited in its conclusions about the 
content. 
In what respect can introspection help to determine the content? Siegel 
defends that for any content represented by an experience, there is a corresponding 
phenomenal character or property. This presupposes at least the following claim: 
contents of experiences have to be phenomenally adequate232. If I understand her 
correctly, this means an experience with the represented content 'yellow' will differ 
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phenomenally from an experience with the represented content 'blue'. Therefore, 
introspection can detect the phenomenal contrast of those experiences and therefore 
certain contents233. Introspection is, according to Siegel, basically about phenomenal 
properties in a narrow sense; that means introspection can detect phenomenal 
differences in different experiences and rule out certain contents. This however also 
means that introspection is quite limited. It is basically only capable of detecting the 
phenomenal contrast. 
 How does the idea of limiting introspection to the phenomenal contrast 
enable an argument against the plurality thesis? The key lies in the analysis of 
experiences. While Schwitzgebel seems to exploit the idea of a conscious experience 
as a whole, Siegel seems to develop a picture that analyses conscious (visual) 
experiences. Her analysis interprets conscious (visual) experience in general as having 
a content of some sort and corresponding phenomenal properties. More importantly 
however, authentic introspection is related to the phenomenal properties of an 
experience, as it detects the phenomenal contrast, and not to the content. 
Now, Schwitzgebel's pluralistic account describes the forming of an 
introspective judgment about a conscious experience as a combination of factors. In a 
situation where I see a green tree, my introspective judgment about this 'green tree' 
depends on knowledge of the external world, my expectations, cultural influences and 
so on. In my view, the reason for such an interpretation of introspection stems from 
the target, which is the conscious experience as a whole. The plurality is basically 
created by giving introspection a complex target, or better the plurality thesis creates 
this complex target in the first place. To state it differently: if we assume the 'green 
tree' experience as a whole to begin with and analyze the formation of a 
corresponding judgment, then it seems obvious that we have to consider cognitive 
processes which cannot count as introspective. A judgment about experiences as a 
whole may include components of background knowledge or knowledge about the 
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world, expectations, cultural influences and other factors. This, however, depends on 
how many contextual circumstances one is willing to include. In the end, it comes 
down to how many determining factors of an experience one supposedly has to know 
in order to know the experience as a whole. However, self-knowledge of phenomenal 
properties does not depend on this kind of endeavor. Introspecting phenomenal 
properties of an experience only relies on those phenomenal properties themselves or 
at least that is what many introspection theorists234 argue. Interesting enough is that 
this brings us back to the initial question about the epistemic features of self-
knowledge, or better the issue of the privileged access in the sense of 1). An 
introspective account of phenomenal properties itself, however, is not endangered by 
the within-case claim. 
 
II.2. Self-knowledge about the phenomenal and alternatives for privileged access 
 
Assuming that the argument against the plurality thesis is sound, and the 
possibility for an introspective account of phenomenal properties in general prevails, 
we are back at the issue of the privileged access in the sense of 1). So far it was said 
that the epistemic specialness in the sense of 1) states that self-knowledge is certain. 
This epistemic certainty stems from the idea that we are infallible and omniscient 
about the phenomenal properties of our ongoing conscious experiences. In this 
context, infallibility refers to the idea that we cannot have false beliefs about those 
phenomenal properties. Omniscience states that having those phenomenal properties 
is sufficient to know them. Those two ideas are usually considered to be the strongest 
claims about epistemic specialness. However, epistemic specialness can be achieved in 
many different ways. Alston, in a detailed paper about the matter, adds the following 
four: 
Indubitability-No one, in fact, ever has grounds for doubting a 
[first-person-current-mental-state-belief or] FPCMSB. 
Incorrigibility-No one else ever, in fact, succeeds in showing 
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that a FPCMSB is mistaken. 
Self-warrant-FPCMSB's are, as a matter of fact, always 
warranted. 
Truth sufficiency-True FPCMSB's are, as a matter of fact, always 
warranted.235 
I do not claim that this list of interpretations of privileged access is complete. I think 
however that it is enough to show the impressive amount of versions held by 
philosophers. 
Since I want to ensure certain self-knowledge, the privileged access to the 
phenomenal has to justify this endeavor. This means, all Alston cases clearly affect my 
efforts by weakening the strong initial claims. That being said, we can see that all 
versions of privileged access coordinate the relation between the experience and the 
corresponding judgment. It seems, however, that only the strongest concept of 
certainty – entailing infallibility and omniscience – asks for a special relation. That is 
why the standard manner to ground strong certainty is to assume acquaintance. 
Acquaintance is a relation that contrasts causal relations236. It is direct and unmediated 
in an epistemic and metaphysical sense, therefore giving credence to infallibility and 
omniscience. However, since I have shown acquaintance to be implausible, we need a 
different way to justify certain self-knowledge about the phenomenal, one however 
that maintains the interpretation of certainty in the strong sense. 
To get a grip on the issue, we may want to consider cases where certainty does 
not depend on acquaintance. As stated before, Alston's cases may constitute certainty 
– even if the kind of certainty established is weaker – without relying on basic relations 
in the Levineian sense. In general, it is enough for all these interpretations of privileged 
access to assume that a judgment is especially warranted or that there are no grounds 
to doubt that judgment. This means that a directness relation especially in the 
metaphysical sense is not necessary. However, for many this fact alone means that 
since there is no directness relation between the phenomenal properties and the 
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corresponding judgment anymore – at least there is none in the metaphysical sense – 
the basis for certainty in the strong sense is eroded. It may therefore not be enough to 
just ask for a special warrant. 
We may, however, want to consider other examples and see whether or not 
they can do better. Following Stoljar, one might introduce 'epistemic principles'. Those 
principles describe the relation between experience and knowledge.237 Stoljar 
considers three 'epistemic principles'238 for knowing our experiences. One, first 
principle is self-presentation. Self-representation claims that “[...] having an experience 
puts you in a position to know or justifiably believe that you are having the 
experience.”239 A second principle is understanding and states that “[…] if one has an 
experience at a certain time, then one understands what that experience is at that 
time.”240 A final principle considered by Stoljar is revelation. Revelation may be 
regarded to be a particular strong version of such an 'epistemic principle'. It asserts 
that [by having an experience] […] you know or are in a position to know the essence 
or nature of the experience.241 At this point, the important question is whether the 
principles entertain special epistemic relations or not; and if so, how those relations 
may be justified. 
Stoljar clearly uses the first epistemic principle, namely self-presentation, much 
like Chisholm.242 So far, I have only discussed the acquaintance thesis as a version of an 
unmediated observation model of self-knowledge. Interestingly enough, Chisholm's 
self-presentation principle suggests an alternative model. When talking about the 
possibility of knowledge, or what we can know, Chisholm defines self-presentation the 
following way: 
If (i) the property of being-F is such that every property it 
conceptually entails includes the property of thinking, if (ii) a 
person S has the property of being-F and if (iii) S believes 
                                                          
237
 In a sense, all versions of the privileged access are governed by 'epistemic principles' (not only the 
Alston cases, also infallibility and omniscience). 
238
 Especially the first principle, or self-presentation, is based on Chisholm's foundationalist theory of 
knowledge. For discussion on the issue and other principles see especially Chisholm 1981 and 1987. 
239
 Stoljar 2009, p. 116. 
240
 Ibid., p. 117. 
241
 Ibid., p. 115. 
242
 The term 'self-presentation' however goes back to Meinong. 
 
75 
 
himself to be F, then it is certain for S that he is F.243 
According to Gertler, this principle basically claims that psychological properties, which 
are self-presenting, refer to special epistemic and psychological features. This claim 
does not have to entail the proposal of an acquaintance relation. It only means that 
Chisholm's theory needs to be analyzed in the manner the unmediated observation 
model is interpreted in general. That means to accept that a) self-presentations 
exclude the direct ascription of its negation; b) careful introspection of self-
presentations entails their attribution; and c) self-ascriptions of self-presentations are 
in a sense certain.244 For Chisholm, the self-presenting principle may be applied to 
intentions and sensory (or being appeared to) states. Whether it is possible to 
attribute certainty to such a broad variety of mental states is doubtful, it is however 
interesting whether this principle applies to the phenomenal or not. Chisholm's 
proposal however, also weakens the interpretation of certainty. By definition certainty, 
according to Chisholm, is the following: 
h is certain for S at t =df (i) Accepting h is more reasonable for S 
at t than withholding h (i.e., not accepting h and not accepting 
not-h) and (ii) there is no i such that accepting i is more 
reasonable for S at t than accepting h.245 
Here, certainty is closely tied to what is reasonable for the subject to accept. This may 
lead to especially justified judgments, it lacks however certainty in the strong sense.246 
This however seems to apply to Stoljar's version of the principle also. Since the 
unrestricted interpretation of having an experience puts one in a position to know that 
one has that experience employs the reasoning of (ii) and (iii) of Gertler's analysis. Also 
and more importantly, it does not claim more than certainty in Chisholm's sense. 
For Stoljar the second epistemic principle – understanding – does not require 
any description or concept. It does not even have to last an extensive period of time. 
Basically he assumes that understanding may be a form a tacit knowledge of what an 
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experience is. Stoljar describes the principle in the following way: 
[…] what understanding says is that if a creature is 
psychologically complex enough to undergo a certain 
experience at a certain time, then the creature is 
psychologically complex enough to know what that experience 
is at least in the ordinary sense that is sufficient for 
understanding.247 
As far as I can tell, the key question is whether the ordinary sense of knowing what 
establishes certainty, and if so in what sense. Certainty is probably not the ordinary 
sense of knowing what refers to, at least not in the strong sense. We may assume that 
knowing what an experience is in the ordinary sense leads to a justified degree of 
knowledge. We also may assume that this justification is extremely reliable – since we 
are talking about experiences –, but we do not assume that this establishes a strong 
sense of certainty. Stoljar seems to admit that by stating that “[...] sometimes when we 
speak of someone’s understanding something we mean only that they know what it is 
in [a] less demanding sense.”248 
The third epistemic principle, according to Stoljar, is revelation. In his view, 
revelation stands in an interesting relation to understanding. While understanding is 
necessary to establish revelation, it is not sufficient. One could say that understanding 
is basically the usual or common form of knowing what, while revelation asks for “an 
uncommonly demanding and literal sense of 'knowing what'”249. This demanding sense 
follows from the claim that by having an experience we are supposed to be in a 
position to know or simply know the essence or nature of that experience. The general 
standard notion may be put the following way: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to know or 
know that Q is F (for F is the essence of Q).250 
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However, if true, clearly revelation gives us an amazing insight of what experiences 
essentially consist in. Since we should suspect already at this point that this profound 
claim about experiences is closely linked to their phenomenal properties as well, we 
may have a relevant epistemic principle that could explain the privileged access. To 
find out whether or not we can get the revelation thesis of the ground, we first need to 
answer the following two questions: i) what is the uncommonly demanding sense of 
'knowing what' or what does knowing the essence respectively nature of an experience 
mean? ii) Does revelation establish certainty in the above strong sense? In the spirit of 
Damnjanovic, a short answer to i) is something like this: knowing the essence of an 
experience is to know 'what it takes to be'251 an experience or, to put it differently, to 
know what makes an experience an experience. Now, if one accepts such a 
characterization, then one should, at least at a first glance, accept 2) as well. Does that 
mean we have found an alternative explanation to construe privileged or certain self-
knowledge about the phenomenal in a strong sense? Before answering such a 
controversial question, some background information about the hypothesis may be in 
order. 
 
II.3. Revelation 
 
The revelation thesis was first introduced by Bertrand Russell in the context of 
philosophy of colors.252 The terminology however derives from Mark Johnston253. 
Being an epistemological argument, the thesis is about our epistemic position. It refers 
to what we are in a position to know or simply know, by having an experience. Since 
the thesis is about the 'essence' or 'nature' of some property254, it also has 
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metaphysical consequences. As described above, it is an epistemic principle which 
describes the relation between the property and the corresponding knowledge. 
Revelation, according to Stoljar and Lewis255, can be applied to both, experiences 
themselves and what experiences are of. The latter concerns properties which are 
closely connected to experiences256, e.g. properties like colors. In contemporary 
philosophy, the revelation thesis is viewed as highly controversial. The most contested 
part concerns the claim that we can know the 'essence' or 'nature' of a particular 
property. As stated above, knowing the 'essence' or 'nature' of a property suggests 
that one knows everything about the property in question that makes the property 
that property. This means, everything else one may learn about that property is 
accidental or contingent and therefore not necessary for the constitution of that 
property. 
There is however a second concern. It is regarding the epistemic position we 
are in. This position is different from others, in the sense that it is clearly superior. 
Stoljar explains the situation in the following manner: 
[…] I have a diamond in my pocket. It does not begin to follow 
that I know the essence of diamonds, or that the only things 
left to know are various facts about the distribution of things 
with this essence or nature—whether other people have 
diamonds in their pockets, and so on. For one thing, merely 
having a diamond in my pocket puts me in no epistemic 
position whatsoever. I may have a diamond in my pocket and 
have no idea what diamonds are. Moreover, even if I know 
what diamonds are in the ordinary sense that most of us do—
be able to reliably pick out diamonds at the jewelers, know that 
the biggest diamonds come from South Africa and so on—I may 
be quite ignorant of the chemical nature of diamonds, and so 
ignorant of something that is surely essential to them. So, 
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according to proponents of revelation, having an itch puts one 
in an epistemic position with respect to itches that having a 
diamond does not put one in with respect to diamonds. I am in 
a position with respect to itches (and experiences more 
generally) such that the only thing left to learn are accidental 
truths. But I am not in that position with respect to 
diamonds.257 
One way of characterizing this extraordinary epistemic position is to follow Williamson: 
To be in a position to know p it is neither necessary to know p, 
nor sufficient to be physically or psychologically capable of 
knowing p. No obstacle must block one’s path to knowing p. If 
one is in a position to know p, and one has done what one is in 
a position to do to decide whether p is true, then one does 
know p. The fact is open to one’s view, unhidden, even if one 
does not yet see it.258 
Damnjanovic suggests that to make this statement true what we have to do in 
particular cases is to reflect on the matter at stake.259 I guess that in general this may 
be the right approach. Since I am investigating self-knowledge of the phenomenal 
here, reflection should be understood as introspection or introspective judgments 
may, it simply seems to be a more appropriate interpretation. On a side note, I think 
that Williamson's characterization seems quite helpful, since in a solid reading it 
suggests certainty in a strong sense. 
Now, being originally introduced as an epistemic principle in the philosophy of 
colors260, revelation holds that having an experience of a particular color puts one in 
the position to know the essence or nature of that color. In this case, the relation is not 
between the experience of that color and the corresponding knowledge. It rather 
states that we are in this kind of special epistemic position is respect to the color itself. 
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For example, Johnston – after concluding that the external world must be both, 
colored and not colored – distinguishes between 'core beliefs' and 'peripheral beliefs' 
to account for this position.261 According to his interpretation 'core beliefs' are beliefs 
in the following sense: 
were such beliefs to turn out not to be true we would then 
have trouble saying what they were false of, i.e., we would be 
deprived of a subject matter rather than having our views 
changed about a given subject matter.262 
'Peripheral' beliefs on the contrary only refer to a change of mind about the subject 
matter. In Johnston's opinion when we talk more inclusively about the colors we ought 
to refer to 'core beliefs'. According to Muñoz-Súarez, he interprets revelation, 
therefore, as one of such 'core beliefs'.263 Johnston admits however that it is not the 
only one and because of its controversial status, not an easy belief to maintain. 
As stated above, the basic idea of the revelation thesis about colors stems from 
Bertrand Russell. According to Russell, to know the colors themselves – and not only 
the truths about them – means the following:  
The particular shade of colour that I am seeing . . . may have 
many things to be said about it . . . But such statements, though 
they make me know more truths about the colour, do not make 
me know the colour itself any better than I did before: so far as 
concerns knowledge about the colour itself, as opposed to 
knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and 
completely when I see it and no further knowledge of it itself is 
even theoretically possible.264 
In a more recent interpretation Strawson interprets revelation about the colors in the 
following manner:  
[...] colour words are words for properties which are of such a 
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kind that their whole and essential nature as properties can be 
and is fully revealed in sensory, phenomenal-quality 
experience, given only the qualitative character that that 
sensory experience has.265 
Finally, Johnston posits his own explicit account of revelation. The main reason 
may be that Russell's account is closely connected to his acquaintance approach or 
even equivalent to it. Johnston therefore offers a slightly different account. He agrees 
with Russell that being acquainted with a property is connected to 'knowing the nature 
of a property'.266 Both authors therefore claim that the revelation thesis entails 
acquaintance. In their view, it describes the epistemological position one is in – just by 
having a sensation or experience – to know a property by acquaintance. Since Russell's 
notion of acquaintance however is, according to Johnston, too strong267, he tries to 
solve the problem with the following operational account:  
If you know or are acquainted with the nature of properties F1, 
F2, … FN then you can know a family of similarity and difference 
relations (unity principle) holding among F1 through FN and 
know these without relying upon knowledge of the laws in 
which the properties are implicated or upon knowledge of 
which particulars have the properties.268 
This approach implies that acquaintance comes in degrees. For acquaintance this 
means that is does not necessarily entail complete revelation, since it is enough to 
know certain similarities without having explicit propositional knowledge of the 
properties in question. What might sound strange at a first glance, serves however to 
disentangle acquaintance and revelation. Revelation still entails acquaintance, but 
there are not equivalent like in Russell's interpretation. This is one way of giving the 
revelation thesis about colors its own right to exist. As a result, the revelation thesis 
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about colors, in general, may be put in more or less the following structure: 
Consider a subject S: 
S has an experience E and E is about X. 
Via revelation: 
S knows the essence of X.269 
Representing only the general idea of revelation about colors, one may ask for 
particular application. One popular version of the thesis is often defended by 
primitivists about colors.270 Primitivists usually share a common ground which can be 
called minimal primitivism271. Byrne & Hilbert characterize this mutual assumption to 
mean that colors are ontologically independent entities which cannot be reduced to 
their physical properties. To this characterization they add one more constraint: 
primitivism denies that colors are relational properties between the perceiver and the 
viewing conditions.272 Even though advocating for different versions, it is their view 
that most primitivists assume interpretations of Johnston's revelation thesis.273 
Obviously stating the revelation thesis even in general terms is a somewhat 
difficult and controversial issue. According to Byrne & Hilbert however, we may 
consider the thesis to be a conjunction of the following two claims: 
SELF-INTIMATION 
If it is in the nature of the colors that p, then after careful 
reflection on color experience it seems to be in the nature of 
the colors that p. 
[…] [And]: 
INFALLIBILITY 
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If after careful reflection on color experience it seems to be in 
the nature of the colors that p, then it is in the nature of the 
colors that p.274 
Especially due to self-intimation, it seems that revelation entails minimal primitivism. It 
remains however the question, whether or not minimal primitivism also entails 
revelation. 
At a first glance, it seems that minimal primitivism neither entails infallibility 
nor self-intimation. Without adding major assumptions, Byrne & Hilbert, conclude 
however that minimal primitivism paired with infallibility entails self-intimation. Since, 
for them, minimal primitivism holds 'p' to be exclusively chromatic, it seems that “[...] 
given Infallibility, if 'It seems not to be in the nature of the colors that p' is true, and 'p' 
is purely chromatic, then 'p' is false.”275 This allows the introduction of a relative 
harmless assumption, namely completeness. Completeness more or less states that if 
we can assume that a subject already had sufficient color experiences and also 
possesses the capacities to reflect carefully and the relevant ability to discern colors, 
we can also assume that the subject – if pressed – would assert a judgment, even if 
false. Since Byrne & Hilbert think that for every primitivist it is natural to take 
infallibility as background assumption, they conclude that minimal color primitivism 
most entail revelation necessarily.276 This means color primitivism has no other option 
than assuming the revelation thesis. Since the common ground of minimal primitivism 
already entails revelation, primitivism in general entails the thesis as well. Primitivism 
about colors is therefore one important approach to the colors that defends the 
revelation thesis. 
In the beginning of the chapter, I already mentioned a second form of 
revelation. This form concerns experience itself277, it is about the nature of experience. 
According to Lewis, revelation about experience claims that “[...] when I have an 
experience with the quale Q, the knowledge I thereby gain reveals the essence of Q: a 
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property of Q such that, necessarily, Q has it and nothing else does.”278 According to 
Lewis this thesis is built in to folk psychology, since it is assumed that we have the 
ability to identify the qualia of experience. This intuition mounts to what was stated 
above, namely the demanding sense of 'knowing what'. One indication for the 
demanding interpretation of 'knowing what' may be seen in certain corresponding 
abilities it creates, i.e. recognize and imagine. The capacity to recognize can be 
described in terms of experiencing a quale the first time, and recognizing it again when 
it appears. Consider the simple example of a red quale. Once redness was experienced, 
only by having the experience again, one is in the position to know that one is having 
the same red experience as before. Within the same example, the ability to imagine 
consists of knowing beforehand how to imagine redness. Of course, only when actually 
experiencing redness one knows that one was imagining an experience that 
corresponds to redness. 
Now, since revelation is intimately connected to an 'uncommonly demanding' 
sense of knowing what and proponents of revelation need, according to Lewis, ascribe 
to this demanding sense, it is only a small step to the idea that revelation is 
incompatible with physicalism.279 A physicalist claim needs to state, at least, that if 
revelation is true – and assuming that qualia are physical properties – we have to know 
that they are physical properties. Following Lewis’s famous lines shows to what 
implausible consequence this reasoning leads, for a physicalist: 
If for instance, Q is essentially the physical property of being an 
event of C-firing, and if I identify the qualia of my experience in 
the appropriate 'demanding and literal' sense, I come to know 
that what is going on in me is an event of C-firing. 
Contrapositively: if I identify the quale of my experience in the 
appropriate sense, and yet know nothing of the firing of my 
neurons, then the quale of my experience cannot have been 
essentially the property of being an event of C-firing. A 
materialist cannot accept the Identification Thesis [the 
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revelation thesis]. If qualia are physical properties of 
experiences, experiences in turn are physical events, then it is 
certain that we seldom, if ever, identify the qualia of our 
experiences. Making discoveries in neurophysiology is not that 
easy!280 
Again, this conclusion is, at first glance, only a threat from the physicalist's point of 
view. The revelation thesis in general however is seen as a strong interpretation of an 
epistemic principle281. It therefore seems reasonable to believe that if revelation is 
true, then it constitutes certainty in the strong sense. 
 
II.4. Is revelation an alternative account for self-knowledge about the phenomenal? 
 
There are reasons to believe that revelation can constitute an account of 
privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal that may be considered a real 
alternative to the acquaintance approach. However, to count as such an alternative, 
revelation has to fulfill the following two conditions: first, revelation has to constitute a 
strong form of certainty and second, to do so it cannot rely on an acquaintance 
relation in the sense discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
II.4.1. Certainty 
 
So far we have seen that the strongest version of certainty is based on 
infallibility and omniscience. In the case of phenomenal properties, infallibility and 
omniscience state something like this: 
 
One is infallible about one's own phenomenal properties of an experience iff one, after 
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careful introspection, cannot form or have a false belief that one has an experience 
with those phenomenal properties. 
 
One is omniscient about one's own phenomenal properties of an experience iff having 
an experience with those phenomenal properties, and carefully introspecting them, is 
sufficient for knowing them.282 
 
We may, however, want to qualify both ideas by tying them to the 'essence' or 'nature' 
claim283 about experience with certain phenomenal properties. By doing so we get the 
following interpretations: 
 
Infallibility: If after carefully introspecting an experience with certain phenomenal 
properties, it seems to be in the nature of those phenomenal properties that p, then it 
is in the nature of those phenomenal properties that p. 
 
Self-intimation: If it is in the nature of the phenomenal properties of an experience 
that p, then after carefully introspecting an experience with those phenomenal 
properties, it seems to be in the nature of those phenomenal properties that p.284 
 
Now, tying both epistemic principles to the 'essence' claim is not a simple task. At this 
point, it is far from clear how to interpret the 'essence' or 'nature' claim of revelation. I 
will get to this problem in a minute. For the moment, I simply assume that it is possible 
to satisfy this claim and evaluate the thesis's alternative interpretation of certainty. 
Qualifying both claims has the advantage that if feasible, we get an interpretation that 
is tied to the revelation thesis. 
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In the case of infallibility we only narrow the scope of the thesis and therefore 
in what cases it is valid. The unqualified infallibility thesis about phenomenal 
properties of an experience states that – after careful introspection – one cannot be 
wrong about the fact that one has an experience with certain phenomenal properties. 
The infallibility thesis about the phenomenal restricted by the 'essence' claim, holds 
that – after careful introspection – if something seems for someone to be in the 
essence of certain phenomenal properties, then it is in the essence of those 
phenomenal properties. Now, what is exactly the difference between the former and 
the latter interpretation? When the unqualified infallibility thesis is applied to an 
experience, someone may not know if the object of that experience really exists or 
what causes her experience, she may however know that she has some sort of 
phenomenal appearance. So, after careful introspection, she cannot have a false belief 
about this phenomenal presence in general. In the case of the restricted infallibility 
thesis, this kind of knowledge might not apply. One is only infallible about the essential 
properties which constitute such a phenomenal appearance. Most readers may see no 
immediate difference or practical consequence285, but it should at least be clear that 
infallibility in the latter sense does not hold for all properties, it only holds for those we 
consider to be essential. 
Qualifying the omniscience claim works quite similarly. There is however a 
small terminological difference. In the unqualified case, this epistemic principle states 
that if someone has certain phenomenal properties instantiated – and after careful 
introspection – this fact is sufficient for that someone to know those phenomenal 
properties. The self-intimation claim or the restricted version of this principle ties this 
general idea to the 'essence' claim again. Self-intimation interpreted this way basically 
means that if something is in the nature of certain phenomenal properties instantiated 
by someone – and after careful introspection – then it seems, for that someone, to be 
in the nature of those phenomenal properties. Again, in the former interpretation one 
may not know what caused the relevant experience, but simple having a phenomenal 
appearance – and carefully introspecting on it – is sufficient to know it in general. In 
the latter, restricted version, this idea applies only to the nature of such a phenomenal 
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appearance, therefore tying it to the essential properties. 
I stated above that there is a small terminological distinction to be made. When 
qualifying the omniscience thesis, it is no longer appropriate to call it that way. The 
reason is that being omniscient about a property or state, seems to involve a sense of 
global application. This means it does not apply to part of the property or state, but to 
all of it. Self-intimation may sound weak, but I suggest keeping the term anyway, 
especially because it was already introduced into the literature by Byrne & Hilbert.286 
The term, at least, does not seem to involve global application and may therefore be 
applied to the restricted version of this epistemic principle. 
The important question however is still open. Does revelation constitute a 
strong form of certainty or not? Since revelation includes both, the infallibility and the 
self-intimation claim287, it depends on the plausibility of those qualified 
interpretations. At a first glance, we can at least assume that both epistemic principles, 
in their restricted form, limit the scope of a strong certainty claim, but not the strength 
of the claim itself. Of course it is now necessary to assess the scope, by discussing 
different possibilities for the 'essence' claim. Revelation however may, in general, 
ground strong certainty. 
 
II.4.2. Revelation and acquaintance 
 
We have seen that the revelation thesis, just as acquaintance, goes back to 
Bertrand Russell. For him, both views288 are strongly related. In his famous passage 
about color properties, cited above, Russell states that seeing a color already puts him 
in a position to know the color itself. Or to put it in different words, having a visual 
color experience puts him in the position to know the essence of that particular color. 
Anything else we may learn about the color, i.e. any new knowledge of truths about 
that color we obtain, does not improve our knowledge about the color itself. One 
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standard interpretation of this passage289 claims that a version of the revelation thesis 
about color properties – not phenomenal properties – is postulated here. This here 
endorsed claim about color properties states that the knowledge we obtain is 
complete knowledge of the color properties themselves. At a first glance, complete 
knowledge can mean many things. According to Campbell however this idea is often 
misunderstood. In his view the issue should be interpreted exclusively in the following 
manner: 
The trouble with this whole exegetical line is that Russell’s 
comment is being interpreted as a remark about the relation 
between experience and propositional knowledge of the 
essences or natures of colors. This misses the point that 
Russell’s remark was about knowledge of things, rather than 
knowledge of truths. Acquaintance with the colors is not a 
matter of possessing propositional knowledge about them. It is 
a matter of having knowledge of the thing, not knowledge of 
truths about natures or essences.290 
A plausible interpretation is therefore that the revelation thesis is about knowledge by 
acquaintance, therefore stating that it is this type of knowledge which is complete. 
This means, to know the 'essence' or 'nature' of the color properties is to have 
complete knowledge by acquaintance of them, making the revelation thesis therefore 
a demanding acquaintance account. Now, according to Campbell, that is what Russell 
really intended. He did want not to claim that by having a visual color experience we 
come to know all essential propositional truths about a color; it is rather that by 
encountering the particular color in our visual experience we obtain complete 
knowledge by acquaintance of the color property itself. 
Even though this version of revelation concerns what experiences are about, 
namely color properties, one may construe a similar interpretation for experiences 
themselves. Damnjanovic, for example, postulates a possible version of the 
acquaintance approach to revelation that puts one in the position to know the essence 
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of phenomenal properties. It may be spelled out the following manner: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to have or 
have complete knowledge by acquaintance of Q.291 
 
Now, clearly this interpretation of revelation is in Campbell's spirit. It is about having 
complete knowledge by acquaintance of the phenomenal property Q in question. Also, 
the thesis does not make any assumptions about propositional knowledge of essential 
truths. It is therefore up to the acquaintance theorist to spell out the details of this 
proposal. In the preceding chapter, I suggested that acquaintance in the strong sense is 
either not compatible with physicalism – and in the end therefore deeply mysterious – 
or only a restatement of the privileged access intuition. In the weaker sense it is 
synonymous with the experience thesis and therefore a condition for knowledge about 
phenomenal properties. What does this mean for this interpretation of the revelation 
thesis? 
The strong sense of acquaintance already seems to be incompatible with the 
Levineian Materialist Constraint or just a restatement of the privileged access 
intuition292. As seen above, there is, however, a similar doubt about revelation. Lewis 
states that a physicalist should resist the thesis even though it seems to be embedded 
into folk-psychology. As stated above his criticism concerns the issue that if revelation 
and physicalism are true, then revelation should reveal that, in the case of pain, it is 
also C-fiber firing. Since this is an absurd claim, revelation is not compatible with 
physicalism.293 
At a first glance, it seems that this version of the revelation thesis is therefore in 
double jeopardy. On the one hand, the thesis is compromised by any strong 
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acquaintance approach. On the other hand, revelation endangers itself. This is 
however only the case if one wants to avoid anti-physicalism at all cost. An alternative 
strategy, however, might be especially promising for this account. So far, I assumed in 
Lewis's spirit that revelation should not be endorsed since it asks for a 'demanding and 
literal' sense of knowing what. Assuming the truths of physicalism and revelation 
about qualia, one should therefore know how those qualia are realized in the brain. If, 
on the contrary, one cannot know how qualia are realized in the brain, then this brain 
process is not essential to the qualia. It is clear that this consequence is absurd for 
Lewis. A supporter of the revelation thesis about experiences themselves in the 
Campbellian sense combined with a strong interpretation of the acquaintance relation, 
may however think that this to expect. At this point, I want to remind the reader what 
was said about the connection between the acquaintance relation and phenomenal 
properties. There is a perfectly viable explanation that does not describe the 
acquaintance relation as basic in the Levineian sense. The acquaintance theorist simply 
needs to resist strong transparency and argue that phenomenal properties are not 
completely representational in character. The consequently resulting independent 
ontological status of phenomenal properties, assumed in this approach, is able to 
justify and explain the acquaintance relation by tying a certain introspective judgment 
about those properties to the phenomenal reality itself. This interpretation of 
phenomenal properties is often assumed to be incompatible with physicalism.294 
Therefore, on this view revelation shows that brain processes are not essential to 
phenomenal properties and anti-physicalism is true. Even though this might be 
considered a possible solution, at least for some philosophers, it does not change a 
second issue. This version of revelation cannot genuinely count as an alternative 
explanation since it entails knowledge by acquaintance. The goal however is to find a 
real alternative to the acquaintance approach. The obvious reason is that this 
interpretation of revelation confronts the same problem: it is incompatible with 
physicalism. 
There may however be an alternative approach to pair revelation with a strong 
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account of acquaintance. As seen in the previous chapter, Levine does not only claim 
that one should not appeal to basic mental properties, one should also not refer to 
basic relations as well.295 In the latter case acquaintance seems even more 
mysterious296. Now, I started this illustration with Damnjanovic's interpretation of 
Campbell's idea and it seems to me, at this point, that this idea may ask, in the end, for 
something closer to Conee's answer to the knowledge argument discussed in the last 
chapter. In both cases, knowledge by acquaintance constitutes clearly a third, 
independent type of knowledge. It can neither be reduced to propositional knowledge 
nor to knowing-how, but it is compatible with physicalism. However, since Conee's 
approach was already rejected, there needs to be a decisive difference between his 
approach and the one endorsed by Campbell/Damnjanovic, to make the latter a viable 
possibility. And as a matter of fact, this difference exists. 
Conee's approach argues, on the one hand, close to the acquaintance theorist's 
idea that this kind of knowledge can only be obtained by a maximal direct relation with 
an experience. On the other hand, he thinks that even though knowledge by 
acquaintance is knowledge in its own right, it does not constitute the basis for 
propositional knowledge nor knowing-how. The price this account pays is that 
acquaintance can only be interpreted in the weak sense. As seen in the last chapter, 
this means that acquaintance is identical to the experience thesis. For a version of the 
revelation thesis, this interpretation of acquaintance leads to an implausible result. 
Revelation interpreted in this manner would state something like this: 
 
When having an experience with phenomenal property Q, we are in the 
position to know, about phenomenal property Q, that the experience has to be 
instantiated.297 
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Assuming that this thesis does not consist in a vicious circle from the start, the only 
thing it states is that the experience thesis is a necessary condition to have knowledge 
about phenomenal properties. This, however, implies no epistemic position to know 
the 'essence' of a phenomenal property. It only implies that we can know some 
condition to obtain knowledge about phenomenal property Q. Even if this condition is 
essential to know Q, it is still not about the 'essence' of Q. In my opinion therefore, this 
thesis can hardly be considered a version of the revelation thesis about the essence of 
phenomenal properties. 
Campbell's position towards acquaintance, on the contrary, maintains Russell's 
approach and insists that knowledge by acquaintance is the basis for propositional 
knowledge. To do so, Campbell broadens the consciousness relation. He seems to 
think that in most of the literature consciousness of an object is described as a two-
place relation between an experiencing subject and an object. His view, however, 
claims this to be false and states the following: 
We should think of consciousness of the object not as a two-
place relation between a person and an object, but as a three-
place relation between a person, a standpoint, and an object. 
You always experience an object from a standpoint. And you 
can experience one and the same object from different 
standpoints.298 
This notion of standpoint supplements the traditional two-place relation. According to 
Campbell, this notion secures the introduction of a form of knowledge of things more 
basic than knowledge of truths. The notion of standpoint therefore assures the 
possibility of acquaintance. Campbell justifies this idea by explaining that “[t]he notion 
of a standpoint comes in because you can have knowledge of one and the same thing 
from different standpoints.”299 
To give a characterization of what he means, Campbell proceeds with an 
example.300 To describe the perception of e.g. the Taj Mahal, Campbell claims that we 
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have to first decide which sensory modality we want to account for. Assuming that we 
choose to explain the standpoint in visual perception, we need to account for many 
visual parameters, like position, distance, lightning conditions and so on. Even though, 
according to Campbell, we usually do not spell out all these different conditions for the 
notion of standpoint, his thesis shows that it influences our knowledge about 
experiences. The problem to be explained then, is simple the fact that naturally we can 
have different perspectives of the same object or property, but at the same time one 
can experience an object or property in only one way.301 Of course, this is not to say 
that experiencing an object or property from one standpoint in one particular way 
means that sameness or the unity of the object or property is lost. This is, according to 
Campbell, why Russell introduces the role of standpoint in the following way: 
[…] we keep the idea that we should characterize consciousness 
in Moore’s terms, as the holding of a generic relation between 
the self and an object. But we should restrict the range of the 
relation.302 
The conclusion being that what restricts this relation is the standpoint. This idea 
ensures that the reference of the object or property is fixed by explicating that we 
experience the object or property in only one way. 
Campbell's solution is almost complete. The only thing missing is to determine 
to what kind of objects or properties one can restrict this three-way relation. 
According to Campbell this may be solved in the following manner: 
We should keep it restricted to objects of which the subject 
automatically has comprehensive knowledge. This in effect was 
the solution adopted by Russell and Moore, when they talked 
of direct awareness as a relation between the subject and a 
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sense-datum.303 
This means, in my opinion, Campbell restricts knowledge of things in the Russellian 
sense to objects or properties directly present in experience. Since there is only one 
way we experience an object or property from a particular standpoint in our 
experiences – where all conditions can be spelled out, but in practice are not – we 
have automatic, direct and comprehensive knowledge of the thing, which is essentially 
more basic than knowledge of truths. This is also the reason, why knowledge of things 
or knowledge by acquaintance constitutes the basis for propositional knowledge. The 
epistemic contact is established by the acquaintance relation, the direct relation to the 
objects or properties present in experience. Knowledge of truths depends on this 
relation, since without it, propositional knowledge has no reference. 
Now, let me get back to revelation and phenomenal properties. Campbell 
argues that revelation in the Russellian tradition claims that one is in the position to 
have complete knowledge of the thing or complete knowledge by acquaintance. As 
pointed out before, in the case of phenomenal properties, this means one is in the 
position to have complete knowledge by acquaintance of these properties.304 As we 
have seen, since both types of knowledge are independent there seems to be no clash 
with physicalism. Campbell himself seems to think something similar by claiming the 
following: 
To say that knowledge of the thing is complete is not of itself to 
deny the possibility of there being further propositional 
knowledge to be had to the effect that this thing has certain 
essential features. These further essential features, of which we 
have propositional knowledge, may indeed be physical, or of 
some sort quite unsuspected by the naive observer.305 
As far as I can see, Campbell makes three important claims. First, he thinks that 
revelation is only about knowledge by acquaintance. Second, knowledge by 
acquaintance and propositional knowledge are independent. And third – based on 
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what we have seen before – propositional knowledge depends on knowledge by 
acquaintance. Interesting enough is the fact that Campbell also thinks that there is no 
conflict with physicalism. It is important to stress again that this thesis is stronger than 
Conee's account. The crucial difference is that Campbell sets his interpretation up like 
most contemporary acquaintance theorists do. In my opinion therefore, Campbell is 
bound to the idea that knowledge by acquaintance secures some profound inside 
about the object or property involved. On the contrary to Conee, then, Campbell's 
account of acquaintance seems to imply a strong reading of acquaintance and, in his 
opinion, this version of revelation is still compatible with physicalism. The reason is 
that, other philosophers who try to make sense of revelation306 miss Russell's initial 
point. 
The trouble with this whole exegetical line is that Russell’s 
comment is being interpreted as a remark about the relation 
between experience and propositional knowledge of the 
essences or natures of colours. This misses the point that 
Russell’s remark was about knowledge of things, rather than 
knowledge of truths. Acquaintance with the colours is not a 
matter of possessing propositional knowledge about them.307 
That being said, it all crumbles down to the question of whether or not one can 
support the strong acquaintance claim and still maintain physicalism.308 
As we have seen, Conee's disadvantage, on the one hand, is that knowledge by 
acquaintance is not the basis for propositional knowledge, therefore leaving the 
acquaintance relation too weak for any contemporary acquaintance theorist. The 
advantage, of course, it is compatible with physicalism. Campbell, on the other hand, 
insists in the Russellian approach and therefore that knowledge by acquaintance is the 
foundation for propositional knowledge. This last remark however makes him 
vulnerable to Nida-Rümelin's following comment: 
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A friend of the knowledge argument might concede that a 
person is acquainted with Q only if she has or had an 
experience with property Q but he would have to insist that 
being acquainted with Q in that sense is a necessary condition 
for being able to know (in the relevant sense) that an 
experience has Q.309 
As a reminder, the knowledge argument claims that physicalism is false. In my opinion, 
Campbell, however, has to believe the above statement to be true. Especially the 
second part claims that being acquainted with a phenomenal property is necessary for 
knowledge that an experience has that particular property. Since this is new 
propositional knowledge that Mary learns when leaving the black and white room, 
physicalism is false. In my opinion Campbell still has to maintain Nida-Rümelin's 
argument. Therefore, if certain philosophers make the mistake to think that revelation 
in the Russellian sense is connected to knowledge of truths and claim that the thesis is 
incompatible with physicalism, Campbell makes the mistake to believe that his 
interpretation of revelation as 'complete knowledge by acquaintance of phenomenal 
properties' is compatible with physicalism. The reason is that acquaintance interpreted 
this way, entails – as can be shown by an analysis of the knowledge argument – that 
physicalism is false. Campbell can therefore choose between two options: either 
concede that acquaintance is not compatible with physicalism or withdraw the claim 
that knowledge by acquaintance is the basis for propositional knowledge.310 So far, 
knowing the 'essence' interpreted as having complete knowledge by acquaintance of 
the phenomenal properties has failed. To really let justice prevail, there is, in my 
opinion, a final possible solution for this interpretation of revelation to be considered. 
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Even though Campbell thinks that most other contemporary philosophers 
interpret the essence claim of revelation to be about knowledge of truths, Johnston 
explicitly tries to give an alternative account of knowledge by acquaintance. Since 
Johnston agrees that the Russellian interpretation of essence of a property as having 
complete knowledge by acquaintance of that property is dubious, he tries to 
operationalize the acquaintance relation311. By operationalizing this account, he 
concludes something interesting about this view, namely that acquaintance comes in 
degrees. One important consequence is, therefore, that complete revelation of the 
essence of properties is not necessary for an acquaintance relation with those 
properties. In the case of color properties, Johnston assumes two possible 
interpretations. To apply this notion of acquaintance to the secondary quality account 
of colors means that color vision acquaints us with the response disposition – which 
are the colors in this theory – without portraying them as dispositions. Pairing this 
interpretation of acquaintance with the primary account of colors leaves us with 
descriptions of the effects of those properties. Since on this view, we can only obtain 
propositional knowledge of the physical causes of color experiences, vision acquaints 
us only with those effects; the colors are so to speak invisible.312 
This leads to two questions: i) can we formulate such an operational account of 
acquaintance about phenomenal properties? ii) Does this account save this reading of 
revelation? To explore whether or not i) is an option, consider Johnston's 
operationalization of the acquaintance relation with certain properties again. The basic 
idea is that being acquainted with the essence of certain properties, one can know 
resemblance and difference relations between those properties. This knowledge does 
neither depend on knowledge of laws in which those properties are engaged, nor on 
the knowledge which entities possess those properties. To make sense of this idea, 
one may pair such an account of acquaintance with approaches to the phenomenal. I 
suggest conducting this debate in the context of strong/weak transparency. On the 
one side, weak transparency suggests that even though an experience is in general 
representational, there are some features of phenomenal properties which are not. On 
the other side, strong transparency holds that a description of an experience is 
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exhausted simply by reference to its representational content. The former ontology 
suggests that there is more to a perceptual experience than its object. The latter, on 
the contrary, claims that a perceptual experience only depends on the features of the 
perceived object. 
When paired with the strong account of transparency, the operational 
approach to acquaintance seems to amount to knowledge about the world. Since all 
properties are depending on the representational character of the object of the 
experience, the type of knowledge an acquaintance relation amounts to, depends on 
the view one has about the objects of experience. The resemblance and difference 
relations between e.g. phenomenal redness and phenomenal blueness are cashed out 
in purely representational terms. Since this approach maintains that these 
phenomenal qualities are qualities of the object, knowledge about phenomenal 
properties depend entirely on the object of experience. Interestingly, this approach 
leaves us, in the case of visual color experiences, with the original options implied by 
Johnston. 
Combining weak transparency with the operational account of acquaintance 
opens the possibility for direct access to the phenomenal. Since phenomenal 
properties, in the weak transparency view, are only partially representational – and 
therefore do not entirely depend on the object of experience – there is room for a 
proper, unique acquaintance relation to those properties and therefore direct 
knowledge of the properties themselves. In this case, the resemblance and difference 
relations between e.g. phenomenal redness and phenomenal blueness are solely 
dependent on those phenomenal properties themselves. For such a special directness 
relation to be possible, everything stands and falls with the ontological status of 
conscious experiences and their phenomenal properties. 
With this background in mind, we may consider ii). Does the operational 
account of acquaintance help to save this interpretation of revelation? The short 
answer is no. In my opinion, there are two reasons why this account is in no better 
shape than the ones before. The first problem concerns the pair of strong transparency 
and the operational account of acquaintance. In the previous chapter I argued that 
strong transparency violates the spirit of acquaintance. Judgments about phenomenal 
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properties depend in the end not on those properties, but on the objects of 
experience. Now, even if one assumes that this does not necessarily lead to trouble, 
the resulting account is again arguable. Leaving out Johnston's discussion about the 
nature of colors, objects external to the mind, should in some sense be constituted by 
physical properties. Since phenomenal properties depend solely on the objects of 
experience, they have to be considered being physical properties as well. Considering 
the knowledge argument, we may conclude that all physical knowledge is 
propositional knowledge or knowledge of truths. If phenomenal properties are 
physical properties, then our knowledge about those properties is propositional as 
well. Since, according to Campbell and Russell, this is not meant by knowledge by 
acquaintance, the only viable alternative is to interpret the acquaintance approach in 
the weak sense and therefore as synonymous to the experience thesis. As argued 
before, acquaintance interpreted in this sense cannot lead to a viable reading of the 
revelation thesis. 
The second issue with the operational account of acquaintance becomes clear 
by considering the approach combined with weak transparency. The obvious trade-off 
for such a unique acquaintance relation is that the whole thesis is not compatible with 
physicalism again. Since ontological independent or basic phenomenal properties 
violate the Levineian Materialist Constraint, one may obtain a viable acquaintance 
thesis, mystifying however phenomenal properties. The resulting revelation account is 
the one I started with by considering the essence claim as complete knowledge by 
acquaintance. A thesis in this spirit basically states that anti-physicalism about 
phenomenal properties is essentially true. 
In general, I think, the operational account of acquaintance fails because it only 
restricts acquaintance to certain similarity and difference relations. It brings nothing 
new to the table besides weakening the application. Johnston's account, therefore, 
does not put acquaintance in any better position. His personal interpretation of the 
acquaintance-revelation relation is stated in quite a bloomy manner: 
 Part of my pleasure in seeing color is not simply the pleasure of 
undergoing certain experiences but the pleasure of having 
access to the natures of those features of external things that 
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are the colors.313 
Since Johnston, of course, subscribes to weakening the acquaintance approach, in my 
opinion, acquaintance loses part of its charm. 
In the beginning of the discussion about revelation and acquaintance I said that 
the 'essence claim' interpreted as complete knowledge by acquaintance is not really an 
alternative to the acquaintance thesis in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, revelation 
and acquaintance can be traced back to the same origin. For Russell, both ideas are so 
intimately linked that making sense of the revelation's 'essence claim' has to explore 
this interpretation first. Of course, if one argues in this respect that the acquaintance 
relation is dubious or mysterious at best, than revelation inherits all these problems. 
Nothing that revelation adds will make those problems go away. Despite the 
similarities and deep relatedness of both approaches, it is not necessary for revelation 
to depend on the acquaintance thesis. At this point, it should be explored how 
revelation can emancipate itself from its descent. To count as a real alternative to the 
acquaintance thesis as an explanation of the privileged access to the phenomenal, 
revelation should preserve all the benefits and eliminate all the threads of the previous 
approach. In the spirit of this idea, it should be especially examined whether there is a 
viable version of revelation that is compatible with physicalism. To do so means in my 
opinion, to evaluate what the revelation thesis is about and discuss alternative 
interpretations which do not violate physicalism. 
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III. INTERPRETING THE REVELATION THESIS 
 
In this chapter I want to evaluate whether the revelation thesis may be 
considered an alternative explanation for the privileged access. To evaluate whether or 
not this thesis is a viable possible option, I will first consider what the revelation thesis 
claims. As a second step, I will try make sense of the most controversial idea, namely 
the essence claim. The basic thought behind this move is to eliminate implausible 
interpretations of the revelation thesis. 
 
III.1. Readings and meanings of revelation 
 
Up to this point I assumed that it is crystal clear what is meant when we talk 
about revelation. I pointed out that the revelation thesis may be interpreted in the 
following two manners: first, the thesis's essence claim is about properties closely 
related to experiences (e.g. colors) and second, revelation makes essence claims about 
experiences themselves. Clearly, revelation is interpreted in the second sense here. 
According to Stoljar, however, there are different meanings of revelation. For him, 
there are at least five different issues that need clarification. In my opinion, three of 
those problems may be considered preliminary and shall be settled without extensive 
discussion. The remainder can be divided in the core issue, namely to make sense of 
the essence claim, and whether revelation is really a claim about experience itself or 
about the understanding of what an experience is. Before discussing the core problem, 
I will try to settle the minor issues swiftly and clarify what the revelation thesis’s claim 
is really about. To discuss the above issues, here is, as a reminder, the unqualified 
revelation thesis about experience again: 
 
By having an experience, I am in a position to know or know the essence of that 
experience.314 
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III.1.1. Preliminary issues 
 
A first minor detail concerns whether one should understand the revelation 
thesis to state that one is 'in the position to know' the subject matter or that one 
plainly 'knows' it. According to Stoljar, it seems rather appropriate to assume that we 
are 'in the position to know'. Clearly this interpretation is weaker and may be buffered 
by conditioning the circumstances of being 'in the position to know'. That is to say, it 
seems less controversial. Stoljar however thinks that this version comes with a 
downside. The epistemic position one is in becomes less tenable. To maintain this 
extraordinary position, one has to spell out the exact conditions for this version. In my 
opinion, in the case of experience, this depends largely on one's view of the epistemic 
access to our experiences. Many would agree that such an access is introspection. This 
means our special epistemic position depends on one's detailed view of introspection. 
As shown in the previous chapter however, introspection, at least in this context, 
depends largely on the force of the epistemic principle that is revelation. At this point, 
one may think that such an idea leads to circularity. It however does not. It is one thing 
to consider the revelation thesis to ground privileged access; it is another to give a 
detailed account of introspection. Since I have shown in the last chapter that, in 
principle, the development of an introspective approach should be considered 
possible, I will assume from this point on that the weaker notion of revelation is 
tenable as well. That 'one is in the position to know' therefore seems to be a 
reasonable interpretation.315 This less controversial interpretation of our epistemic 
position is sufficient for revelation to get off the ground.316 Since I do not think, 
however, that a lot hangs on the decision between both alternatives, at least for the 
validity of revelation thesis, we may leave both possible options open at this point. 
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This means, one either 'knows' or is 'in the position to know'.  
A second preliminary issue for Stoljar is that it may not be as straightforward to 
interpret the essence claim as it was assumed so far. In his view, one problematic 
interpretation of revelation leads to the idea that one already needs to have a concept 
of essence. If interpreted in this latter manner, then revelation is construed as knowing 
that E is the essence of that experience. This contrasts a simpler reading of the thesis, 
where revelation is interpreted as knowing that this experience is E and E is, as a 
matter of fact, the essence of the experience. On the less demanding reading, a 
concept of essence is not necessary. Of course it seems to be correct, at this point, that 
the simpler interpretation is true. It seems odd to assume that one needs a 'concept of 
essence' to experience e.g. a tickle.317 Still, we will see in the next chapter that this 
issue is not as innocent as it seems. However, I think that for now we may assume 
Stoljar's weaker claim as a working hypothesis and settle the issue in that chapter. 
A final minor problem is according to Stoljar, whether revelation claims tacit or 
explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge in this context means that knowing the essence 
of an experience is 'before the mind'.318 Even though Stoljar thinks that it is not clear 
how to characterize such a situation, it seems to me as if this interpretation could be 
explained by the idea of construing revelation as knowing that E is the essence of that 
experience. If one has a concept of essence, then one explicitly knows that E is the 
essence of that experience, or better, one has E 'before the mind'. This is, of course, a 
strange interpretation and leads, according to Stoljar, to the idea that “[…] those who 
are itchy have the essence of itchiness in the forefront of their minds.”319 
If revelation concerns tacit knowledge, then the thesis predicts that one can 
know the essence of an experience, even though it is not clear to one that one knows 
it. I think this characterization may be explained by revelation interpreted as knowing 
that this experience is E and E is in fact the essence of the experience. For revelation to 
be true one only needs tacit knowledge that this experience is E, even if this means 
that one does not know that E is in fact the essence of the experience. Just as above, 
this version seems to suffice for revelation, but again, this idea is not unproblematic. 
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At this point, I will assume this interpretation and settle the next chapter. 
As far as I can see, this should be sufficient for a characterization of what I 
called the preliminary remarks for an understanding of the revelation thesis. The 
original, unqualified thesis therefore states, at least, that one is 'in the position to 
know', which clearly suffices for a reasonable reading of revelation. I however think 
that at this point not much hangs on whether one prefers the epistemic position to 
claim that one 'knows' that one 'is in the position to know'. I will therefore maintain, 
for now, both possibilities explicitly. Only when laying out my version of the thesis, I 
will specifically re-visit this issue. Regarding the interpretation of the essence claim, I 
will assume, at this point, that constructing revelation as knowing that this experience 
is E and E is, as a matter of fact, the essence of the experience suffices for revelation. 
Since the interpretation of knowledge as tacit knowledge seems to go along with this 
previous idea, I will accept this reading as well. I will come back to this issue, however, 
in the next chapter. 
 
III.1.2. E-revelation or u-revelation? 
 
It was assumed so far that the revelation thesis in general may come in two 
versions. The first version is about what experiences are about or better properties 
closely linked to experiences, like e.g. colors. The second option concerns experience 
itself. Following Stoljar however, there is a third variant that may be understood as 
prior to the others. According to the first two options, revelation concerns the result of 
undergoing an experience. This result, as just stated, can refer either to properties 
closely connected to experiences or experiences themselves. Since this interpretation 
is concerned with what happens when we undergo an experience, Stoljar calls it e-
revelation. In the here relevant context, namely experiences themselves, the theory 
states the following: 
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By having an experience E, I am in a position to know or know the essence of E.320 
 
The third interpretation, considered as prior, is the so called u-revelation thesis. This 
thesis concerns the result of understanding what an experience is. The thesis may be 
stated the following way: 
 
By understanding what an experience E is, I know or I am in a position to know the 
essence of E.321 
 
Both ideas are not identical, but in Stoljar's opinion, they are intimately related. 
In the previous chapter I discussed other alternative epistemic principles. One 
of those alternatives is understanding. Understanding is clearly independent from 
revelation. However, it constitutes a condition for revelation in the following sense: 
Understanding is necessary for revelation, for to say that one 
knows the essence of experience is to say at least that one 
understands what experiences are. But it is not sufficient, for it 
as yet an open possibility that one may understand an 
experience and yet not know its essence.322 
The result is that e-revelation can only be constructed when combined with a third 
thesis about understanding. 
 
By having an experience E, I thereby understand what experience E is.323 
 
Clearly, the combination of u-revelation and the thesis about understanding result in 
e-revelation. This inquiry results, according to Stoljar, in two consequences. On the 
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one hand, e-revelation and u-revelation are not the same. On the other hand, u-
revelation combined with the epistemic principle of understanding generates e-
revelation. Stoljar's conclusion therefore is the following: 
[T]he basic doctrine at issue here is u-revelation; e-revelation is 
something that follows from this basic doctrine together with 
the view that if you have an experience you understand it. To 
put this differently, revelation may be factored into two claims. 
The first claim is understanding, namely, that if you have an 
experience, then you understand what it is; the second claim is 
u-revelation, namely, that if you understand what an 
experience is, you know or are in position to know its 
essence.324 
Basically this means that revelation initially interpreted as being about experience 
itself – and therefore what happens when we undergo those experiences – is in the 
end necessarily constituted by revelation about understanding what an experience is, 
or u-revelation, and the epistemic principle understanding. 
The last chapter made it clear that the most important task of revelation is to 
give new credence to the privileged access in the sense of 1), that is to say it 
constitutes certainty. It was also explained that to obtain certainty in a strong sense, it 
is necessary to base it on the two strongest epistemic principles, namely infallibility 
and omniscience. Since revelation consists in qualified versions of those principles, it 
clearly suffices to achieve strong certainty. The crux is that privileged self-knowledge is 
usually secured by assuming an acquaintance relation between consciously present 
phenomenal properties and the corresponding judgments. However, since this relation 
is implausible – and including it as essence claim in the revelation thesis as well – 
grounding epistemic special self-knowledge has to be found in a somewhat different 
approach to revelation. However, according to what is claimed now, understanding 
has to be kept in mind as well, complicating the situation. The question therefore turns 
on whether or not revelation about experience itself is really based on understanding 
and u-revelation. 
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Now, imagine what Stoljar concludes is true. This means - combined with what 
was said above – that every form of revelation entails the following three independent 
epistemic principles: 
 
Infallibility: If after carefully introspecting on an experience with certain phenomenal 
properties it seems to be in the nature of those phenomenal properties that p, then it 
is in the nature of those phenomenal properties that p. 
 
Self-intimation: If it is in the nature of the phenomenal properties of an experience 
that p, then after carefully introspecting on an experience with those phenomenal 
properties it seems to be in the nature of those phenomenal properties that p. 
 
Understanding: A creature that is psychologically complex enough to undergo 
experiences with certain phenomenal properties is also psychologically complex 
enough to know what those phenomenal properties of an experience are.325 
 
These principles explicitly satisfy Stoljar's initial claim that u-revelation is prior to e-
revelation. In the case of phenomenal properties this means, assuming that one 
understands what an experience e with phenomenal property q is, then by revelation, 
one knows or is in the position to know (with infallibility) the nature of q. To convert 
this scenario to revelation about experience itself, one implements the epistemic 
principle understanding in the thesis. The result claims that by having an experience 
with phenomenal property q (self-intimation) – via understanding – one knows or is in 
a position to know (with infallibility) the nature of q. A general version of e-revelation 
may be formulated the following way: 
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By having an experience with phenomenal property q (self-intimation) – via 
understanding – I am in the position to know or know (with infallibility) the nature of 
q. 
 
At a first glance, this seems to be an adequate solution for what e-revelation is. 
There are however two problems with this interpretation. First, when 
examining the epistemic principles involved, there seems to be a difference in type. 
Now, it is common to all three principles that, in some sense, they describe the 
relation between phenomenal properties and the corresponding judgments or the self-
knowledge relation. Infallibility suggests that a judgment about the nature of 
phenomenal property q cannot be wrong. Self-intimation claims that the phenomenal 
property q suffices for a judgment about the nature of q. And finally, understanding 
argues that a psychologically sufficient complex creature that undergoes phenomenal 
property q is also psychologically complex enough to know what q is. 
The difference in type, however, should become clear from this description as 
well. While self-intimation and infallibility make epistemic claims, understanding 
makes a psychological claim. Self-intimation and infallibility, on the one hand, state the 
knowledge conditions for knowledge of phenomenal property q. Understanding, on 
the other hand, states the psychological conditions for knowledge about those 
properties. It is easy to see that the latter claim concerns psychology and therefore 
constitutes a difference in type. Both, understanding and self-intimation refer to the 
first part of revelation. If both were epistemic principles of the same type, then there 
should be a conflict. In my opinion however, there is no conflict. The reason is that 
self-intimation describes the epistemic function and understanding the psychological 
aspect. The epistemic function claimed by self-intimation is that 'by having an 
experience with phenomenal property q' is sufficient to form knowledge about the 
property in question. The psychological dimension, laid out by understanding, is that a 
psychologically sufficient complex creature that has 'an experience with phenomenal 
property q' is psychologically sufficiently complex to know what that phenomenal 
property q is. 
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Now, clearly self-intimation is only epistemic in nature. An epistemic principle 
claims nothing about what psychological conditions one needs for knowledge. 
Analyzed in a general manner, this principle states the following: 
 
Being in a state X with property p suffices for knowledge about p.326 
 
Understanding, however, stated in general terms, claims something like this: 
 
A creature C psychologically sufficiently complex for being in a state X with property p 
is psychologically sufficiently complex to know what that p is. 
 
Clearly this type of claim is different from what is claimed by self-intimation. 
Understanding asserts something about the psychological conditions to obtain 
knowledge and not epistemic ones. In short, self-intimation states the epistemic 
conditions for knowledge, while understanding asserts psychological conditions for a 
creature to obtain knowledge. The confusion however is intelligible. Since we are 
concerned with psychological processes of some form, namely experiences and their 
phenomenal properties, it seems particularly easy to confuse both categories. In the 
end this means, Stoljar mixes up two types of principles: one being epistemic and the 
other one psychological. E-revelation therefore may depend also on understanding, 
but not epistemically, 'only' psychologically. 
A second problem concerns the claim that e-revelation depends on u-
revelation. In specific, it seems arguable that u-revelation really is a form of revelation. 
The key issue here, again, concerns self-intimation and understanding. In the previous 
chapter it was clearly stated that revelation entails two epistemic principles – 
infallibility and self-intimation – to guarantee certainty and therefore to secure 
privileged access to the phenomenal. But u-revelation misses one of those principles. 
As mentioned earlier, u-revelation concerns the understanding of an experience: if one 
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understands what an experience with phenomenal property q is, then one knows or is 
in the position to know the nature of q. Now, the second part of this interpretation of 
revelation is identical to all unqualified versions of revelation explained so far. It 
therefore entails infallibility. The first part, however, is based on the psychological 
principle understanding alone, claiming only the psychological conditions for 
knowledge about the phenomenal. This opens the door to the question about whether 
or not this suffices for revelation. 
In the previous chapter, I defined revelation in the sense of Byrne and Hilbert. 
The thesis is constituted by a conjunction of infallibility and self-intimation.327 Clearly, 
u-revelation misses the latter. In my opinion, this leaves u-revelation with only two 
options. Both alternatives depend on whether or not understanding is, in the end, the 
basis of self-intimation or equivalent to it.328 
The first option then states that both principles are equivalent in function. Of 
course, this does not mean that the two principles are identical. It seems absurd, since, 
as I explained above, one is an epistemic principle, while the other is a psychological 
principle. There is however still the possibility that both principles fulfill the same 
function, namely making sure that an experience with phenomenal property q suffices 
for knowledge of q. At a first glance, this may be the case. Self-intimation realizes this 
function in the epistemic sense: being in or having q suffices for knowledge of q. 
Understanding achieves a similar result: a creature sufficiently psychologically complex 
for being in or having q is a creature sufficiently psychologically complex to know what 
q is. A difference seems to arise only in the types of knowledge produced. While one 
claims propositional knowledge, the other assumes knowing what. This is however a 
minor difference. Since, according to Lewis329, revelation concerns knowing what, it 
should be no problem to restate self-intimation in the following manner: being in or 
having q suffices to know what q is. 
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Now, do both principles equally fulfill the task or not? The answer is no. On the 
one hand, self-intimation as an epistemic principle claims that the fact of being in or 
having q suffices for one to be in the position to know or to know what q is. This means 
this principle justifies that one's knowledge about what q is true, epistemically tying q 
to the judgment. The psychological principle understanding, on the other hand, is not 
concerned with justification of this kind. It rather refers to the sufficient psychological 
complexity of a creature for being in or having q and the corresponding knowledge. 
Understanding therefore is the psychological nexus for knowing what q is, by giving 
psychological conditions. Those conditions however do not lead to an epistemic 
connection between q and the corresponding judgment, therefore making it a weaker 
principle. In short the difference between both principles can be put the following 
way: while self-intimation justifies one's knowledge about ‘what q is’, understanding 
claims psychological conditions under which knowledge about ‘what q is’ possible. 
Since both principles are not functionally equivalent, and understanding is weaker than 
self-intimation, this interpretation fails to satisfy the conditions for revelation. 
A second possibility may however arise by assuming what was said in the last 
paragraph, adding the idea that understanding is the explanation for self-intimation. 
As a psychological principle, understanding makes knowledge about what q is possible 
to begin with. By ensuring the necessary psychological capacities, this principle secures 
the relation between the psychological realization of q and the psychological 
realization of the corresponding judgment. Only if a creature is psychologically 
sufficiently complex to be in or have q, then that creature is psychologically complex to 
know what q is. This does not mean that the creature necessarily knows what q is, but 
it secures further epistemic claims. Self-intimation as an epistemic principle may now 
come into play justifying why being in or having q is sufficient for knowing what q is. 
Even though the nexus between both principles seems evident, it also seems clear that 
understanding is not an explanation for self-intimation. The reason is simple. 
Understanding does not open the door for one epistemic claim, but for many such 
claims. Whether self-intimation follows or any other epistemic principle330 is not 
determined by understanding. Understanding therefore may in general lead the way to 
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the possibility of knowledge about what q is, but it cannot state what kind of epistemic 
justification is involved. Since revelation is an epistemic principle, psychological 
principles may be necessary to constitute knowledge, but understanding is not directly 
involved in constituting the revelation thesis. This is due to the fact that revelation is 
one type of principle and understanding a different type. Understanding may clearly 
form the necessary psychological basis for revelation, it does not form part of the 
revelation thesis itself. Since the revelation is epistemic in nature, u-revelation makes 
therefore no sense. 
There is however one circumstance still to be explained. Stoljar assumes the 
truth of u-revelation for a reason. This reason stems from Lewis's thought that 
“[m]aybe revelation is true in some other cases - as it might be for the part-whole 
relation.”331 Stoljar explains this idea by invoking u-revelation, since, in this case, e-
revelation makes no sense. He explains Lewis's notion in the following manner: 
[…] [Lewis] is invoking u-revelation, and means that if you 
understand what the relation of whole and part is, you know 
the essence of the relation. More generally, since u-revelation 
is a thesis about understanding, and is not a thesis about 
experience, it might be applied without oddity to domains, such 
as whole and part, in which experience has no role.332 
In my opinion, this is simply wrong. It confuses the two different types of principles. As 
argued so far, understanding cannot fulfill the functional role asked for by 
revelation.333 Now, there may be a good indicator for why it is largely assumed that 
revelation is about properties closely connected to experiences or about experiences 
themselves. The reason – maybe held implicitly – is closely connected to the scope of 
privileged self-knowledge. Most contemporary philosophers think that such knowledge 
can only be achieved of ongoing conscious experiences, and I assume that revelation is 
supposed to give us good reasons for why this is the case. The thesis therefore might 
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not be applicable in any other domains and there simply is no u-revelation. Whatever 
Lewis is invoking and Stoljar is defending, might be privileged knowledge of some sort. 
This idea might be closely related to the revelation thesis, it is however not revelation. 
If what was said is right, then an unqualified revelation thesis means revelation 
as an epistemic principle that entails infallibility and self-intimation. Further, it seems, 
at least for now, reasonable to assume that for the thesis to be true, one does not 
need a concept of essence or nature and that knowledge obtained is tacit. As a final 
clarification it was claimed that, at this point, not much hangs on whether one is 'in the 
position to know' or one simply 'knows'. Revelation is a viable thesis in both cases. Of 
course, many implications follow from this decision, including one's detailed view 
about introspection. At this point, however, such details are not the issue. The more 
pressing question is whether or not revelation has a future to explain privileged self-
knowledge. 
 
III.2. The essence claim 
 
So far, I have tried to make sense of the revelation thesis as a whole or better 
how we should read the thesis. In the remainder of this chapter, I will try to make 
sense of the core problem of revelation, i.e., how to understand the essence claim. 
One way of interpreting this claim was already discussed in the previous chapter, 
namely essence as complete knowledge by acquaintance. Since this reading of the 
claim proved unsatisfactory, other possibilities need to be explored. 
 
III.2.1. Knowledge of all essential truths 
 
Even though Campbell clearly states that revelation is not about knowledge of 
truths,334 this may however be a viable option. In his opinion, most critics335 assume 
that revelation is not compatible with physicalism, exactly because of this mistake. 
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One of the most straight forward critiques, as we have seen, stems from Lewis, who 
holds that revelation about experiences themselves asks for an 'uncommonly 
demanding' interpretation of knowing what. If one assumes that a phenomenal 
property is essentially a physical property as well, then by revelation, I should get to 
know the exact physical instantiation of a particular phenomenal property simply by 
having the relevant experience.336 At a first glance, Lewis seems to be right and 
revelation is not compatible with physicalism. The question however arises whether 
one can solve this problem and propose a reasonable account of the revelation thesis. 
A first way of adapting the thesis may lie in the substitution of 'complete knowledge by 
acquaintance' with 'complete knowledge of truths'. The resulting revelation thesis 
states the following: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to have or 
have complete knowledge of truths about Q.337 
 
This interpretation of revelation is obviously implausible. First of all, it is hard to 
believe that we can know every possible description of a phenomenal property just by 
having the relevant experience. Secondly, this version is clearly not compatible with 
physicalism. 
Damnjanovic offers therefore a slightly different version. This new 
interpretation claims the following: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to know or 
know all essential truths about Q.338 
 
Even though this version of revelation limits the scope to 'all essential truths', it is, 
according to Damnjanovic, still not compatible with physicalism. Assuming that 
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physicalism is true, it is clearly essential to the phenomenal. One should therefore 
know something similar to Lewis's claim, namely the physical implementation. This 
means however that limiting the scope does not achieve the goal it is supposed to. The 
problem stems from the claim that one could possess 'knowledge of all essential truths 
about Q'. Even though one only needs to know the essential truths of Q, this version 
still claims that one needs to be all of them. To know all the essential truths however 
means that one needs to possess all possible concepts of Q, something that seems 
clearly impossible.339 
To solve this problem, Damnjanovic introduces a further constraint. This 
modified revelation thesis qualifies the scope even further. By adding the condition 
that one only has to know all those essential truths that one understands, this 
interpretation of revelation allows one to know the essence of phenomenal property Q 
without knowing all the essential truths about that property. One only needs to know 
those essential truths; one is capable to understand and therefore possesses a 
concept.340 Damnjanovic himself however doubts this version. He thinks that it leads to 
a dilemma. To accept this version of the revelation thesis implies to promote a 
posteriori physicalism341. A posteriori physicalsim is the view that even if phenomenal 
properties are identical to physical properties, this fact can only be known a posteriori. 
As it turns out however, this interpretation of revelation cannot satisfy the conditions 
for this type of physicalism. 
At a first glance, this version seems perfectly compatible with a posteriori 
physicalism and therefore a viable candidate. To explain this appearance, Damnjanovic 
gives the following example: 
I may know the full nature of Mohamed Ali. That is, I may come 
to know everything there is to know about his essence – 
including that he is human, perhaps who his parents are if 
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biological origins are essential, and so on. I may then acquire 
the concept CASSIUS CLAY, which rigidly designates the 
selfsame person. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that I 
acquire the latter concept in a way that I cannot work out, a 
priori, that Mohamed Ali is Cassius Clay. At least, it is hard to 
see why those who think that that identity statement is a 
posteriori should think that it must be a priori derivable for 
those who know the nature of Mohamed Ali.342 
According to Damnjanovic, this example shows clearly what the a posteriori physicalist 
is bound to. She needs to claim that knowing the essence of an entity does not entail 
knowledge about all co-existential concepts. This means, if one has a concept for the 
entity in question, then that person obtains a new co-existential concept, yet one still 
might not, a priori, know that those concepts are con-existential. The a posteriori 
physicalist therefore individuates concepts more fine-grained than facts343 and argues 
that one possessed concept of a property is enough for this type of revelation. When 
one has an experience with phenomenal property Q, it is sufficient for this 
interpretation to have only, say, phenomenal concepts of Q. But, since this view is a 
version of physicalism and it turns out a posteriori that Q is also physical (or better 
physical concepts of Q are obtained), something that one could not work out a priori, 
revelation as knowledge of essential truths seems to be compatible with physicalism. 
Even though an elegant solution, this interpretation of revelation is an 
implausible candidate for a posteriori physicalism. According to Damnjanovic, this 
version of the revelation thesis begs the question against a posteriori physicalism. 
[The a posteriori physicalist] […] holds that some phenomeno-
physical identity statements may be necessary a posteriori 
truths which may not be derivable a priori. As the above 
example [...] prima facie suggest[s], an a posteriori physicalist 
should also hold that these statements are not derivable a 
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priori even by someone who knows the nature of the relevant 
property. [Therefore] […] it is an inappropriate, question-
begging way of interpreting Revelation.344 
This is simply to say that it seems implausible that an a posteriori physicalist would 
defend that if one knows the nature of Mohamed Ali, she should not know a priori that 
he is identical to Cassius Clay, but only a posteriori. Since this is exactly what is at 
stake, one should not assume it from the start. 
This restricted version of revelation seems, at first glance, to be exactly what 
we are asking for: a thesis that constitutes a pure epistemic principle, which can 
explain strong certainty and is compatible with physicalism. As it turns out however, 
for the kind of physicalist interpretation this revelation thesis would need, it is 
implausible, making the thesis unsustainable. 
But is that really the case? I think that Damnjanovic gives up the thesis to easily. 
One needs to consider that most a posteriori physicalists state explicitly the 
specialness of phenomenal concepts345. Whether something similar applies to cases 
concerning non-phenomenal concepts seems to have only minor impact. As long as 
this interpretation of revelation only applies to the domain of the phenomenal, it may 
be perfectly reasonable. Since the basic reasoning of the a posteriori physicalist 
bounds this position to think that two co-existential concepts about some phenomenal 
property are not derivable a priori, it may be very well the case, at this point, that this 
version of revelation is compatible with physicalism. An analysis about what may be 
the problem of this approach in the next section will however expose several 
weaknesses, opening the door for a possible solution. 
At this point, my personal opinion however suggests that the main problem of 
this version of the thesis stems from the fact that it clearly seems to be the case, that if 
physicalism is true, it is an essential truth and one ought to know it. I therefore think 
that it is implausible to pair this form of revelation with a posteriori physicalism a 
thesis that is in every context highly controversial346. Since Damnjanovic thinks that 
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this account of revelation should be rejected because it begs the question against a 
posteriori physicalism, and I hold a posteriori physicalism to be a problematic view, 
imagine it is not possible to find a viable interpretation of 'all essential truths' which is 
compatible with physicalism. This means, in this aspect, this revelation thesis cannot 
do any better than interpreting the essence claim as 'complete knowledge by 
acquaintance'. 
One question however remains open. Assuming that this form of revelation 
leads to anti-physicalism: is the thesis, at least, a good explanation for this claim? In 
other words, does this anti-physicalist version of the thesis have a good argument for 
basic properties in the Levineian sense? 
Byrne and Hilbert347, Johnston348 and Lewis349 already lay the groundwork for 
such an endeavor. For them, it is clearly problematic that revelation leads to anti-
physicalism. Stoljar profoundly analyses this idea in the context of revelation about 
experience itself, in what he calls the argument from revelation.350 The argument may 
be put the following way: 
(4) If Jones has an experience of type E, then Jones knows or is a 
position to know the essence of E. 
(5)Jones has an experience of type E. 
(6)The following is one essential truth about E: having an 
experience of type E is identical being in Phys. 
(7) Jones does not know, and is not in a position to know, that 
having an experience of type E is identical to being in 
Phys.351 
Stoljar notes that the four claims are inconsistent. In his opinion, if (4) and (5) are true, 
then revelation is true. However, if (6) and (7) are true, then revelation is false. The 
reason for the latter is that Jones would not know the essence of E, namely that E is 
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identical to Phys. On this view, the first two claims are closely related to revelation. 
This means that (5) states the condition under which revelation is possible and (4) 
follows from revelation. The latter two claims however are closely connected to 
physicalism. This means (6) is one possible claim that follows from the truth of 
physicalism and (7) is a statement, extensively discussed above, that seems to be 
true.352 Stoljar thinks that if those four statements are inconsistent than one of them 
has to be false. In his opinion, it is obvious that (5) and (7) are stipulated, so one wants 
to assume their truth. Our options are therefore narrowed down to (4) and (6). Of 
course, the revelation theorist, Stoljar argues, maintains the truth of (4) and claims 
that (6) is false, therefore demonstrating that the argument from revelation shows 
that physicalism is false, proving it to be a good argument for anti-physicalism. 
Now, for Stoljar there are three ways of dealing with this argument. The first 
option is to agree with it, the second is to assume that revelation is false, and the third 
– the so called Canberra Plan – is to substitute our ordinary concept of experience, 
where revelation is true, with a replacement conception, where revelation is false. The 
second and third alternatives are designed to deny revelation. In this context, Stoljar 
himself picks the third option, namely replacing the folk psychological account which 
entails revelation,353 with a conception that does not. This is of course a 
straightforward method to get rid of the problematic revelation thesis. Since this is 
however not what I want to do here, it is more interesting to follow the first 
alternative. 
Before pursuing this analysis, it is necessary to see why both the second and 
third approach are inadequate. The former idea of simply denying that revelation is 
false runs into problems with Lewis's claim that revelation seems to be embedded in 
folk psychology.354 It is however not enough to dispute this claim. Since the folk 
psychological concept of experience seems to entail revelation one needs at least an 
alternative conception.  
That is where the third option enters. The so-called Canberra Plan tries to 
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substitute this ordinary folk psychological concept of experience with a replacement 
conception. To do so, this plan tries to dispute the idea that a natural concept of 
experience entails revelation. By showing that cases which are supposed to support 
the thesis may be interpreted in a sense that avoids this conclusion,355 this objection to 
the revelation thesis tries to deny the necessity of revelation in each particular case of 
the conception of experience. In my opinion, therefore, we may assume for the sake of 
argument, that this is a real alternative and a thread to the revelation thesis. 
Consequently, I suggest analyzing the first alternative, trying to overcome its problems, 
and at last defend it against the Canberra Plan. 
Opting for this alternative means for Stoljar – just as it does for Byrne and 
Hilbert356 – that one has to assume primitivism. As a difference to the latter 
proponents, it is not primitivism about color; it is rather a form of primitivism about 
experience. This means that experiences are something entirely different from any 
other existing entity. This follows directly from certain thoughts about revelation. 
According to Stoljar, even when paired with the hypothesis that experiences are soul 
like entities, revelation would fail to reveal this essence as well. For all the above 
authors then, revelation always leads to primitivism. The general problem is that any 
metaphysical thesis about the status of phenomenal properties cannot be revealed. 
Accordingly, experiences can only be primitive. Primitivism about experiences is, of 
course, implausible. Since this view implies mysterious basic properties in the 
Levineian sense, it is not only the case that anti-physicalism is true, it is far from clear 
what kind of properties phenomenal properties are, rendering any analysis dubious.357 
If true, this version of revelation is of course in no better shape than revelation 
interpreted as complete knowledge by acquaintance. The only difference is that the 
acquaintance version may be interpreted as basic in the Levineian sense in two distinct 
ways. One version employs a basic relation, the other implies basic properties. 
Revelation interpreted as 'knowledge of all essential truths' can only lead to the latter. 
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In any case, this version of revelation does not widen our knowledge about 
experiences; it leaves us with an interpretation of experience that is mysterious at 
best. 
 
III.2.2. Getting a grip on what happens 
 
The problem of revelation interpreted as 'knowledge of all essential truths' is 
basically that, if not paired with a posteriori physicalism, it violates the Material 
Constraint, or should be rejected by the a posteriori physicalist as question begging. 
There was still the hope that the thesis might leave us with a good explanation for a 
tangible anti-physicalist approach to the phenomenal, but as seen in the last 
paragraph, this hope was quickly shattered. There may however be an upside to this 
version of the revelation thesis. Even though it yields no improvement over the 
previous acquaintance based account, there seem to exist possible ways to adapt the 
theory accordingly. Now, acquaintance by itself leaves only two options358 for its 
proponent. Any account that proposes the possibility of a substantial inside to the 
nature of phenomenal properties359 - or equivalently a strong account of acquaintance 
– leads to a mysterious and primitive view about experiences. Weaker versions 
however are only equivalent to the experience thesis and therefore without profound 
implications for knowledge about phenomenal properties. Since a theory based on a 
strong account already entails its undesirable results, this version of the revelation 
thesis is clearly lost from the start. 
The upside of revelation interpreted as 'knowledge of all essential of truths' is 
that it gets us closer to a solution of the main problems. As we have seen in the last 
paragraph, the compatibility problem was almost solved by introducing a posteriori 
physicalism. If one supports such an approach – which for the sake of argument I will 
do at this point – the main underlying problem for this explanation is that if it is 
necessary to know all essential truths to know the nature of a property, then one 
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cannot fail to know all essential concepts. This means, a posteriori physicalism has to 
reject a version of revelation that entails a priori knowledge of all essential concepts. 
Since, if this version of the revelation thesis were true, the physical concept of 
phenomenal property q had to be known just by having an experience. The a posteriori 
physicalist however cannot commit to this account. The solution therefore involves 
that knowing the nature of a property does not entail a priori knowledge of all 
essential concepts. A resulting thesis could then be accepted by all who accept a 
posteriori physicalism. 
To obtain a solution, we have to quickly illustrate the reasoning of an a 
posteriori physicalist. The strategy of a posteriori physicalism, or the phenomenal 
concept strategy360, is usually employed to give a response to the knowledge 
argument.361 According to Damnjanovic, the important claim made in this context is 
that, different to other concepts like e.g. water, phenomenal concepts – due to their 
special features – do not depend on the actual world and are therefore actuality-
independent. It is often held that the corresponding physical concepts are also 
actuality-independent, suggesting that there should be an a priori knowable identity 
between both concepts. Damnjanovic however explains that the unique claim of the a 
posteriori physicalist is that even if this idea is true about both concepts, it is not the 
case that one has to know a priori that those concepts co-exist. Again, so far this idea is 
not applicable to the revelation thesis. Revelation introduces the further claim that 
one knows the nature of a property, making it implausible to maintain that such an 
identity claim should not be known a priori.362 
To solve this dead lock one now has to show that this last remark may be 
altered. It has to be possible for the a posteriori physicalist to maintain her original 
conclusion, namely that even if the phenomenal concept and the physical concept of q 
are actual-independent and co-existential – even assuming that revelation is true – one 
does not know a priori that those concepts are co-existential. If this idea turns out to 
be a viable position, then the two main problems of revelation may be solved. Firstly, 
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there may exist a version of the revelation thesis that is compatible with physicalism 
and consequently secondly, basic phenomenal properties in the Levineain sense can be 
avoided. 
As we have seen a posteriori physicalism was introduced to block the 
knowledge argument. Since this approach does not entail knowledge about the nature 
of properties, Damnjanovic introduces what he calls the 'Enhanced Knowledge 
Argument'363. This new version of the argument is supposed to show a possible 
strategy to reconcile a posteriori physicalism and revelation. The argument goes as 
follows: 
Enhanced Knowledge Argument 
9. If physicalism is true and Mary knows the nature of all 
physical properties, then Mary is in a position to  know that 
p. 
10. Mary knows the nature of all physical properties. [By 
hypothesis] 
11.  Mary is not in a position to know that p. 
Therefore 
12. Physicalism is false.364 
The decisive distinction between Jackson's original argument and the enhanced 
version may be found in (10). While in the original version Mary knows all physical 
facts, in the latter case she knows the nature of all physical properties. According to 
Damnjanovic, this difference however does not imply alteration in the basic strategy, 
since there are only two ways to deny the truth of (10). One way is to assume that the 
nature of physical properties in non-physical. Of course, a physicalist cannot allow this 
move, since in her approach all properties are physical by hypothesis. Another way is 
to deny that Mary can know the nature of physical properties. Damnjanovic claims that 
this is only possible by assuming Russellian Monism. This view states that one can only 
know the extrinsic features of physical properties and not the intrinsic ones. Since this 
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approach is also used against the original version of the knowledge argument, nothing 
changes for the enhanced version. 
Since (10) does not entail a substantial difference in strategy in comparison 
with the original argument, two possibilities can be found in (9) or (11). Damnjanovic 
argues that (11) corresponds to a similar thesis in Jackson's argument; p just has to be 
substituted with the corresponding claim. It seems then that the strategy change 
should follow from (9). However, according to Damnjanovic, this is not the case. 
Instead by denying the relevant instances of (9), the a posteriori physicalist is in a 
position to solve the original problem the following way: 
One such instance is obtained by substituting ‘phenomenal red 
= P’ for ‘p’, where P is the relevant physical property. If the 
physicalist denies that instance of (9), as it seems she must, 
then she is denying that Mary must know the proposition 
‘phenomenal red = P’. But this means she is in effect saying that 
identity state-ments between actuality-independent physical 
and phenomenal concepts are a posteriori even when one 
knows the nature of the property at issue. And this is just the 
claim that is needed to block the Argument from Revelation. 
So, when it comes to the instances of (9) that involve 
phenomeno-physical identity statements, the extra wrinkle 
does not show that the a posteriori physicalist will face any new 
difficulty in attempting to reconcile Revelation with 
physicalism.365 
There are however further potential reasons that could prevent the a posteriori 
physicalist from reaching her goal. One example is that there may be worries that one 
may not know essential truths about the internal composition of a phenomenal 
property. If both physicalism and revelation are true, then one should know such a 
truth. According to Damnjanovic, this internal constitution may be described in two 
possible scenarios. The first scenario entails the internal neuronal structure of a 
phenomenal property, the second, a phenomenal property as functional role property. 
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At this point, Damnjanovic argues that this case can be solved in a similar fashion as 
before. When comparing the original knowledge argument and his enhanced version it 
turns out that the a posteriori physicalist in the first scenario is in the same position as 
any physicalist. This means that she has to find an explanation for why one is in a 
position to know the nature of a phenomenal property without being in a position to 
know all essential truths about it.366 In the second scenario the a posteriori physicalist 
has to insist in her original claim, namely that the relation between a phenomenal 
truth – a truth derived from phenomenal concepts – and the functional role property 
can only be known a posteriori.367 
The conclusion of these considerations is that for a physicalist to be able to 
defend revelation, she should consider what derives from the new knowledge/old fact 
view368 about the knowledge argument. To know the nature of a property then is not 
to know all essential truths; it is to know all essential facts, or to put it in 
Damnjanovic's words: 
A posteriori physicalists, having drawn a distinction between 
facts and truths, should hold that even if knowing the full 
nature of a property requires knowing all essential facts about 
that property – or all essential properties of that property – this 
does not imply knowing all essential truths about that 
property.369 
 
III.2.3. Knowledge of all essential facts or properties 
 
As seen in the last paragraph, there may be a viable interpretation of the 
revelation thesis that is compatible with physicalism.370 This solution assumes that the 
gained knowledge is ‘knowledge of all essential properties or facts’ of phenomenal 
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properties instead of ‘all essential truths’. It is important to keep in mind that the 
internal composition of phenomenal properties influences the relation between 
revelation and physicalism. Deriving certain considerations about the difference 
between facts/properties and truths, a posteriori physcalism can maintain that 
‘knowing all essential facts’ is enough to ‘know the nature’ of a property. This new 
revelation approach may be stated the following way: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in the position to know 
or know, for every particular essential property F of Q, that Q is F.371 
 
At this point, I want to indicate that one should be careful and not confuse this account 
of the revelation thesis with the one interpreted as complete knowledge by 
acquaintance. The confusion may stem from a lack of labeling. At a first glance both 
theses seem to be about properties. Even though true, the latter interpretation of 
revelation is about complete knowledge by acquaintance of the phenomenal property 
Q in question, while the former concerns knowledge about every particular essential 
property F of the phenomenal property Q in question. As seen above, one could label 
those essential properties also essential facts and avoid the confusion. Since nothing 
hangs on the distinction, I think one can use it interchangeably. 
Now, according to Damnjanovic, this version of revelation includes that one has 
to ‘know all essential properties’ of Q for the thesis to be true. No particular concept of 
those essential properties is required. As long as one has some concept of an essential 
property of Q and knows that Q has that property under this concept, it suffices for 
this account of revelation to be true. 
An a posteriori physicalist can clearly accept this thesis. Since it is not necessary 
– assuming the identity between phenomenal properties and physical properties is 
true – that one knows a priori that the physical concept p of Q and the phenomenal 
concept q of Q are co-existential, one may know this identity statement only a 
posteriori. This account of revelation leaves this possibility open. According to 
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Damnjanovic this thesis basically states that knowing the nature of Q does not imply 
that one must know the identity of p and q, one just has to know that Q is identical to 
either p or q.372 The revelation thesis interpreted as ‘knowledge of all essential 
properties’ seems to solve the compatibility problem with physicalism373, turning it 
into the best candidate so far for examination. 
Even though eloquently solving the major issue in question, Damnjanovic 
argues that this account has to deal with two problems. The first challenge stems from 
the claim that one is supposed to be ‘in the position to know all essential properties’. 
This issue is related to the internal composition of phenomenal properties mentioned 
above. In the first interpretation of this issue, the a posteriori physicalist is not in a 
worse position than any other physicalist. The question about how to resolve the 
relation between revelation and neuro-structure in general, however, still remains. 
This challenge may be split in a two part question. One, does a physical property have 
essential properties which depend on the internal composition? And two, is one in the 
position to know that one's phenomenal properties have all those essential properties 
without empirical investigation? 
Damnjanovic thinks that it is not clear how to solve both matters. The first 
question points to what can be considered elements of internal composition. 
According to him, various candidates come to mind: the kind of experience, e.g. visual 
experience; that introspectively it seems that phenomenal properties are simple and 
intrinsic properties of experiences374; and also the relation to other experiences of the 
same kind. Even though this might not be a knock down argument, however taking 
into account Damnjanovic’s suggestions, we may assume that there are essential 
properties which are related to their internal composition.375 
From what was previously said, it can be inferred that one knows at least some 
of the essential properties, simply not under a physical concept. The question however 
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remains whether those are all essential properties. Damnjanovic argues at this point 
that an answer may depend on the version of physicalism one defends. If one defends 
strong forms of physicalism, e.g. brain/mind identity376, and assumes that phenomenal 
properties have essential properties which depend on their internal composition, then 
it remains unclear whether one is in the position to know all those essential properties. 
However, if one supports multiple realizability377, then the internal composition seems 
to have no influence on any essential property. This latter account of revelation 
remains clearly compatible with physicalism. So, it remains unclear whether or not the 
thesis can be defended by those who support particularly strong versions of 
physicalism. 
There is however a second challenge for this version of the revelation thesis, 
namely that is quite demanding. According to Damnjanovic, if we assume that the 
nature of a property depends on its internal composition, then one should know this 
nature 'all the way down'378.  Damnjanovic asks us to imagine the case of water. Water 
is constituted by H2O molecules. Those molecules entail hydrogen atoms. Those atoms 
contain protons and electrons and so on. The problem is one is confronted with is that 
one has to know the nature down to the last element. But what happens if there is 
none. According to Damnjanovic, it is at least possible that phenomenal properties 
might be properties that have no final element. This means that no one can know the 
nature of those properties, or even water maybe. Since this approach seems very 
demanding, somehow it has to be limited. 
It seems evident that revelation interpreted as ‘knowledge of all essential 
properties’ is on the right track. The thesis is compatible with physicalism, therefore 
avoiding major rejections. Still, there are issues that are in need of solution. It seems 
basically that this version of revelation is too general and in need of qualification On 
the one hand, it would be advantageous to clarify whether this account is only 
                                                          
376
 The theory goes back to Feigl 1958 and Place 1956. Identity was famously defended by Smart 1959. 
For detailed discussion see Smart 2014. 
377
 This thesis was first introduced by Putnam 1967. The idea states that the mental may be physically 
realized in several different ways. Considering e.g. a tickle, it seems that the same tickle may be 
realized physically in a variety of different manners, e.g. by a human or an alien nervous system. For 
detailed discussion see Bickle 2013. 
378
 Damnjanovic 2012, p. 85. 
 
130 
 
compatible with weak versions of physicalism or strong versions as well379. On the 
other hand, it should avoid the demanding interpretation that one is supposed to 
know the nature 'all the way down'. 
To show that it is not possible to maintain the broad claim that one may know 
all essential properties, two comments already discussed in the last section about 
preliminary issues of revelation may help. The first remark to consider is whether or 
not revelation entails the necessity of a concept of essence. The second idea to bear in 
mind is whether revelation amounts to explicit or tacit knowledge. In the previous 
passage I stated that for revelation to be true, it is neither necessary to have a concept 
of essence, nor does one need to possess explicit knowledge of that essence. 
Now, limiting this approach clearly changes the requirements for one's 
knowledge about essential properties. Interpreting this version of the revelation thesis 
shows that knowing essential properties may not depend on the form of physicalism 
revelation is compatible with. It should, however, imply that one cannot know all 
essential properties. 
To see this, consider what was introduced in the last section. We may assume 
that phenomenal properties have essential properties that depend on their internal 
composition. To know all of those essential properties, however, is supposed to 
depend on particular versions of physicalism. Strong versions of physicalism, e.g. 
mind/brain identity theory, show that we are not in a position to know all essential 
properties, since those depend on the internal composition of the brain. Weaker 
accounts, especially those who admit multiple realizability, claim that the internal 
composition has no influence on those essential properties. This assumption allows 
revelation to be compatible with the idea that we can know all essential properties. 
Now, introducing the ideas that one does not need a concept of essence and one only 
has tacit knowledge of the essences, but revelation may still be true, we will see that it 
makes no sense to ask what form of physicalism is true. 
The reason is simple. Imagine the essential property that in introspection 
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phenomenal property q seems simple (s) and intrinsic (i). A believe that is widely 
held.380 In our interpretation this means that one is in the position to know or know 
the fact that introspectively q is s and i, and s and i are, as a matter of fact, essential 
properties of q. Since one only has tacit knowledge that q is s and i, one easily fails to 
know that they are essential properties of q. It seems that since it is necessary to be 
able to classify a property as essential to know all essential properties, it is not a 
problem with the assumed form of physicalism that we cannot know them all. In this 
case for the revelation thesis to be true, it simply does not imply to know that a 
property is essential, it must only be the case that it is essential. This means, the sole 
way to know all essential properties of phenomenal properties is to know all 
properties of the phenomenal property in question. This, however, seems to be too 
much to ask. This consequence is as similarly demanding as knowing the nature 'all the 
way down'. This account of revelation, therefore, clearly needs to limit the knowledge 
of essential properties first. 
Damnjanovic may be right by hinting at a problem here. It also may be true that 
mind/brain identity makes it implausible to know all essential properties of 
phenomenal properties. However, if true that one needs no concept of essence and 
tacit knowledge of this essence is sufficient, then it is not a question about what kind 
of physicalism is compatible with this account of revelation. It is simply the case that 
one is not in a position to know all essential properties. At this point, one may try to 
treat both problems in this section the same way. The problem about all essential 
properties basically entails the problem of ‘all the way down’. One may, however, 
assume the former worsens the situation. It generalizes the worry of the second 
problem by claiming that only knowledge of all properties entails knowledge of all 
essential properties. A very strong statement that, I suggest, cannot be maintained. 
Even though I think that limiting revelation’s compatibility with physicalism by 
limiting possible interpretations of physicalism381 may not lead to the right 
qualification of this account of revelation, one may ask oneself why it fails. In my 
opinion there are at least two reasons: the first is simply that it is an ongoing 
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metaphysical debate what form of physicalism is true. Without splendid arguments, it 
is far from obvious that such a debate would not already end here. Assuming one 
could come up with a positive argument, there is still a second reason which states 
that it is not clear if it would significantly change the outcome. Imagine on the one side 
of the scale mind/brain identity theory and on the other side any approach that allows 
for multiple realizability. 
Now, consider the former case. There are essential properties that depend on 
their internal composition and identity is true. A possible result is that one knows 
those essential properties – under no particular concept of course – which one can 
assess without empirical research. This limits the amount of essential properties one 
can know in a very practical way, since it is not clear whether introspection382 exhausts 
the knowledge of essential properties. Therefore, all essential properties could be 
qualified as all introspective knowable essential properties. 
Consider now the latter case where multiple realizability is true. This means 
that there may not be essential properties that depend on their internal composition 
or better, there is no essential internal composition of the essential properties in 
question. This does not mean that those essential properties do not essentially have a 
physical structure; it only means that this structure is not essential to them. 
Qualification here means that we can exclude the internal composition of essential 
properties, since there is nothing essential about them. This leaves us in a position 
where we do not have to worry about physical structure influencing our knowledge of 
essential properties. 
In my opinion the results of both restrictions is deeply worrying, but the latter 
qualification is particularly flawed. In this case, one assumes that if multiple 
realizability is true, then there is no essential internal composition. This, however, 
seems doubtful. The approach clearly assumes only coarse-grained functionalism and 
ignores fine-grained functionalism.383 Without further discussing the issue, I just want 
to note that it is unclear whether or not Damnjanovic's interpretation is correct. Surely 
multiple realizability allows for a variety of internal compositions, but this does not 
                                                          
382
 There may be other ways to obtain self-knowledge. For detailed discussion see Gertler 2011a and b. 
383
 For extensive discussion of the coarse-grained and fine-grained distinction of functionalism see 
Sprevak 2009. 
 
133 
 
mean that this composition is arbitrary. It might still be true that certain compositional 
features are essential to the essential properties in question. If so, however, one 
seems not to be in position to know those features. It therefore seems that this 
interpretation is not necessarily better off than mind/brain identity. Without 
exemplification of the conditions for multiple realizability of those essential 
properties384 it is not self-evident that one can accept this hypothesis. 
The general reason why this form of qualification is not practical, however, is 
closely connected to this last argument and the ongoing debate in philosophy of mind. 
If there is no clearly favorable thesis, then maybe it is not such a good option to 
restrict the interpretation of knowledge of all essential properties by some arbitrary 
forms of physicalism. This does not mean that if it turns out that revelation is only 
compatible with a special form of physicalism, one may not assume this position, it 
only means that it is not a good idea to restrict revelation in this manner, right from 
the start. 
In what follows, I will focus therefore on two different accounts that qualify 
revelation as knowledge of essential properties. After discussing and criticizing the first 
approach, which involves counterfactual knowledge, I will focus on my solution (in the 
next chapter). 
 
III.2.4. Knowledge of counterfactuals 
 
One way to qualify the revelation thesis as knowledge of essential properties is 
to consider only counterfactual knowledge of those properties. To draw an important 
distinction, we may consider Stoljar's remarks about the difference between the 
following two scenarios: 
On the first way, and the one that we have been adopting so 
far, the proposal comes out as: F is the essence of a iff in all 
possible worlds considered as counterfactual, a is F and nothing 
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else is. Let us call the resulting notion of essence, the c-essence 
(for ‘counterfactual’). On the second way, the proposal comes 
out as: F is the essence of a iff in all possible worlds considered 
as actual, a is F and nothing else is. Let us call the resulting 
notion of essence, a-essence (for actual).385 
The distinction between both forms of essence states that “[…] we might say that 
being the watery stuff is the a-essence of water, whereas being H20 is its c-essence.”
386 
Those two interpretations of essence result in corresponding versions of the revelation 
thesis. A-essence corresponds to a-revelation which states that in order to understand 
a property one needs to know the a-essence. Consequently, c-essence corresponds to 
c-revelation which claims that in order to understand a property one needs to know 
the c-essence. Now, Stoljar thinks that the former account is often assumed to be 
unproblematic, so only the latter account is problematic. 
This being said, there may actually be doubt about whether or not both a and c 
can really count as 'essences'. It is therefore questionable that the corresponding 
accounts of revelation may be maintained in its original form. Now, Stoljar clearly 
interprets a-revelation as an unproblematic idea. It may be held in all possible worlds 
that are considered as actual and is merely an approach to understanding.387 C-
revelation, however, is the controversial counterpart. According to Stoljar, this is the 
version discussed in the revelation debate and it is hardly ever true.388 
To show that both interpretations of 'essence' are genuinely different, we may 
want to consider the a-revelation approach to understanding first and ask ourselves 
whether this account qualifies as a viable proposal. Before doing so, however, we need 
to consider two issues. First, I assume that revelation is true. Therefore, if we stipulate 
that something is the essence of some property, in any possible sense, then it follows 
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that we are in a position to know this.389 Secondly, it is important to note that both 
notions of essence are independent from each other. As far as I can see, to establish 
the notion of c-essence may be achieved without considering the notion of a-essence 
and vice versa. This means if one notion is eliminated, it does not mean that we cannot 
make sense of the other notion. 
As we have seen above, Stoljar thinks that the e-revelation thesis entails 
understanding. He also assumes that u-revelation is prior to e-revelation. Now, u-
revelation is the idea that if one understands a property, one is in a position to know 
the essence of that property. If I interpret Stoljar correctly, the introduction of a-
essence puts us in a position to know or know the essence of a property in the actual 
world and therefore is a proposal about how to make sense of understanding. This 
position, however, seems to be problematic in at least three different ways. A) I 
already argued that there is no u-revelation. B) it overstretches our concept of 
essence. And C) even if assumed, it leads to an undesirable account of revelation. 
I explained in a previous section of this chapter why u-revelation makes no 
sense (A). It basically breaks down to this: the thesis mixes a psychological principle 
and an epistemic principle in a non-suitable way. The reason this thesis overstretches 
our concept of essence, follows from the possible interpretation of a-essence (B). If the 
a-essence of water, to use Stoljar's example, is 'that watery stuff', then it seems to me 
that any property water has in the actual world has to count as essential. This means, 
there are no properties which are not essential (or maybe it is vice versa). That, 
however, depends on the favored standpoint. The important idea to keep in mind is 
that essential properties and properties cannot be distinguished in an a-essence 
scenario.390 
Finally, imagine that we can overcome these worries (C). In this case, it still 
seems that we have to assume an account of the revelation thesis that I already 
                                                          
389
 This move is purely practical in nature. Revelation, of course, depends on the essence claim. 
However, 'essence' does not depend on revelation. The reason I believe revelation to be true, at this 
point, is that if either a-essence or c-essence, or both, turn out to be false, then the corresponding 
version(s) of revelation is (are) non-existent. 
390
 This is not entirely correct. There is a way to differentiate essential properties from other properties. 
This manner, however, is connected to what I will discuss in the third case. A way to distinguish both 
varieties of properties is to stipulate that essential properties are known by acquaintance, while all 
other properties are known by description. This is of course highly problematic. 
 
136 
 
discarded. Citing Jackson, Stoljar concludes that what we are in a position to know by 
revelation is the following: 
Frank Jackson for instance, as I understand him, holds that to 
understand, e.g., water is to know that water is the watery 
stuff, i.e., “the kind common to the watery exemplars that 
we...are acquainted with”.391 
This is, however, the acquaintance account of revelation all over again. I think it was 
clearly shown in the last chapter that this approach is implausible. A-essence seems to 
be a misdirected way to interpret the essence claim and therefore a-revelation. 
Stoljar, however, admits that the focus of his discussion is c-revelation and as a 
result c-essence.392 Even though this notion is clearly more controversial, it is 
important to see whether or not this approach may lead to a plausible interpretation 
of revelation. The case of phenomenal properties may be stated as follows:393 c-
essence properties are those properties of a phenomenal property which are stable in 
all counterfactual worlds. A possible resulting account of the revelation thesis, 
according to Damnjanovic, therefore asserts the following: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to know or 
know the counterfactual extension of a phenomenal concept C of Q.394 
 
Now, knowing properties which are stable in all counterfactual worlds does not mean 
the same thing as knowing the counterfactual extension of some phenomenal concept. 
Damnjanovic tries to bridge this difference by showing that in the case of experiences 
one focuses on the features of those experiences. This means that the counterfactual 
extensions of a concept of a phenomenal property eliminate all contingent features of 
that experience first. After that it determines which of the remaining features of that 
experience may be altered without losing its particular phenomenal property. 
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According to Nida-Rümelin, this is the reason why metaphysical discussions about the 
essence of phenomenal properties are mainly about their implementation in 
counterfactual worlds.395 From this idea, Damnjanovic concludes that knowing the 
counterfactual extension of a phenomenal concept entails in some sense knowledge 
about 'what makes the property the property it is'396, living up to Lewis's uncommonly 
strong knowledge constraint397. This is however not the only benefit of this approach. 
To know the nature of phenomenal properties, according to Damnjanovic, does not 
depend on the version of physicalism one assumes. This account of the revelation 
therefore avoids metaphysical discussions about physicalism. 
To find out whether or not 'knowledge of the counterfactual extensions of a 
phenomenal concept' is suited to qualify the revelation thesis we need to examine its 
exemplification. The basic line of thought of this theory is taken from works by 
Chalmers and Nida-Rümelin.398 Damnjanovic thinks therefore that to establish this 
approach, one must focus on their following claim: 
For some concepts we are in a position to say, for each world 
considered counterfactually, what the extension of that 
concept is. In other words, for every counterfactual world there 
is some presentation of it such that we are able to determine 
the extension of the concept at that world. If we have this 
ability, then we can be said to know the nature of the property 
associated with the concept.399 
Since, according to both authors, phenomenal concepts are actuality-independent400, 
one may know the essence of those properties without knowing which of the worlds is 
actual and which is counterfactual. Damnjanovic thinks that the only knowledge one 
needs, is some default knowledge of the phenomenal concept in question. This theory 
therefore claims that if a concept is actuality-independent, then it is revelatory in 
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relevant sense. We have already seen that the same applies, not only to the 
phenomenal concept of phenomenal properties, but to the corresponding physical 
concept as well. Now, on the contrary to many a posteriori physicalists401, on the one 
hand, Chalmers and Nida-Rümelin argue that the identity of those concepts has to be 
known a priori. Since physicalism cannot commit to this claim, it is therefore false. On 
the other hand, Damnjanovic insists that the a posteriori physicalist has good reasons 
to deny this claim.402 He concludes therefore that his version of revelation interpreted 
as 'knowledge of the counterfactual extensions of a phenomenal concept' is not only 
compatible with physicalism, but the adequate interpretation of the revelation thesis. 
So far we have seen what a viable version of the revelation thesis should 
explain and what it must fulfill. This idea is about epistemic specialness. This means, 
until now, I implicitly assumed that if some property is revelatory, then one is in a 
privileged epistemic situation. In this case, the thesis is about experience itself and 
should provide an explanation for our privileged access to our phenomenal properties. 
The revelation thesis should also avoid certain pitfalls, especially those which arise 
from the acquaintance approach. This means, revelation should not entail any basic 
relations or properties in the Levineian sense403 and if possible it should be compatible 
with physicalism.404 Finally, the revelation thesis must lead to an adequate description 
of what it means to know the nature of the phenomenal properties of experience.405 
Damnjanovic himself is not interested in whether or not revelation may explain 
our privileged access to the phenomenal. He simply wants to show that revelation 
does not necessarily violate physicalism. One could argue that this is already enough to 
show that our access to our phenomenal properties is epistemic superior and I agree 
that if what Damnjanovic claims is true, one only has to frame the theory in the right 
context. Since his version of revelation, at a first glance, fulfills all the desired 
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requirements, the only issue left is to test its soundness. Since the two most important 
criteria to evaluate any revelation approach may be found in its compatibility with 
physicalism and whether or not the version in question is an adequate interpretation 
of revelation, I will analyze Damnjanovic's thesis in the light of these ideas. 
To evaluate the first issue, namely the compatibility with physicalism, one may 
ask the following: is it necessary to know the identity of co-existing actuality-
independent concepts a priori, or is it possible to learn about this fact a posteriori? In 
this particular case, the co-existing actuality-independent concepts in question are the 
phenomenal concepts and the physical concepts of a given phenomenal property. 
Damnjanovic's revelation thesis relies on the assumption that a posteriori physicalism 
is true. Now, the general strategy of an a posteriori physicalist may, according to Nida-
Rümelin, be put the following way: 
All proponents of the view [a posteriori physicalism] point out 
that, according to their proposal, physical concepts and 
phenomenal concepts are cognitively independent: it is 
impossible to see a priori that something that falls under a 
physical concept of a particular phenomenal character also falls 
under the corresponding phenomenal concept of that 
phenomenal character.406 
This is true for all cases. For famous Mary, the perceptual super scientist, it is possible 
to have all physical concepts about a perceptual experience – including the physical 
concepts of the corresponding phenomenal properties – without having the 
phenomenal concepts of those properties.407 More natural cases are usually the other 
way around. Someone may have a phenomenal concept of, say, phenomenal redness, 
without having the physical concept of this property. Sometimes, it can even be the 
case that one has both concepts at the same time and still cannot work out that they 
are identical. This is the case discussed above.408 
The basic line of objection to a posteriori physicalism suggests that its 
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proponent depends on two modes of presentation. According to Nida-Rümelin, this 
implies the following idea: 
[T]he subject knows the fact under one mode of presentation 
and does not know it under some other mode of presentation. 
So, for example, a person may know the fact that Venus is a 
planet under the mode of presentation associated with “the 
morning star is a planet” and fail to know the very same fact 
under the mode of presentation associated with “the evening 
star is a planet.” In this particular case, as in many others, the 
difference in the mode of presentation involves two different 
properties that are used to fix the referent. In one mode of 
presentation Venus is given as the heavenly body visible late in 
the morning (or some similar property), whereas in the other 
mode of presentation the object is given as the heavenly body 
visible early in the evening.409 
If true, this is certainly an undesirable consequence for the a posteriori physicalist, 
since it means to introduce non-physical entities. On the one hand, believing a fact 
about the phenomenal under the physical mode of presentation refers to the 
phenomenal as a physical property. On the other hand, believing a fact about the 
phenomenal under the phenomenal mode of presentation refers to the phenomenal 
as a non-physical (phenomenal) property. It is therefore the case that two different 
referent fixing properties are introduced and the proposal fails.410 
The underlying assumptions about the kind of physicalism employed by 
Damnjanovic's account of revelation, lets it suffer from this issues as well. It is clearly 
not so much a problem of his account of the revelation thesis; it is rather the necessity 
to depend on a posteriori physicalism. Since Damnjanovic is therefore in no better 
situation than any other proponent of this version of physicalism, his account stays and 
falls with the success of this approach. Since, in my opinion, the opponents raise a 
convincing argument against a posteriori physicalism in general, one needs to consider 
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an alternative account that avoids this critique. According to Nida-Rümelin such an 
alternative can be found in Loar.411 Loar assumes that phenomenal concepts are 
recognitional in nature. This means, to have a phenomenal concept of some 
phenomenal property is to recognize that property while being present. This 
recognitional (phenomenal) concept refers to its referent, i.e. the phenomenal 
property as physical property, directly. Loar describes this idea the following way: 
[A phenomenal concept and a physical concept that] converge 
on a [physical] property, may have that [physical] property as 
their common reference, in the following way. A recognitional 
concept may involve the ability to class together, to 
discriminate, things that have a given objective property. Say 
that a recognitional concept is related thus to a property, the 
property triggers applications of the concept. Then the 
property that triggers the concept is the semantic value of 
reference of the concept; the concept directly refers to the 
property, unmediated by a higher-order reference-fixer. Now 
suppose we have an independent account of what a property a 
given theoretical concept refers to. Nothing prevents that 
property from being the property that triggers a given 
recognitional concept, and so the two concepts can converge in 
their reference despite their cognitive independence, the latter 
being a sort of brute psychological fact.412 
Even though often criticized413, this solution is designed to solve the problem of two 
reference fixing properties and may save a posteriori physicalism. This triggers 
however an old issue. What Loar describes as direct and unmediated reference is, of 
course, nothing else than the acquaintance thesis. But this reinstates the problem of 
basic relations in the Levineian sense.414 Since I argued against this idea in length in the 
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first chapter, reappearance should be avoided. However, this is not only a problem for 
Damnjanovic's account of revelation alone, it also defeats any account that interprets 
the essence claim of revelation as knowing all/some properties or facts. Since, in my 
opinion, a qualified version of this interpretation is appropriate, it is necessary to 
discuss particular problems for Damnjanovic's thesis. 
So far it seems that the revelation thesis in question is a viable account, 
assuming that a posteriori physicalism is true. The remaining question is whether or 
not this approach is an adequate account of the revelation thesis. I have already stated 
that it is necessary to qualify the revelation thesis to limit the 'knowledge of all 
essential properties' requirement. It is, however, important to keep in mind that we 
cannot constraint revelation arbitrarily. We need an account that adequately describes 
the situation. Damnjanovic's restriction leaves us with the following interpretation: 
[This version of revelation] […] implies only that the relevant 
experiences put us in a position to know enough essential 
truths or properties of [a phenomenal property] […] so that 
we can determine the counterfactual extension of [that 
property] [...].415 
Even though this seems to be a weaker version of revelation, it adequately describes, 
according to Damnjanovic, that one can know the nature of phenomenal properties. As 
already pointed out, this is due to the idea that in the actual world properties only 
contingently share features, while counterfactual extensions fix features across 
possible worlds. Counterfactual extensions therefore refer in some sense to the nature 
of that property. 
This solution seems to be adequately accommodating a qualified account of 
revelation. It limits the knowledge of the relevant properties appropriately and leaves 
us with an adequate version of the revelation thesis. However, this account can only 
achieve its task by implicitly sidestepping the problems of phenomenal concepts. Even 
though advocating the compatibility of revelation with physicalism, Damnjanovic 
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assumes that phenomenal concepts are actuality-independent and therefore 
appropriately revelatory. He also claims that one can know these counterfactual 
extensions of that concept by only depending on knowledge for the possession of that 
phenomenal concept, but without knowing which world is the actual.416 In a footnote 
Damnjanovic states what this required knowledge amounts to: 
[…] I say we know the counterfactual extension of a 
phenomenal concept because when the phenomenal property 
is imaginatively presented as being instantiated at a certain 
region in a counterfactual world we can recognize it falls under 
the concept.417 
What Damnjanovic, however, fails to mention is that actuality-independence of 
phenomenal concepts has to be explained. Both, the physicalist and the anti-
physicalist, agree that phenomenal concepts are special in this sense. Balog, however, 
claims that the latter often thinks that the independent ontological status of 
phenomenal properties leads to phenomenal concepts which are directly related to 
those properties via acquaintance. It is therefore the ontological independence that 
accounts for the specialness of phenomenal concepts.418 The proponent of the former 
view depends, according to Balog, on the view that there is no such thing as 
ontologically independent phenomenal properties. There is only 'dualism of 
concepts'419. This last idea is according to the physicalist also the reason why dualism 
seems to be true. 
What was claimed against the a posteriori physicalist in general comes back to 
haunt Damnjanovic's proposal of the revelation thesis in particular now. He obviously 
should not claim that the specialness of phenomenal concepts lies in the acquaintance 
relation with our consciously present phenomenal properties. First of all, this may 
undermine his tentative to unit revelation with physicalism, and second, with those 
underlying assumptions, it will be difficult to defend a substantial approach to the 
                                                          
416
 See Damnjanovic 2012. His assumption is based on Chalmers 2004, 2009 and Nida-Rümelin 2007a. 
Both authors explicitly defend anti-physicalism. 
417
 Damnjanovic 2012, p. 87, footnote 27. 
418
 Chalmers 2003 explains in length how direct phenomenal concepts depend on acquaintance. For 
discussion see Balog 2009. 
419
 Balog 2009, p. 303. 
 
144 
 
acquaintance account.420 
Damnjanovic is therefore bound to assume the specialness of phenomenal 
concepts in the sense of the phenomenal concept strategy421. As shown in the previous 
section, this idea is not easy to defend. The above argument already showed the 
problems a posteriori physicalism faces. Focusing on the phenomenal concept strategy 
seems not to help accommodate the situation. Criticism422 therefore is intense. Clearly 
one of the strongest arguments against this proposal is Chalmers's 'master 
argument'423. This argument is of special interest, since it is directed against this 
strategy in general. As stated above, phenomenal concepts are designed to rebut the 
anti-physicalist claim that phenomenal properties are ontologically independent. 
According to Chalmers, however, the strategy maneuvers itself into a dilemma. The 
argument may be spelled out in the following way: 
1. If P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable. 
2. If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
__________ 
3. Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation.424425 
According to Chalmers, thesis C is introduced by the phenomenal concept strategist to 
show that humans have the claimed psychological key feature stated by C (C explains 
why there seems to be an epistemological gap). C itself can be explained in physical 
terms. Chalmers's master argument tries to show that what the proponent of the 
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phenomenal concept strategy faces – even assuming that humans have those claimed 
features: either the thesis C is not physically explainable or it cannot explain the 
epistemological situation we are in. The proponent of phenomenal concepts is 
therefore not in a position to maintain both claims about C at the same time. This is a 
powerful argument and puts pressure on the phenomenal concept strategy as a whole. 
Unless Damnjanovic gives good reasons why his particular idea about phenomenal 
concepts is different or his revelation account fails. 
As is often the case in philosophy, there are proposed solutions. According to 
Balog, one can show that the master argument does not go beyond the 'original' anit-
physicalist ideas, e.g. the explanatory gap.426 After extensively analyzing Chalmers's 
argument, she concludes that he is basically right: C – interpreted in phenomenological 
terms – cannot be explained physically, and C – interpreted in physical terms – does 
not explain our epistemic situation. Balog, however, claims that this is perfectly 
compatible with physicalism. The only thing the argument can show is an 
epistemological gap, a gap physicalism can live with. While anti-physicalism 
presupposes that an epistemic gap points to an ontological gap, physicalists resists this 
step. Now, Balog shows that Chalmers's reasoning relies on the 'original' anti-
physicalist assumptions, namely that the physicalist's proposal is inconceivable, since 
her account fails to plausibly explain its constitution. This, however, presupposes an a 
priori entailment of an ontological gap. According to Balog, there is no substantial 
difference between whether these facts involve the classical idea that phenomenal 
facts are not identical with physical facts, or the new introduced phenomenal concept 
facts which are not identical with physical facts. Chalmers's argument therefore does 
not lead to new insights. It is, according to Balog, 'a mere refusal to meet the argument 
on its own ground'.427 
To strengthen her position, Balog also claims that the constitutional 
interpretation of the phenomenal concept strategy428 has an explanation for 
acquaintance that is compatible with physicalism. This second idea, if successful, could 
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really change everything claimed so far. The physicalist could win the high ground and 
be in the position to rebut all arguments against her problem to explain the 
compatibility of acquaintance and revelation with physicalism. 
Now, the specialness of the constitutional account is that it straight forwardly 
explains the epistemic relation to our phenomenal properties. According to Balog, 
“[o]n the constitutional account, tokens of a phenomenal concept that refers to a 
particular type of visual experience [...] are constituted in part by tokens of that type of 
experience.”429 This means that tokens of the certain type of experience act as 'modes 
of presentation of the phenomenal properties'430 which are instantiated by them. 
Balog compares the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts to linguistic 
quotation. 
The idea of an item partly constituting a representation that 
refers to that item is reminiscent of how linguistic quotation 
works. The referent of ‘—’ is exemplified by whatever fills in 
the blank. In a quotation expression, a token of the referent is 
literally a constituent of the expression that refers to a type 
which it exemplifies, and that expression has its reference (at 
least partly) in virtue of the properties of its constituent.431 
While there is an account that resembles only slightly the linguistic counterpart, 
prefixing the experience itself by the operator 'the experience...'432 to produce 
phenomenal concepts, Balog thinks that to explain those concepts one should take the 
quotational analogy more seriously and focus on the conceptual role of phenomenal 
concepts.433 Both versions, however, fall under the name quotational account of 
phenomenal concepts.434 The latter explanation states the following: 
[…] on this view, every token of a phenomenal concept applied 
to current experience is (partly) constituted by that token 
                                                          
429
 Balog 2009, p. 307. 
430
 Balog 2012a, p. 7. 
431
 Balog 2009, p. 308. 
432
 Ibid., p. 308. 
433
 See Balog 2009, 2012b. 
434
 For a proponent of the former account see Papineau 2002, 2007, of the latter account Balog 2012a, 
b. 
 
147 
 
experience, and this fact is crucial in determining the reference 
of the concept. Not only is it the case that a token experience 
that constitutes a token phenomenal concept instantiates the 
phenomenal property the concept refers to, but it is because 
the concept is so constituted that it so refers.435 
In Balog's opinion, this physicalist account of phenomenal concepts can explain the 
acquaintance relation in the appropriate manner. The reason is that the applied 
phenomenal concepts contain actual instantiations of the referent physically. Since, 
however, tokens of the phenomenal concepts present that referent – the experience 
tokens – as phenomenal properties, the reference to those properties is direct, 
grounding the acquaintance relation.436 
Apart from explaining acquaintance in physicalist terms, Balog claims that her 
constitutional approach to phenomenal concepts accounts for revelation in a straight 
forward manner. 
Undergoing an experience that instantiates the referent reveals 
something essential about the referent in a particularly vivid 
manner, namely, it reveals what it is like to have it. This means 
that phenomenal concepts provide grasp of the phenomenal 
properties they refer to in a way that reveals their essence.437 
One can see that, for Balog, revelation and acquaintance are intimately connected. 
They might even be two sides of the same coin. Surely, acquaintance provides the 
important directness relation with our phenomenal properties, but revelation adds 
substantial insight.438 In my opinion, Balog's version of revelation seems to be closer to 
Campbell's acquaintance account then to Damnjanovic's interpretation. For one, she 
does not seem to qualify revelation in the relevant sense. Her idea about how 
phenomenal concepts refer to phenomenal properties, however, has straight forward 
consequences for Damnjanovic's approach as well. Since all other options to explain 
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the specialness of phenomenal concepts seem to be more problematic, both rely on 
Balog's physicalist grounding of the acquaintance relation to instantiate unique 
phenomenal concepts. Defeating her argument, therefore defeats, mutatis mutandis, 
Damnjanovic's as well. 
Since this account relies on its direct acquaintance relation with phenomenal 
properties, this interpretation does not fall prey to the problem that different 'modes 
of presentation' introduce. The only open question is whether or not this approach can 
do justice to what it claims, namely grounding acquaintance in accordance with 
physicalism.439 Levine argues against this possibility.440 He thinks that a constitutional 
account does not correctly account for the unique form of substantivity that 
acquaintance possesses. Simply assuming directness of reference is not enough. While 
this approach finds its answer in the cognitive presence of phenomenal properties – 
which is accounted for by physical presence – in phenomenal concepts, Levine thinks 
that it this is impossible.441 The reason is, according to Levine, that the constitutional 
account442 is not better off than the demonstrative approach. In the end, whether 
assuming a mental pointing or quotational symbols the functional role is the same. 
The relevant instance of acquaintance in terms of the constitutional account 
then is, according to Levine, that […] a phenomenal concept affords acquaintance with 
the relevant phenomenal property by containing an instance of that property within 
it.443 This interpretation, however, shows the inadequacy of this account. Levine rebuts 
this view, by showing that the underlying physical structure cannot explain the 
cognitive structure. Assuming a representational system, what is important for 
acquaintance or cognitive presence is the relation between cognitive property tokens 
and not how those tokens relate to their objects. The latter relation only determines 
what is represented, leaving it unclear how this representation relation can account for 
cognitive significance. This means that difference in the former mechanism does not 
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explain differences in what is relevant cognitively. In short, Levine's argument 
undermines the constitutional account's claim that substantial cognitive presence, 
which explains substantial acquaintance, can be explained by physical presence, 
denying that the physical presence is able to account for what is cognitively relevant. 
In my opinion, this clearly shows that Balog's account fails. Again, acquaintance 
is supposed to be a special epistemic relation we have with our phenomenal 
properties. By forming the relevant phenomenal concepts, we gain self-knowledge 
about those properties. Those concepts are in phenomenal terms which are 
determined by our cognition. In this sense, what is relevant for phenomenal concept 
possession should also be determined by what is significant cognitively. Even though 
the underlying physical structure may dictate what is represented in cognition in the 
first place, it seems far from clear how this structure influences what is cognitively 
significant. 
This, however, means that Damnjanovic's version of the revelation thesis fails. 
Even though the account qualifies revelation in the relevant sense, and leaves us with 
a more tangible approach, it relies on the acquaintance relation nonetheless. The 
problem, as far as I can see it, is that the specialness of phenomenal concepts relies on 
this relation. Physicalism, however, seems to lack the possibility to account for 
acquaintance, leaving us with anti-physicalism or a mystery. 
This means, so far we have no viable revelation thesis. It seems that the 
problem is inherited form its origin. Russell entangled his idea of acquaintance 
intimately with the revelation thesis making it therefore difficult to separate the two 
ideas. In what follows, I will try to show, however, that a qualified and substantial 
account of revelation does not have to depend on the acquaintance approach and that 
it is compatible with physicalism. 
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IV. THE RIGHT KIND OF REVELATION 
 
So far, we have seen those interpretations of revelation not viable for self-
knowledge about the phenomenal. What we need now, is to formulate a version of the 
revelation thesis that describes our epistemic situation adequately and avoids the 
problems discussed. I have already stated that, in my opinion, the best candidate 
should qualify the idea that I am in a position to know or know ‘all the essential 
properties’. To accomplish my goal, I will try to show the following: 
- Revelation should be qualified as “Q-me revelation”. The essence claim of the final 
version of this view refers to knowledge that ‘E is essentially Q-me’. 
- Q-me revelation reveals phenomenal Q-me-ism (an ontological account of 
phenomenal properties, respectively experiences, that is based on some ideas 
stemming from adverbialism). 
- Phenomenal Q-me-ism is the correct ontological account of phenomenal properties 
and experiences. 
- Q-me revelation explains privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal. 
- Q-me revelation is compatible with physicalism. 
 
IV.1. Essential properties qualified: a first approximation 
 
I hope it became clear that this interpretation of the revelation thesis refers to 
an account that interprets the essence claim in a particular way. The basic idea is that 
what we know essentially are not truths about experiences, but rather facts or 
properties. The thesis therefore states the following: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in the position to know 
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or know, for every particular essential property F of Q, that Q is F.444 
 
This thesis has, according to Damnjanovic, a decisive advantage over 'knowledge of all 
truths'. This advantage can be seen by the claim that we only need to know all 
essential properties of Q, but not under one particular concept. Interpreting revelation 
this way does not need to account for the identity with physicalism. 
There is, however, a downside. This thesis needs to explain what its stands on 
relational properties of internal constitution are, i.e. whether or not those properties 
are conjunctive or structural. Damnjanovic thinks that, since we are not aware of 
certain constitutional properties, we might fail to know some essential properties F of 
Q. One explanation depends on whether or not physical properties are essential to the 
internal constitution, and if we are capable to know all those properties without 
empirical investigation. A possible solution is, according to Damnjanovic, to assume 
that physical properties are essential properties and, if identity is true, is to 
acknowledge that we know those properties under phenomenal concepts. As a 
consequence, we at least know some of the essential properties, the question remains, 
however, whether we know all of them. Now, it is not clear if we can really know all 
essential properties – especially the physical ones – under a different concept. Such a 
view is in need of further argumentation. One way to avoid the issue is to give up 
identity and allow multiply realizability. The advantage is that in this interpretation of 
revelation the physical constitution is not essential and therefore knowledge of all 
essential properties might be possible. More importantly, such a thesis is compatible 
with some forms of physicalism. 
According to Damnjanovic, whether or not this revelation thesis is true 
depends, in the end, on how physicalism is spelled out. He thinks that this is a quite 
demanding solution of the compatibility problem. This does not mean he discards this 
view entirely, but given its complexity, he gives it up for, what he thinks, is a less 
demanding one. 
In one important sense Damnjanovic is right. This revelation thesis asks for a 
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too demanding solution. In my opinion, however, he abandons this version of the 
thesis prematurely. It seems to me that asking for knowledge of all essential properties 
may not be possible even if we allow for multiple realizability.445 Since we may not be 
able to determine whether the internal composition depends on physical properties or 
arrangements, this reading clearly leaves open what an essential property F of a 
phenomenal property Q may include. This is, of course, problematic and of little help 
to solve the problem of privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal. 
Then, how can we solve this interpretation of the revelation thesis? The most 
straight forward way of saving it is to qualify the thesis so that we do not need 
knowledge of all essential properties anymore. To put it differently, one could try to 
determine whether or not there is something like the essential property. Since I have 
already claimed that following Lewis's idea of essence means that F is the essence of 
Q, iff necessarily Q has F and nothing else does446, this is a genuine possibility. We 
simply need to qualify the essential properties F and assume that there is only one 
essential property. In what follows, I will try to model a fairly undemanding solution 
that is based on the original idea that revelation involves knowledge of essential 
properties. 
Such an account of revelation has to fulfill two purposes. It should explain our 
privileged self-knowledge about our phenomenal properties and solve the 
compatibility problem in a straightforward fashion. Revisions, therefore, have to focus 
on avoiding the problematic interpretation of all 'essential properties'. One solution, I 
will argue, is a Q-me-istic447 account of revelation, which may be put as follows: 
 
 (Initial) Q-me revelation: By having an experience E with the phenomenal property Q, I 
am in a position to know or know that Q is essentially Q-me448. 
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I shall call this the phenomenal Q-me-istic interpretation of revelation or Q-me 
revelation. This account of revelation employs the same idea as the standard account 
introduced in the second chapter. The only difference is that it is already qualified. This 
means that the former approach claims that we should come to know that Q is F (for F 
is the essence of Q), while the latter that Q is Q-me (for Q-me is the essence of Q). The 
unqualified account needs us to know all essential properties; the qualified account 
only the essential property.  
Now, phenomenal Q-me-ism is partially based on classical ideas stemming from 
adverbialism. Since this view, however, is not unproblematic, I will first discuss it in 
more detail. After that, I will argue for the advantages of my account. The focus will 
especially turn on what I perceive as phenomenal Q-me-ism. 
 
IV.2. Adverbialism 
 
Classically, adverbialism449 was introduced to describe perception. Originally, 
the idea was thought to eliminate the act-object model with its ontological 
problematic assumptions. Jackson characterizes the view as follows: 
The basic idea behind [adverbialism] […] is to utilise the fact 
that, on standard views, appearances, after-images, sense-data, 
and so on, cannot exist when not sensed by some person 
(sentient creature), in order to reconstrue statements which 
purport to be about appearances, after-images and so on, as 
being about the way or mode in which some person is sensing. 
Hence a statement of the form 'x presents a red appearance to 
S', becomes 'S senses red-ly with respect to x', and 'S is having a 
square sense-impression' becomes 'S is sensing square-ly'.450 
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The main advantage of adverbialism is that there are no problematic objects present 
before the mind. This is to say that even if there are objects in the world, there are no 
objects sensed. This view rather claims that the way one senses is fundamental to 
perception and argues that those sensations should be described as being altered by 
different ways or modes of sensing. This means, if e.g. a sensation presents us with 
red, it is not because in contains a red object, it is because the sensation is altered in a 
red manner. Thus, adverbialism only needs to acknowledge experiencing subjects, 
experiences and that experiences can be altered. In veridical cases of perception the 
perceiver is in some perceiving state where an actual object is the source for the 
alteration of the perception. In cases of hallucination or illusion the perceiving state is 
structurally the same, but the source is abnormal.451 
It can be said, however, that adverbialsm – also often not spelled out in 
detail452 – suffers from a minor and a major problem. The minor objection to this 
model concerns the intuition that experiences seem to have an object.453 The major 
objection is the so called many-property problem.454 
The idea behind the minor objection is inherited from the 'qualia' problem. 
Martin analyzes this issue in detail. He thinks that the expression 'qualia' is confusing, 
since it denotes at least two different concepts and those are used ambivalent in the 
mind debate. One concept refers to 'qualia' as properties of mind-independent objects 
and the other to the ways of having experiences. This distinction clearly corresponds to 
the difference between the act-object model and adverbialism. 
Martin discusses, therefore, which theory should we prefer. He thinks that, in 
complex cases, descriptions of our experiences cannot be given without reference to 
the appeared objects and, since the adverbialist account cannot do so, it is ruled out. 
The inadequate descriptions of adverbialism simply lead to an incomprehensible 
picture of our knowledge of experiences. Martin shows in an example of how an art 
theorist talks about a complex work of art the manner we assess such a situation, 
namely by attending to the objects of experience. Part of what an experience is like for 
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the perceiving theorist cannot be made public, of course. Still, communication about 
the features of an object clearly exists. The audience can learn about the theorist's 
inner life – and also about their own – by listening to the descriptions. Therefore, one 
may assume that some form of investigation about the experienced world and our 
own experiences are implied. But most importantly, one part cannot be separated 
from the other. Martin concludes that it is not enough to attend to the ways of 
experiencing – as the adverbialist claims – one must attend to the objects of 
experience as well. Attending to one's experiences cannot be construed independently 
from attending to its objects.455 
The major problem, the so called many-property problem, argues, according to 
Franck Jackson456, that after-images have many properties, e.g. being red, square, etc. 
The problematic issue for the adverbial theory is that it is unclear how to describe 
these properties. According to Jackson, adverbialism has only two options: it can 
analyze the properties separately, e.g. as red-ly and square-ly or join them into, e.g., 
red-square-ly.457 There are advantages and disadvantages to both solutions. 
The first solution, attributed to Ducasse458, has the advantage that it explains 
how 'I have a red, square after-image' entails 'I have a red after-image'. The 
corresponding adverbial formulation is 'I sense red-ly and square-ly' and entails 'I sense 
red-ly'.459 There is however a downside to this solution. This form of adverbialism fails 
to distinguish between two different scenarios. One scenario is having a red, square 
after-image and at the same time a green, round after-image, the other is having a red, 
round after-image and at the same time a green, square after-image.460 Ducasse's idea 
of adverbialism has to account for both situations with the analysis 'sensing red-ly and 
round-ly and green-ly and square-ly'. Jackson, however, points out the following 
problem: 
In essence the point is that we must be able to distinguish the 
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statements: 'I have a red and a square after-image', and 'I have 
a red, square after-image', and Ducasse does not appear to be 
able to do this.461 
This solution basically fails due to the fact that it cannot account for specific 
differences in the after-images. 
The second solution is based on a version of adverbialism put forth by 
Sellars462. According to Jackson, the general idea is that a new mode of sensing is 
created. If we sense e.g. 'red-triangular-ly', the new mode does not include 'red-ly'. It 
rather is a different, new kind of sensation. The problem that arises from this approach 
is that it cannot account for the fact that sensing 'red-triangular-ly' is only a special 
case of sensing 'red-ly'. Since, according to the theory, it does not entail the latter as 
component, the adverbialist, however, cannot establish this fact.463 This may only be 
partly true. The adverbialist could insist that while it is true that 'red-triangular-ly' is a 
new mode of sensing that exists as one whole, this does not mean that one cannot 
describe the sensation from different angles. This includes the description that one 
senses 'red-ly'. 
Many answers have been given – especially to the many-properties problem – 
to avoid these issues. Since I understand phenomenal Q-me-ism to be different from 
adverbialism, solutions differ as well. As I go on arguing against these worries, I will 
explicate certain features my view, including what distinguishes this view from 
adverbialism. Of course, this also alters how I pretend to solve these issues. 
 
IV.2.1. Martin's worries 
 
How could we argue against the intuition that experiences seem to have 
objects? In my opinion, there are two things one can reply. The first response involves 
an analysis of the types of experiences involved in the intuition. The second answer 
focuses on possible interpretations of adverbialism. 
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Examples in the adverbialism debate usually exploit intuitions about visual 
perceptions. Martin himself uses the visual experience of an art theorist to make his 
point. He claims that when the theorist makes statements about shadows and objects 
in the environment, he also tells the audience something about his experience. Martin 
suggests:  
what […] [the art theorist] does here, and reports himself as 
doing, is to attend to what it is like for him to look out at the 
world around him, and attend now to the objects he 
recognises, now to the shadows by which they come to be 
visually defined for him.464 
It seems clear to me that this description has only two possible readings: in the first 
interpretation the theorist attends to 'what it is like for him' and separately attends to 
the objects and shadows. It is not entirely clear to me how to treat the difference 
between the latter distinctions. I think that both, objects and shadows, represent 
something that could be considered the object, or better, the content of experience. I 
assume therefore they belong to the same category. That does not mean they fall 
under the same category as 'what it is like for him' to 'look out at the world'. The art 
theorist seems to attend to a variety of different things. This fact alone, however, does 
not explain Martin's swift conclusion. One may ask Martin: what is the art theorist 
attending to and what is his description about? Is it a situation, an experience or both? 
The answer is far from clear. Without further clarification Martin's conclusion is 
difficult to assess. I guess that for his purposes the second reading is more convenient, 
but he should make it explicit. 
Assuming that he refers to experiences, there is still a second issue, namely that 
this interpretation assumes strong transparency. This means that Martin thinks that 
experiences tell us only something about their intentional objects, denying any kind of 
independence to the phenomenal. Phenomenal properties are therefore purely 
representational, i.e. they are entirely determined by the experience's object. Of 
course, if this is Martin's view, it inherits all the objections lanced against the original 
theory in the first chapter. It should therefore be denied. 
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We may also follow a third consideration to deny Martin's approach. It seems 
that Ducasse is right in thinking that examples from visual perception might be 
problematic. For him, the fact that e.g. colors are spatially external leads many to 
belief that they are also external to the mind and therefore exist independently from 
being experienced. In Ducasse's opinion, this is, however, based on confusion. Being 
spatially external does not mean “external to the mind”, i.e. existing independently of 
being experienced.465 Other examples might therefore be more appropriate. 
For Ducasse examples from taste already show that these intuitions are not 
obvious. His argument revolves around the idea that taste, e.g. being bitter, cannot be 
an object of experience. It should rather be considered a 'species of experience'. 
Martin may still insist that the bitter taste depends on properties of the food and 
therefore on external objects, it seems, however, that not everyone would follow this 
idea. Admittedly this is not a case an act-object theorist has to fear but she would 
probably avoid those examples. 
Now, pain allows for even less confusion about the spatial external-internal. Of 
course, it is usually spatially located (in a body part). It seems however doubtful that 
there is an object to it. It is often claimed that one essential characteristic of pain is 
that we identify it with its phenomenal properties.466 This seems to point to the 
importance of being experienced rather than being a property of an object. Again, 
these considerations leave the door open to Martin to argue that phenomenal 
properties of pain depend on those properties of whatever the object of pain is. It is, 
however, obscure what kind of object that could be. 
These considerations are far from a knock-down argument. They simply present 
some intuitions about the different kind of experiences we have. At least in some of 
the cases we seem to rely on the objects of experience, while in others we do not. 
 Since there are many possibilities to interpret Martin’s approach, the following 
argument may be stronger. Perceptual standard views of adverbialism are usually 
employed to deal with the problematic ontology of the act-object models. The crucial 
claim is to deny that there are objects of experience and rather describe experiences 
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as ways of sensing. Versions of adverbial accounts include, by now, views about all 
kinds of experiences, such as pain467 and consciousness468, or experience469 in general. 
There are also alternative adverbialist approaches available. Both Janzen and Douglas 
defend such accounts. For example, Janzen's adverbial interpretation of pain claims 
the following: 
[...] according to my characterization, pains have intentional 
content: they are directed at surface or non-surface bodily 
areas. This means that the object of a pain is whatever bodily 
area the subject attends to, i.e. whatever bodily area she says 
hurts. If the subject complains of having a stomachache, then 
the object of her complaint, and hence the object of her pain, is 
an area of her stomach; if she complains of having an earache, 
then the object of her pain is an area of her ear, and so on. 
Thus, just as a subject can be aware of a visually (or in a visual 
way), tactilely (or in a tactile way), auditorily (or in an auditory 
way), etc., so a subject can be aware of an object—a bodily 
area—painfully (or in a painful way).470 
Introducing intentional objects has, according to Janzen, three advantages. The first 
advantage is that all conscious states are object directed or intentional. Secondly, in 
the case of pain, it makes us aware of bodily areas. Finally, there is a connection with 
the external world. The argument given by Janzen is designed to show that it is 
possible to construe adverbialism in a way that it accommodates our intuition that 
experiences have objects.471 According to such a theory, adverbialism and objects of 
experience do not have to be contradictory and Martin's worry might be too hasty. 
Now, phenomenal Q-me-ism solves this problem in a different way. Since the 
thesis is not committed to the same interpretations as adverbialism the issue should 
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not arise. 'What it is like for me', or a phenomenal property, is in part different from an 
experience's representational object or content. This is not an uncontroversial 
suggestion. Strong transparency does not allow for such a distinction. Since strong 
transparency subscribes to the perceptual account of introspection, it is, however, 
blind to features of experience that do not form part of its content or object. What 
phenomenal Q-me-ism adopts from adverbialism is that it does not only implicitly 
permit the possibility of subjective feature, it explicitly stresses their importance. 
Describing those features in this particular manner amounts to the way they are 
experienced by me. This means in short: Q is essentially Q-me. 
Does that mean I have to deny that an experience has representational 
objects? No, it simply implies that, even if there is an object, there is also a way it is 
experienced by me. Now, Q-me revelation predicts the existence on the latter feature, 
phenomenal Q-me-ism simply adopts this prediction. The relation between both, the 
ways and the objects, is thereby left untouched. This view, of course, does not result in 
an argument against Martin's view. It could still be the case that the ‘by me’ feature, 
important as it may be, is determined by the object of experience. This, however, 
depends on the account of experience one assumes from the start. Martin explicitly 
opts for the view that objects of experience are the primary constituents. They 
therefore control subjective processing or experiencing. Even though such a view may 
be consistent with phenomenal Q-me-ism, it is implausible unless strong transparency 
is true. 
 
IV.2.2. The many-property problem 
 
The most prominent problem for adverbialism is clearly the many-property 
problem.472 There have been many attempts to defend the adverbialist approach 
against this threat473, but since phenomenal Q-me-ism is not the same as adverbialism, 
I will employ a different kind of argument. 
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The many-property problem basically points out that adverbialist theories 
cannot accurately describe certain cases of perceptual experiences, namely those that 
contain more than one property. It is assumed that there are two standard approaches 
to solve this issue. Ducasse's approach is capable to explain reductions like e.g. red-ly 
and square-ly to red-ly, but fails to differentiate scenarios like 'red, square after-image 
and at the same time a green, round after-image' from 'red, round after-image and at 
the same time a green, square after-image'. Sellars's view – via creating a new mode of 
sensing, e.g. 'red-square-ly' – may avoid the first option's problem. Since this solution, 
however, assumes a new mode of sensing, some argue that it cannot account for the 
fact that 'red-square-ly' is only a special form of sensing 'red-ly'.474 
Whether or not it is possible for classical adverbialist theories to solve this 
dilemma may be considered an open question. The important task is to show that the 
many-property problem does not concern phenomenal Q-me-ism. As stated above, 
phenomenal Q-me-ism accepts objects of experience. The important idea is that 
phenomenal properties of experience are interpreted in the following sense: Q is 
essentially Q-me-ness. This implies that apart from the qualitative properties entailed 
in Q, Q is also sensed in a subjective way, namely by me. To see how this idea 
influences the solution to the many-property problem one needs to make phenomenal 
Q-me-ism’s view about phenomenal properties explicit. When I experience E, I 
experience it to include phenomenal property Q. But I do not experience Q only as a 
qualitative property, I experience it as my own, and therefore as Q-me-ness. The 
reason why the many-property problem has no impact on phenomenal Q-me-ism is 
that a phenomenal property is in a sense both. It depends in Martin’s sense on the 
objects of experience, i.e. it accepts those objects. At the same time the view insists 
that I am sensing in a subjective way. Qualitative properties of the phenomenal, 
therefore, allow for objects, the adverbialist notion of sensing only applies to the fact 
that experiences are also sensed as being mine. Experiences with Q present 
themselves therefore as Q-me.475 Since the way of sensing only applies to the 
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subjective way of undergoing an experience, and not the qualities themselves, the 
many-property problem does not arise. This means that the adverbialist component of 
this view only concerns a property that all experiences share, namely that they are 
mine. 
Adverbialism is a controversial topic. There are two main problems associated 
with this approach: the intuition that experiences have objects and the many-property 
problem. Whether or not classical versions of the theory can solve this problem may 
be an open question. At least, the adverbialist intuition based on phenomenal Q-me-
ism can sidestep both worries. The reason is that the view can unit both ideas. It 
accepts that experiences have objects, but also includes that experiences are a way of 
sensing. In my opinion, therefore, there is no obvious danger in following this account. 
 
IV.3. Essential properties qualified: a second approximation 
 
The problem of revelation interpreted as knowledge of all essential properties 
is that it is too demanding, especially with respect to its solution for the compatibility 
problem with physicalism. However, if revelation is supposed to explain epistemically 
privileged knowledge of the phenomenal, we need to maintain some related 
approach. As we have seen, the demanding implications of the theory follow from the 
idea that one may not know which properties are essential and that one may not know 
all of them. This conclusion arises, since it seems unclear – assuming that structural or 
conjunctive properties are in part physical – that we can either know all essential 
physical properties F of Q or – denying the Identity claim – that the issue solely 
depends on how and if we are willing to limit multiple realizability. 
This account of the revelation thesis, however, includes another interesting 
effect. By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to 
know or know, for every essential property F of the phenomenal property Q, that Q is 
F. It seems that this approach includes a further demanding element. To be able to 
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determine that Q is F, this account has to entail the following claim about knowledge: 
 
Knowledge that property F is essential to Q. 
 
This is to say that one not only has to know that property F is instantiated, but also 
that F is essential. This means, this version of revelation requires that one has a 
concept of essence and, therefore, explicit knowledge of the essence as well. In the 
last chapter I stated that, according to Stoljar476, both requirements are not necessary 
for revelation. Stoljar argues that accepting such an approach has implausible 
consequences. On the one hand, this version demands that to have a ‘tickle’ 
experience requires a 'concept of essence'; something that seems inappropriate. On 
the other hand, if we really had an explicit concept of the essence of a tickle, then this 
essence would present itself literally before the mind. This latter consequence seems 
also implausible. Imagine then Damnjanovic's original example, where Q is the 
phenomenal property of the taste of peaches.477 Damnjanovic's version of revelation, 
then, would have the undesirable result that he demands a 'concept of essence' for 
the taste of peaches and thinks that this essence is presented literally before one's 
mind. I have to agree with Stoljar and claim that this seems implausible. If 
Damnjanovic, however, insists that this is the correct interpretation, then the only 
possible epistemic relation that allows for these claims seems to be acquaintance, a 
relation that is to be avoided.  
There is however an interpretation closely related with those 'essential 
properties'. Damnjanovic's original formulation of his version of the thesis, of course, 
does not imply this reading, since his version is about 'essential properties'. But one 
could argue that revelation refers to the following: 
 
Knowledge of features essentially phenomenal. 
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Muñoz-Suárez neutral argument from revelation seems to point to such an 
implication. The idea behind this essence claim is that, from a phenomenological point 
of view, we can understand 'essential features' in the sense that these features are 
essential to experiential knowledge and not only to states or contents. Having 
experiential knowledge that does not entail those essential features implies that it 
cannot be phenomenal. Thus Muñoz-Suárez claims that essential features of this sort 
can only be known by the experiencing subject via the phenomenal. Those features are 
therefore essentially phenomenal.478 
This leaves Muñoz-Suárez essence claim with a crucial advantage. Since the 
claim is not about whether or not we can know all that is essential, but rather about 
features which are essentially phenomenal, we do not need to know all that is 
essential. We only need to be in a position to know or know that for any of these 
essential features of an experience, this feature is essentially phenomenal. The 
revelation thesis, then, interprets the essence claim as knowledge of essential 
features, a feature essentially phenomenal by its phenomenal presence. The key idea 
then is not that what is essential to a phenomenal property, it is that a feature is 
phenomenally present. In this case, it is not an essential feature of a particular 
experience – an experience defined by its content – but the general feature an 
experience has to have, namely something phenomenally present. If I understand 
Muñoz-Suárez correctly, revelation therefore is not about a property of the content of 
experience, it rather gives rise to an epistemic condition that stems from the necessary 
feature that something is phenomenal present, the so called 'transcendental 
condition'479 for experiential knowledge. This condition, according to Muñoz-Suárez, 
enables experiential knowledge in the first place.480 
In my opinion, by claiming that the revelation thesis refers to some general 
feature of experience, Muñoz-Suárez's account points in the right direction. I think 
however that revelation expressed as 'feature essentially phenomenal' may not go far 
enough. Interpreting the presence of a phenomenal feature as a transcendental 
condition for the possibility of experiential knowledge is to say that revelation is not so 
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much about the experience itself, but rather about features of the experience which 
are necessary to obtain experiential knowledge. In my view, this is simply wrong. The 
reason is that revelation about experience itself comes first. It reveals the essential 
properties of experience. From such an account we may be able to conclude 
something like the transcendental condition. Revelation, however, needs to refer to 
the essential properties of phenomenal features, properties which secure that some 
features are essentially phenomenal. To put it differently, phenomenal presence might 
be essential to experiential knowledge, but revelation understood as being about 
experiences themselves, needs to refer to the essential properties, which guarantee 
phenomenal presence in the first place. 
 
IV.3.1. Revelation and phenomenal Q-me-ism 
 
Even though Muñoz-Suárez fails to account for those essential properties, it 
seems that the idea of phenomenal presence may imply that revelation is not so much 
about a particular experience, but about properties that are essential to all 
experiences. Now, if we assume that it is correct that revelation does not refer to the 
content of experience, therefore denying strong transparency, then revelation can 
only refer to properties which are not solely determined by the content. It seems to 
me, therefore, that it is not enough to simply refer to phenomenal properties as a 
whole. Since those properties are, at least, in part determined by the content of 
experience, the answer may be found in what properties are essential in the 
constitution of those phenomenal properties. 
I hope to be able to convince the reader that the version of revelation I am 
promoting, is designed to explain those properties. Of course, I am also inclined to 
believe that my phenomenal Q-me-istic account can avoid the problems that stem 
from the theory, so that, in the end, this approach explains the privileged access to the 
phenomenal. Before exemplifying my argument, here is what Q-me revelation claims, 
again. 
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(Initial) Q-me revelation: By having an experience E with the phenomenal property Q, I 
am in a position to know or know that Q is essentially Q-me. 
 
Now, how does this account of revelation work? To see this, a distinction of 
how phenomenal properties may be interpreted is useful. As Nida-Rümelin shows, 
there are at least two classical ways we can conceive of phenomenal properties481. 
They can either be properties of an experience or properties of the experiencing 
subject482. This amounts to the difference of being an experience or having an 
experience. On the one hand, the first approach is capable to explain the following: 
assuming that physicalism483 is true and phenomenal properties are properties of an 
experience, then phenomenal properties are identical to physical properties. On the 
other hand, the second interpretation seems to account for an important intuition we 
have about experiences. If phenomenal properties are properties of the experiencing 
subject, then, so it seems, by having those properties instantiated, the subject may get 
to know what having those properties consists in. The latter reading has a certain 
natural resistance towards physicalism and complicates solutions to the compatibility 
problem. The former, however, has difficulties in explaining the privileged access. 
Q-me revelation is the hypothesis that tries to accommodate both intuitions. It 
claims that in sense, Q is of the experiencing subject and at the same time that E is Q. 
Saying that E is Q means that Q is in part determined by the representational content. 
This means the 'what it is like' quality – even though it is always the case that 'what it 
is like' implies someone – is determined by representational qualities. However, since 
'what it is like for me' also includes that it is a quality for the experiencing subject, the 
fact that the experience is mine does not depend on the content of experience, it 
instantiates the experience as experience. Of course, this implies two things: a) the 
privileged access, in the here assumed strong sense, can only refer to the properties 
which involve an experiencing subject; and b), the answer to both, the compatibility 
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problem with physicalism and the privileged access, depends on whether or not it is 
plausible to construct phenomenal properties in the above sense. This does not mean 
that it is necessary to argue for a special theory of phenomenal properties at this 
point. The relevant strategy should instead show, independent from the question 
about physicalism or anti-physicalism, whether or not the basic structure of those 
properties is composed in one particular way. If it turns out that this composition is 
plausible, then the most important step to ground privileged access is achieved. In 
addition, if it is possible to show that a feasible account of this structure does not 
violate the Materialist Constraint, then we should be able to exclude mysterious 
explanations. 
 
IV.3.2. The subjective, qualitative and phenomenal 
 
From a phenomenological point of view, there is the thesis that any conscious 
experience entails an implicit form of self-consciousness.484 This thesis has also 
supporters in analytical philosophy.485 The basic idea behind this approach is that any 
conscious experience is based on an implicit, non-reflective or pre-reflective form of 
self-consciousness486. Alvin Goldman describes this idea in the following manner: 
[in] the case of thinking about x or attending to x. In the 
process of thinking about x there is already an implicit 
awareness that one is thinking about x. There is no need for 
reflection here, for taking a step back from thinking about x in 
order to examine it. […] When we are thinking about x, the 
mind is focused on x, not on our thinking about x. Nevertheless, 
the process of thinking about x carries with it a non-reflective 
self-awareness.487 
This implicit or non-reflective self-consciousness identifies us typically as the ‘owner’ of 
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the experience.488 This ownership is identical to the ‘someone’ for whom ‘it is like’ to 
have the experience. This notion, therefore, may point to a possible theory that can 
describe the basic structure of phenomenal properties in the right way. 
According to Gallagher and Zahavi, a first phenomenological approach 
characterizes the contrast between non-reflective self-consciousness and reflective 
self-consciousness in two ways. A first distinction states that while the latter is a 
thematic and explicit form of self-consciousness, the former is not. The second 
difference characterizes non-reflective self-consciousness as more basic than its 
reflective counterpart. This means reflective self-consciousness is only possible 
because it is based on non-reflective self-consciousness. Gallagher and Zahavi suggest, 
therefore, that pre-reflective self-consciousness describes the following common trait 
of experiences: 
All the experiences are characterized by a quality of mineness 
or for-me-ness, the fact that it is I who am having these 
experiences. All the experiences are given (at least tacitly) as 
my experiences, as experiences I am undergoing or living 
through. All of this suggests that first-person experience 
presents me with an immediate and non-observational access 
to myself, and that consequently (phenomenal) consciousness 
consequently entails a (minimal) form of self-consciousness. To 
put it differently, unless a mental process is pre-reflectively 
self-conscious there will be nothing it is like to undergo the 
process, and it therefore cannot be a phenomenally conscious 
process.489 
The important claim, therefore, amounts to the idea that unless a mental state is pre-
reflectively self-conscious, it cannot be phenomenally conscious either, denying that 
this particular mental state counts as experience. In my opinion, this means that, just 
as Q-me revelation claims, there are two different kinds of properties involved when 
referring to phenomenal properties. One is of the subject and the other connected to 
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the experience’s content. It also means that the properties of the experiencing subject 
are in a sense more basic than the qualitative properties related to the 
representational content. 
This claim, however, is not undisputed. Even though this general idea seems to 
be a plausible phenomenological approach, Nida-Rümelin seems to think that 
philosophers commit a rather fundamental mistake. In her opinion, and contrary to 
what I claimed above, it is simply not the case that this form of consciousness points to 
the experiencing subject. It is rather the case that, by proclaiming the idea of mineness 
or for-me-ness, even more properties of experience are introduced. For starters, Nida-
Rümelin believes that the notion of mineness or subjective character, as it is often 
called, is ambiguous. She thinks there are at least three different possible 
interpretations of this idea. The first interpretation refers to, what she calls basic 
intentionality, the second to primitive awareness and the third to awareness of basic 
intentionality. Since what I have said so far is more or less equivalent to the third 
account, I will discuss the problem of whether the idea of mineness is a property of the 
experiencing subject or the experience itself only in the context of this approach. 
It seems to me that it is possible to settle the issue without discussing the pre-
reflective self-consciousness claim in detail. Nida-Rümelin thinks that the problem 'of 
just another property of experience' arises, since, in the end, all views about the 
subjective character interpret the experiencing subject as independent from any other 
form of self-consciousness. The reason, or so she claims, stems from basic 
intentionality. Basic intentionality is, in her view, a description of the basic structure of 
experience in the following way: 'the experience is an event which consists in the fact 
that something is phenomenally given to some subject'490. Using the metaphor of the 
stream of consciousness, for Nida-Rümelin this means the following: 
The stream of consciousness is the totality of what is 
phenomenally given, it is an extremely complex and rich totality 
of what is given to a subject in perception, emotion, bodily 
feeling, memory, imagination and thought, a totality which is in 
permanent change from moment to moment. The stream of 
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consciousness, so understood, does not ‘contain’ the subject, it 
is rather the totality of what is present to the subject over a 
stretch of time. To say that basic intentionality is not 
phenomenally present, or to say that awareness of basic 
intentionality is not a kind of experiencing is to say – within the 
metaphor of the stream of consciousness – that basic 
intentionality does not occur in the stream of consciousness, it 
is not an element in it among others. Rather, we are 
permanently aware of the basic intentionality of experience in 
experiencing, in being presented with the rich totality which 
makes up the stream of consciousness within a given period of 
time. We should not think of the necessary relation between 
phenomenal consciousness and awareness of basic 
intentionality as relating two phenomena with one another. 
Rather, awareness of basic intentionality is an aspect of what it 
is to be phenomenally conscious of something. This is why basic 
intentionality does not enter the content of the experience. We 
are not aware of basic intentionality by experiencing it as a 
further element in what is phenomenally ‘there’.491 
Nida-Rümelin concludes that, for such a view, the self is not somehow created by 
obtaining self-consciousness. It rather represents the independent and necessary basis 
for all experience. This, of course, entails the idea that when becoming aware of the 
basic intentionality, this form of intentionality has to be interpreted as the object of 
awareness, even if this kind of awareness is identical to a pre-reflective self-awareness. 
Nida-Rümelin claims that even when pre-reflective self-consciousness or awareness of 
basic intentionality is adopted for the first time, it does not create the experiencing 
subject since basic intentionality does not form part of the stream of consciousness. It 
is rather the case that we become aware of something, namely this basic intentionality 
and therefore the self. According to her interpretation of such a view, then, we “[…] 
confuse awareness of something with ‘the something’ one is aware of in that 
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awareness.”492 
This confusion, however, needs to be avoided. To maintain that we do not have 
to view the self in this objective manner, one needs to follow Gallagher and Zahavi’s 
claim. They think that many phenomenologists493 believe that having an experience, 
and consequently being pre-reflectively self-aware, does not allow for a self as object. 
Being aware in this pre-reflective manner of one’s own self rather means that being 
conscious of an experience entails being conscious of that experience in a ‘first person 
mode of givenness’494. Gallagher and Zahavi therefore argue for the following: 
[…] we should not think of the self, in this most basic sense, as a 
substance, or as some kind of ineffable transcendental 
precondition, or as a social construct that gets generated 
through time; rather it is an integral part of conscious life, with 
an immediate experiential character.495 
This way of thinking is not unique to phenomenology. Some contemporary analytical 
philosophers496 seem to hold similar views. This means that Nida-Rümelin is right in 
doubting the claim that awareness of the basic intentionality is the appropriate 
interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness in the sense that the experiencing 
subject is included in the stream of consciousness. Since basic intentionality includes 
an object by definition, in this view, the experiencing subject must be interpreted as an 
object. We should, therefore, give up the idea ‘that something is phenomenally given 
to a subject’ and find a solution that involves the experiencing subject. Consequently, I 
guess, if one is able to abandon the view that the self is an all-encompassing basic 
entity or condition for the phenomenally given, then the self may simply form part of 
the phenomenal. Entailing the experiencing subject within conscious experiences also 
avoids the stipulation of 'simply another property' of experience. Clearly experiences, 
then, may involve something more, namely a subjective aspect. This, however, is not 
just some new stipulated property, it is the subject itself. 
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The important question now is whether or not such a phenomenological insight 
may be translated to a characterization of what the subjective character is. Obviously, 
this is only possible, if we assume that Nida-Rümelin is wrong and the subjective forms 
part of consciousness itself. A valid account, therefore, must claim that, both, the 
experiencing subject and the qualitative aspect of experience can be integrated in the 
relevant way. Primitive, pre-reflective self-consciousness must form part of the stream 
of consciousness just as ‘what it is like’ does. Phenomenal properties, therefore, must 
consist in subjective properties, which entail the self as form of pre-reflective self-
awareness, and qualitative properties, which consist of the ‘what it is like’. The 
subjective properties, or so this view claims, compose the experiencing subject. This 
means that the pre-reflective self-awareness is in a very real sense a minimal form of 
the self. 
Now, I considered this experiencing subject to be a plausible candidate to avoid 
being 'just another property' of experience in the last paragraph, but I still owe the 
reader an explanation. Implementing the 'self' within phenomenal consciousness 
means, in my opinion, that no new property has to be stipulated. The subject simply 
forms part of the experience and does not have it. We will see by having a closer look 
at phenomenal Q-me-ism that, not only is this approach adequate to explain this 
phenomenological view, it also accounts for this issue. 
I stated above that adverbialism focuses on the sensing of sentient or conscious 
subjects.  It is, therefore, not the case that some appearance or representation is 
presented to the subject, it rather describes the ways or modes the subject senses. I 
have shown that in its classical form, adverbialism presents us with serious problems. 
Phenomenal Q-me-ism, however, is better off. I have already pointed out that the 
latter view allows for representations, which means that it avoids the classical 
objections. 
As a consequence there is an obvious difference between phenomenal Q-me-
ism and adverbialism. Classical adverbialism ascribes to the existence of experiencing 
subjects which, in return, have experiences497, even if those experiences are modes of 
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sensing. The latter thought refers to the ways experiences are instantiated. Since an 
experience is a property of the subject, those different modes refer to the ways the 
property, or experience, is realized in the subject. This means, on the one hand, a 
representational account describes the experience as being e.g. a red 
representation498 that is presented to the subject. Adverbialism, on the other hand, 
designates the modes in which the subject has e.g. a red experience, namely as red-ly. 
The adverbialist view, therefore, clearly accounts straight forward for certain 
phenomenological implication. It fails, however, to incorporate the idea that 
experiences are about something. Representationalism is capable of the contrary. It 
accounts for what experiences are about, but does not consider our phenomenology. 
To maintain the importance of the phenomenal, it is therefore enough for phenomenal 
Q-me-ism to maintain that the experiencing subject forms part of the process of 
experiencing. This does not impose the idea – on the contrary to adverbialsim – that 
experiences are not about something. A phenomenal Q-me-ist, therefore, should 
always have both aspects of experience in mind. This means that this view describes 
the ontology of an experience not as a classical dichotomy. This dichotomy may be put 
the following way: 
 
R 
E=<+ 
Q499 
 
For phenomenal Q-me-ism, an experience is the phenomenal structure Q-me, which 
can be translated in the function me(representational quality) or me(RQ). In short, 
phenomenal Q-me-ism claims the following: 
 
E = Q-me = me(RQ)
500 
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The function means that the representational qualities are realized in the minimal self. 
There, however, remains the question of how we can spell out this approach. I 
could suggest a similar proposal as Janzen above and introduce an adverbialist-
objectualist account. This view clearly has the advantage that it considers both 
required aspects of experience. However, since Janzen's version favors some form of 
higher-order theory of consciousness which implies an inner-sense model of self-
knowledge, it cannot allow for privileged access in the sense of certainty. I will 
develop, therefore, phenomenal Q-me-ism differently.501 In my opinion, one should 
focus on the fact that phenomenal Q-me-ism is specifically about phenomenal 
properties and try to make sense of that. If strong transparency were correct, there 
would be no story to tell. Phenomenal properties would form part of the 
representational content of experience and the story would end here. Since, in my 
opinion, strong transparency is false, phenomenal properties have to be, at least in 
part, non-representational. This means, I assume that the phenomenological structure 
of an experience has representational properties and non-representational properties. 
I also assume that the phenomenal consists in 'what it is like' and 'for me' properties. If 
an experience E with phenomenal property Q presents itself essentially as Q-me, then 
the qualitative properties have to be designated by Q and the subjective properties by 
-me. But what kind of properties does this involve? 
It seems clear to me that a subjective property, or our pre-reflective self-
awareness, cannot be representational. To represent something, or to be about 
something, there has to be something that can be represented, or something, 
something can be about.  Usually we would assume some kind of object. Since pre-
reflective self-awareness does not involve the self as an object, but as first person 
mode of givenness, it cannot represent the self as an object. It follows that subjective 
properties cannot be representational. Consequently, the question arises what the 
subjective properties are. My claim is that those properties are in fact the real deal, 
the most primitive form of the self as a function.502 
                                                          
501
 There may be the possibility of introducing a one-level interpretation of this account. I will, however, 
resist that possibility and try to develop phenomenal Q-me-ism in a related, but different way. 
502
 There are different forms of minimal self-models. Since the structure of this primitive self is not my 
concern here, I simply claim its existence. For discussions about different forms of the minimal self 
 
175 
 
Now, qualitative properties are clearly different. On the one hand, they seem to 
involve qualities closely connected to the representational content. It is odd to assume 
that e.g. the representational content red has no influence on 'what it is like' to have a 
red experience. In a sense, one should expect that the representational content red at 
least partially constitutes the phenomenally experienced redness. On the other hand, 
we should at least concede that the phenomenal quality redness involves the 
experiencing subject. Since a phenomenal quality does not exist for itself, but entails 
that someone has it, we should expect – assuming that the subjective property is pre-
reflective self-awareness and therefore a minimal form of the self – that, since 
subjective properties form part of the conscious experience, their involvement in 
phenomenal aspects of an experience can hardly be denied. However, even though it 
seems that the involvement of subjective qualities may influence the overall 
phenomenology, the qualitative aspect seems to be fully exhausted by the 
representational content. For having a red experience in a certain way it is enough that 
the red representation is a certain way. The qualities of the red representation fully 
describe red qualities. This, of course, does not mean it fully describes phenomenal 
red. Since the phenomenal includes the experiencing subject, this cannot be the case. 
It may be unclear from this train of thought what exactly the impact of the subjective 
properties on the phenomenal red sensation is, but it is clear that phenomenal 
properties entail subjective properties. Anyway, at this point, it seems to me that the 
qualitative properties of our phenomenology are exhausted by the experience's 
representational content.503 
So far I have claimed that phenomenal properties are not entirely 
representational. The reason is that, even though qualitative properties may be solely 
representational, subjective properties are not. Both are clearly controversial. As a first 
step, one should analyze the relation between both types of properties and see 
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whether or not it justifies those initial claims. If approved – as a second step – one 
should discuss the implications and evaluate if the consequences of this view are 
reasonable. 
By assuming that phenomenal properties consist in subjective properties and 
qualitative properties, it seems only natural to assume also that both are closely 
related. In the case of phenomenal Q-me-ism, phenomenal properties include both 
qualitative properties or Q and an experiencing subject or -me. If we assume that the 
experiencing subject, interpreted as pre-reflective self-awareness, is a constituent of 
conscious experiences504, then it is not possible for a mental state to be an experience 
without this subject. This may be considered a minimal form of the self and therefore 
the experiencing subject itself. Without discussing any particular theory505 of the 
minimal self, we still need, at least, a short characterization. Gallagher puts 
phenomenological dimension of the minimal self in the following manner: 
Minimal self: Phenomenologically, that is, in terms of how one 
experiences it, a consciousness of oneself as an immediate 
subject of experience, unextended in time.506 
For the 'self' to be considered minimal, it is only needed that it is necessary aspects 
remain. All other aspects are removed. Those facts come only into play when 
considering the 'narrative' self, a self which includes extension over time, memories 
and future intentions.507 If true, one may assume that the experience always entails its 
experiencing subject already. The only remaining question being why we should 
consider the minimal self to be necessary for a conscious experience. 
Based on phenomenological considerations by Gallagher and Zahavi, I have 
stated that pre-reflective self-awareness is a constituent of phenomenal 
consciousness. In my opinion, one should make the following stronger claim. 
Phenomenal properties entail subjective properties as an essential constituent by 
definition. In his famous article 'What is it like to be a bat?' Nagel writes the following: 
Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. […] No 
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doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, 
on other planets in other solar systems throughout the 
universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that 
an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, 
that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may 
be further implications about the form of the experience; there 
may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the 
behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has 
conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it 
is to be that organism – something it is like for the organism.508 
Interestingly, in the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind it was attributed to 
Nagel that the mystery of qualia or phenomenal properties is to be found in the 
'something it is like' and not so much that it involves an experiencing subject.509 As I 
understand this passage, however, it seems to be equally or even more important to 
be the subject of experience, or better the one for whom something is a certain way. If 
my interpretation is correct, then subjective properties do not only form part of the 
constituents of our phenomenology, they are essential to it by definition. 
What about the qualitative properties? In my opinion, Nagel is pretty clear. 
Certain phenomenal qualities or qualitative properties are also constituents of 
conscious experiences. To be considered an experience does not only entail the fact 
that there is necessarily an experiencing subject, this subject also has to experience 
something the way it does. To count as an experience, therefore, it needs to involve 
that there is something it is like to experience for the subject. It seems only natural, 
then, to assume what phenomenal Q-me-ism predicts, namely that in standard cases 
the phenomenal entails both, subjective properties and qualitative properties. To 
postulate such an account is a first step in explaining how those properties are related 
and therefore whether or not my claim about the structure of the phenomenal is 
accurate. To decide the latter, however, one needs a further step. This step consists in 
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an analysis of the reciprocal influence. 
Now, before starting this investigation, I still want to sum up the basic ideas of 
this view. To claim that subjective properties and qualitative properties are both 
constituents of the phenomenal entails certain consequences. Since I argued that 
subjective properties are not representational, phenomenal properties cannot be 
entirely representational as a result. On the one hand, if subjective properties are 
present as a form of minimal self, then the experiencing subject is literally present in 
the phenomenal. Phenomenal Q-me-ism's designation for this claim is -me. The 
important implication of this assumption is that it establishes a universal condition for 
the existence of experiences and is therefore essential. This means that the awareness 
of the experiencing subject as the possessor of the experience is always present, as 
long as we experience.510 On the other hand, I stated that qualitative properties are 
entirely representational. Whether or not this is true, is still to be seen. However, 
those properties, designated by Q, clearly present themselves to be variable. They 
consist in different kind of qualities, stemming e.g. from perception. 
Now, to return to the question about what one property means to the other, 
consider our ontological description of the phenomenal again. Having or being an 
experience, according to phenomenal Q-me-ism, is simply the presence of the 
phenomenal which is constituted by qualitative properties Q and the experiencing 
subject -me. The first component is representational and the second one is not. At this 
point, however, we may assume a further important distinction, one that involves two 
different interpretations of quality. This distinction will clarify phenomenal Q-me-ism's 
view on qualitative properties and initiate the first step to describe the relation 
between those properties and the experiencing subject. 
Basically, a quality manifests itself in two different ways. It can either be a 
quality in the objective sense or a quality in the subjective sense. An objective quality 
usually refers to something that is measured against some standard. Consider the 
following example as far as I know, the quality of a diamond depends in a big part on 
its clarity. If the diamond has a high degree of clarity, the diamond is considered of 
being of high quality as well. In this case it is not important what some particular 
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subject thinks about the diamond, either the diamond does well compared with its 
standard of clarity or it does not. Subjective interpretations of qualities seem to be 
different. They involve a subjective standpoint towards a certain quality. Consider 
another example. Whether or not something tastes good to me includes a subjective 
view on what tastes good to me. This means, it is not up to some objective standard of 
good taste, whether I think something tastes good, it is up to me. In the case of 
phenomenal properties, it seems to me that both approaches apply, maybe at a more 
primitive level. 
Imagine, therefore, that I have a red experience. To have this kind of 
experience means in one sense that some red quality is present. It also means, in a 
second sense, that there is some subjective view about this quality involved. On the 
one hand, it seems, therefore, that we can objectively compare different kinds of red 
hues. This is actually something we often do. By stating that something is bordeaux or 
flame red, we locate the specific red quality on a somewhat standardized scale. On the 
other hand, it seems that the red experience contains also the red quality as having a 
subjective aspect. It entails that the red quality is a certain way for me. It seems that 
no objective scale can tell me how such a red experience is sensed by me. This seems 
to depend on me, the subject of experience. 
The problematic interpretation is the latter, the subjective aspect of quality. 
Still, it is usually not the same to think of something tasting good and sensing red in a 
particular subjective way. The first quality entails the second plus an assignment of 
some value to the experience. More importantly however, both cases are grounded by 
how a quality is sensed by me. On a lower level of experiencing, they can, therefore, be 
treated as equal. The remaining question is about what we can conclude from this 
analysis. In my opinion, the answer is along these lines. Phenomenal redness needs the 
instantiation of a red quality in the objective sense, that is to say a representation of 
that quality.511 It, however, also needs that this red quality is present in its 'first-person 
mode of givenness', this means as a quality that is experienced by me. The latter is 
what subjective properties add to the former, and does not involve representations. As 
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I argued above, those properties cannot be representational because they include pre-
reflective self-awareness and therefore a minimal form of the self. I hope that it 
became clear why qualitative properties are purely representational. They are 
representational because they simply represent qualities in the objective sense. As a 
consequence we may, however, ask ourselves what exactly the minimal self 
contributes. 
If this description is correct, then phenomenal properties are in part non-
representational. This is the case, since the phenomenal entails subjective properties. 
Qualitative properties are entirely exhausted by their representational character. This 
means, what gives qualities in the objective sense its experiential character stems from 
the subjective properties an experience possesses. So far many descriptions were used 
to characterize these subjective properties. At this point, it seems, however, 
reasonable to refine what their role within an experience is. I claimed that subjective 
properties may be described as pre-reflective self-awareness. This awareness 
constitutes a minimal form of the self that is experiential in character. I also claimed 
that this may be expressed as the 'first-person mode of givenness' of some quality that 
is experienced by me. Since I abandoned the position that the minimal self has to be 
some basic entity that possesses consciousness, but is rather located within 
consciousness itself, the subjectivity of experience arises here. A consequence of this 
approach is that the self or the subject of a conscious experience is already 
experiential and therefore the origin of the experiential character of experience. This 
means, what makes one's experiencing what it is, is essentially oneself. 
That experiencing something is essentially tied to the self does not mean that 
an experience only depends on oneself. Experiences are usually about something. This 
means, even if experiencing arises from the instantiation of subjective properties, 
phenomenal properties commonly need qualitative properties as well. Those latter 
properties may be representational, they shape, however, the kind of experience we 
are having. Above all, representational qualitative properties are usually of the highest 
importance for the appearance of subjective properties. On the contrary to the latter, 
it is normal for qualitative properties to be instantiated in mental states different from 
experiences. It seems no wild speculation that e.g. unconscious mental states employ 
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qualities, they simply pass without being noticed consciously. Those states still play a 
role in the economy of our mental life; even we do not become aware of them. Apart 
from conscious experiences, however, subjective properties normally do not arise. 
Since those properties can only be present when we are experiencing, they are closely 
connected to experiences themselves. In the ordinary formation of an experience, 
then, qualitative properties often invoke subjective properties and therefore the 
phenomenal. 
I want to disarm an obvious criticism at this point. The view that phenomenal 
properties are composed the way I claim may lead to a concern that arises from Nida-
Rümelin's initial distinction.512 As considered above, Nida-Rümelin claims that there 
are two basic manners we can interpret the structure of experiences, namely being an 
experience or having an experience. In the former case phenomenal properties form 
part of the experience, in the latter of the experiencing subject. I claimed so far that 
phenomenal Q-me-ism in a sense accommodates both claims. After characterizing my 
view, however, the suspicion prevails that, since I assume the minimal self to be 
experiential in character, it forms part of the experience and therefore is a property of 
the experience itself. I also explicitly claimed something similar above. But, how can 
that be? On the one hand, in this interpretation of the minimal self, the self is the 
origin of experiencing an experience, so strictly speaking it gives the experience its 
experiential character. On the other hand, this minimal self is, in my opinion, the real 
deal. It is an authentic form of the self that, even adding the experiencing, is where the 
experience is located. Therefore, the self, in a sense, has the experience. This may not 
satisfy Nida-Rümelin, since she thinks that an experience presupposes a subject as 
entity513, but I hope to have shown that this does not have to be the case. 
At this point, we may want to consider the implications of this view and 
whether or not those describe experiences in an appropriate way. One implication is 
that phenomenal Q-me-ism might make sense when talking about visual perception. 
Having a red experience may, at a first glance, be considered to involve 
representational qualitative properties. Pain, however, is often considered to be 
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different.514 Even though there are common sense ideas about the location of pain in 
certain body parts, it seems more natural to assume that pain is a private matter. This 
means that, apart from the one in pain, no one else has epistemic access to it. It may, 
however, be worst. Unlike a red sensation, which may be present even when we are 
not consciously aware of it, pain seems to depend on our awareness of it. Pain that is 
not consciously present seems, therefore, to be no pain. In a famous passage Kripke 
states the following: 
To be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if one 
had a pain is to have a pain; to be in the same epistemic 
situation that would obtain in the absence of pain is not to have 
a pain […]. Pain […] is not picked out by one of its accidental 
properties; rather it is picked out by its immediate 
phenomenological quality […]. If any phenomenon is picked out 
in exactly the same way that we pick out pain, then that 
phenomenon is pain.515 
How can phenomenal Q-me-ism deal with this problem? First of all, I think that 
Kripke is right in pointing out that pain is a phenomenal quality. In terms of 
phenomenal Q-me-ism that is the qualitative property, or Q. I stated that Q is 
representational, which means it is entirely constituted by the content of experience. 
This, however, seems to be the contrary of what Kripke claims, since he also assumes 
that the phenomenal pain quality is immediate. I will leave this issue open for just a 
moment to first discuss what the problem of a representational account of pain is and 
how I think it can be solved. Hopefully this way I can come back to Kripke's claim and 
show that phenomenal Q-me-ism agrees with his view. 
Now, in the case of pain the representational account suggests that what is 
represented is tissue damage. Aydede points out that two problems arise from this 
idea. The first issue is connected to strong transparency. If true, then pain is only tissue 
damage. It seems, however, that pain also includes an 'affective-emotional'516 
component, namely that it hurts. The representationalist seems to ignore this fact. The 
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second problem stems from the assumption that a pain representation represents 
tissue damage. When we, however, refer to this tissue damage, we do not literally 
state that there is tissue damage, we refer to the pain experience. This is called the 
problem of focus.517 In short, representationalism treats both problems the same. It 
assumes strong transparency and claims that all aspects of phenomenal properties are 
representational. Phenomenal Q-me-ism denies this claim and takes the issue 
seriously. 
Since, in the first case, we should assume that tissue damage is also present in 
its 'first-person mode of givenness' or better involves the experiencing subject, one 
would expect that a pain experience hurts. What stems from the subject or the self is 
its experiential character or that we are experiencing. Hurt, then, is the 'first-person 
mode of givenness' of pain. To put it differently: the self is experiencing pain in a 
hurtful way. 
The second issue can be avoided by phenomenal Q-me-ism in a straight 
forward manner. The theory predicts that one obviously focuses on the experience. 
This means, one focuses on experiencing or better on what is given to the experiencing 
subject with experiential character. Since this way of referring to tissue damage 
involves the way it is for the subject, i.e. the experiential character of pain is 
psychologically present for the subject, the impact of this psychological aspect, or 
hurting, is more immediate than the tissue damage. 
In my opinion, these solutions build the backbone to maintain that what Kripke 
asserts is correct. Especially the explanation of the second issue clarifies why pain is 
immediately experiential and therefore depends on its phenomenal quality. This, 
however, does not mean that one has to interpret Kripke in a way that does not allow 
for any constituent of a phenomenal property to be representational. It is only 
necessary that not all components are representational to maintain that pain is 
essentially phenomenal. It is therefore not problematic that qualitative properties are 
entirely representational; they just have to be supplemented with subjective 
properties. 
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Before continuing to discuss any issue raised by phenomenal Q-me-ism, I want 
to say something about the representations involved in phenomenal qualities. In the 
context of the previous issue, we have seen that representations may be quite 
different. At first, I discussed the question of whether or not qualitative properties are 
representational by introducing an example from visual perception. Only after that, I 
considered bodily sensations. It seems obvious to me that, even though both cases 
include representations, they are not of the same type. The difference may be put as 
follows: visual perception has representations about the world states, and bodily 
sensations have representations about the body states. Our representational system 
works with both. This may be one possible explanation for the differences in our 
experiences.518 
There is a second question that arises when assuming phenomenal Q-me-ism. A 
phenomenal Q-me-ist has to answer the standard metaphysical arguments519 of the 
consciousness debate. Without providing a detailed answer, at this point, I want to 
focus on why the appearance of those arguments seems natural in this framework. 
This means, I am less concerned with what phenomenal Q-me-ism has to say about 
these issues, and rather with how this view explains their occurrence. 
Now, consider the knowledge argument first. As we have seen, the basic idea of 
the argument is that Mary the super-scientist was locked in a room that contained no 
color whatsoever. Even though she learned everything physical there is to know about 
color vision, until she leaves the room and actually sees the first time e.g. a rose, she 
does not know everything there is to know about color. This argument is designed to 
show that physicalism is false. If phenomenal Q-me-ism is true, it becomes clear why 
this issue arises. Even if Mary knows everything about color representations520, she still 
cannot know what they are like for her. This is the case, because she never had a color 
experience and therefore no experience composed in the relevant sense. It is true that 
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she had experiences which do not include colors and therefore she knows something 
about experiences in general. But she never had a qualitative color property 
instantiated in the relevant subjective sense, so all her knowledge about colors misses 
the experiential character. In short, the right me function containing red was never 
instantiated, so she lacks phenomenal knowledge about it. For that reason, it is natural 
to assume that she cannot have experiential color knowledge before having the 
relevant experience521 and therefore no miracle that the scenario of the knowledge 
argument arises. 
In my opinion, the case of the explanatory gap is somewhat related to this last 
idea. This argument claims that there is supposed to be an unbridgeable gap between 
physical descriptions of a person's experience and phenomenal descriptions of the 
same experience. According to phenomenal Q-me-ism this issue stems from the 
problem that straight forwardly one can only describe the representational qualities in 
physical terms. Since subjective properties are not straight forwardly physically 
describable – they are essentially experiential in character to us – we therefore have 
the intuition that an experience cannot be described in physical terms alone. If what I 
said about phenomenal Q-me-ism is true, then this fact depends on how we can 
explicate the me function. 
Finally, what does phenomenal Q-me-ism say about the zombie intuition? Now, 
the intuition is based on the idea that we can imagine a world where phenomenal 
zombies exist. This world is a perfect copy of our world, and the zombies are perfect 
copies of us – therefore they behave, utter and act the same way we do. The only thing 
those zombies lack are phenomenal properties. This means, for those zombies there is 
nothing it is like to e.g. see red. This argument – just as its former relatives – is 
designed to refute physicalism. To do so, it introduces one more idea, namely that the 
following scenario cannot be ruled out a priori: since this zombie world is conceivable, 
it is also metaphysical possible. Now, phenomenal Q-me-ism explains the rise of this 
intuition by claiming that what the zombies are missing are experiences. They still have 
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representational qualitative properties, but without experiential character. On the one 
hand, for phenomenal Q-me-ism, such a scenario is not conceivable, because the 
zombies would not have experiences. Therefore, they are essentially different from us. 
Those zombies cannot behave like us, they behave like zombies. On the other hand, it 
is conceivable, and even possible. This, however, implies that we are zombies as well. 
Since the function me(RQ) may only be some brain state, the zombie world is our 
world. 
A final issue may follow from the relation between subjective properties and 
qualitative properties. So far, I claimed that they co-exist necessarily to form the 
phenomenal. It is, however, often assumed that highly skilled masters of meditation 
may reach a state that involves awareness without objects. It is claimed that they are 
only aware of awareness itself.522 This may imply that the only properties they are 
aware of are subjective properties, or better, they are only pre-reflectively self-aware. 
In any case, those masters seem to be in a state that does not include qualitative 
properties. They are therefore only experiencing the experiential character which does 
not involve the intentional dimension of experiences or their aboutness. On the one 
hand, if such a state of mind is possible, this is a favorable outcome for the existence of 
subjective properties. It implies that those properties have an independent ontological 
status and therefore an authentic influence on experience. On the other hand, this 
means that the experiential character itself does not need qualitative properties, at 
least when that state is purely experiential. In my opinion, however, this is compatible 
with phenomenal Q-me-ism. First of all, it clearly confirms the existence of the 
proclaimed subjective properties and their experiential character. Secondly, I only 
described how experiences are formed in everyday life and not whether or not we can 
access the experiential character itself. This state of mind does not imply that there are 
exceptions to what an experience is; it implies that in special cases we can access the 
experiential character itself. It is entirely plausible to assume this consequence within 
the framework of phenomenal Q-me-ism. The conclusion being that what can be 
achieved in meditation is a pure form experiencing or accessing the experiential 
character itself, without employing the intentional content of experience. At no point, I 
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claimed that subjective properties and qualitative properties have to co-exist 
necessarily; I just claimed that experiences which are about something contain both 
properties.523 
In my opinion, so far phenomenal Q-me-ism proved itself to be a view that 
naturally explains certain intuitions about experiences and their phenomenal 
properties: it explains the structure of the phenomenal, since it can account for 
intuitions about e.g. pain and similar sensations; it accounts for the appearance of the 
standard metaphysical arguments; and finally, it allows for non-standard cases of 
experiencing that arise, e.g. profound meditation. At this point, I will return to the 
initial problem of revelation and the following question: can Q-me revelation explain 
the privileged access and still be compatible with physicalism? 
 
IV.4. Q-me revelation: a defense 
 
To defend this account of revelation I have to solve two puzzles. I, first, have to 
solve the epistemological issues about the specialness of privileged self-knowledge of 
the phenomenal. Then, I need to show that the metaphysical problem of the 
revelation thesis's compatibility with physicalism does not apply to my view. For the 
first task, one should make use of the intuitions about the epistemic features of 
phenomenal properties and show how Q-me revelation can meet them. The second 
matter involves a more general approach. To show that Q-me revelation is compatible 
with physicalism is to demonstrate that it is at least in general possible to spell out 
phenomenal Q-me-ism in a physicalistic way. 
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IV.4.1. Privileged access 
 
I treated intuitions about the epistemological features of phenomenal 
properties so far in the following manner: I maintained that privileged self-knowledge 
about our phenomenal properties in a strong sense, entails infallibility and 
omniscience.524 This form of epistemological specialness is supposably explained by 
the acquaintance relation with those properties. The rebuttal of this approach 
however, left a) the privileged access without legitimate justification and b) an 
unproblematic acquaintance view as merely a synonym for the experience thesis.525 I 
disproved strong transparency, but maintain that experiences are partially 
representational.526 Finally, we will see how the fineness of grain527 unfolds from the 
defense of Q-me revelation. 
As seen in the last paragraph – and the preceding chapters – the privileged 
access is in need of an explanation. I claimed that, since acquaintance fails, revelation 
may be considered the most promising alternative. After already rebutting a number 
of interpretations of this view – mostly on the grounds that they either entail 
acquaintance and/or are not compatible with the Material Constraint – I stated that 
the correct account is a phenomenal Q-me-ist approach to revelation or Q-me 
revelation. I also showed that, in the end, Q-me revelation is about the nature of 
experience. The thesis, therefore, states the following: 
 
(Initial) Q-me revelation: By having an experience E with the phenomenal property Q, I 
am in a position to know or know that E is essentially Q-me. 
 
I argued so far that phenomenal Q-me-ism can reasonably explain phenomenal 
structure of our experiences. It is, however, not clear so far why Q-me revelation 
justifies privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal. To ground the privileged 
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access contemporary acquaintance approaches claim: a) a metaphysical directness 
relation with our phenomenal properties and b) an epistemic directness relation with 
those properties.528 The purpose of this suggestion is to secure that the instantiated 
conscious phenomenal properties overlap with the grasp of those properties. In the 
first chapter, I argued in length that the foundation of this proposal can only be found 
in b). The consequence is that it must be the case that either the conscious 
phenomenal properties we rely on for justification enjoy an ontologically independent 
status or that the relation with those properties is basic in the Levineian sense. I 
argued, however, that, since both assumptions violate the Material Constraint, this 
approach should count as implausible. 
Revelation in general, I think, does most of the time involve condition a) as 
well529. It also maintains the fact that we are in a special epistemic position for 
knowledge, namely knowledge that is infallible and omniscience, or in short certain. Its 
justification is usually similar to b). It depends only on the essence of the property in 
question which means here the essence of experiences. However, we can also find one 
decisive difference in this formulation. While even qualified versions of acquaintance, 
on the one hand, seem to be too broad and therefore fail to distinguish between what 
is important or essential to ground privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal, 
this approach has to project its plausibility by either claiming to be a basic relation or 
to be grounded by basic properties. Revelation, on the other hand, usually involves 
highly qualified views about experiences and their phenomenal properties. Since the 
thesis entails an essence claim, it is therefore crucial to restrict the knowledge claim 
accordingly. 
This is due to the second determinant deviance. It stems from what the implied 
knowledge is about. While acquaintance tends to ground judgments about what is 
present in our phenomenal reality, revelation justifies knowledge about the 
ontological and/or metaphysical essence of experiences themselves. This means, while 
the acquaintance approach only justifies why my epistemic judgments about some 
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presence e.g. phenomenal red are special, revelation primarily justifies knowledge 
about the essence of experiences themselves in general and therefore leads to 
knowledge about the underlying ontological/metaphysical structure of experiences. 
Now, since acquaintance is principally silent about the ontology of experience, the 
acquaintance theorist may apply this account to justify the special epistemology of 
self-knowledge within a variety of ontological/metaphysical frameworks. Revelation, 
however, may not be applied in the same sense. Since the view implies knowledge 
about the ontology/metaphysics of experiences themselves, it stands and falls with the 
correctness of its essence claim. Even though this kind of self-knowledge is the primary 
concern of revelation, I claim that the thesis may justify privileged epistemic 
judgments about e.g. phenomenal red sensations as well. 
Q-me revelation, then, is a view that primarily claims knowledge about the 
ontology/metaphysics of an experience itself. In particular, this account asserts that Q 
is essentially Q-me. The thesis therefore implies general ontological self-knowledge 
about the essential features – in this case Q-me – that constitute an experience. This is 
to say, if Q-me revelation is true, then all other features, different from Q-me, are only 
contingent or accidental to Q. I am, therefore, in a position to know or know, by having 
E with Q, that E is constituted by a specific phenomenological structure that entails 
representational or objective qualities and the experiencing subject. The remaining 
issue revolves around the question whether or not Q-me revelation can also ground 
epistemic privileged self-knowledge about a particular phenomenal property as well. 
As stated above, justifying the right kind of epistemological situation, via Q-me 
revelation, is related to some of the reasoning implied by the acquaintance approach. 
However, in the case of revelation the essence claim is decisively involved. So far, I 
have tried to show that Q-me revelation puts us in a position to know or know general 
implications about what constitutes a phenomenal property, by simply having it. This 
knowledge about the ontological/metaphysical structure of the phenomenal reveals, 
therefore, that one of the essential properties of the phenomenal property in question 
is the experiencing subject. But, what makes this kind of self-knowledge, in the end, so 
special? The answer, I claim, can only be found in Q-me revelation's claim about 
essences, that means the idea that E is essentially Q-me. There has to be something 
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special about Q-me that it presents itself in the relevant manner. It may not come as a 
big surprise that, in my opinion, this stems from the fact that the minimal self is 
involved. Since we are immediately and pre-reflectively aware of ourselves as the 
experiencing subject for whom there is something it is like, we therefore intuitively 
distinguish between us, the subject of experience, and the present qualities that shape 
the experience. This is not to say that we become necessarily aware of an outer world 
– even though this may generally be the case, especially in cases of perception. Since 
our subjective properties, however, do not entail those experienced qualities, we 
become aware of them as a shaping element. This means, in a sense, pre-reflective 
self-awareness entails already what constitutes the experiential component of an 
experience, without, however, defining what kind of experience we are experiencing. 
Now, the reason why pre-reflective self-awareness is special is that it 
constitutes the experiential. If this feature of experiences, therefore, did not exist, 
experiences would also not exist. To put it differently, if the subject of experience were 
not involved in constituting an experience, the question 'what is essential to an 
experience?' would not arise, since there would be none. The simple fact that we 
assume that there are experiences entails already the fact that there is an experiencing 
subject. Therefore, to be in a position to know or know something about the 
ontological/metaphysical structure of the subject only requires to have an experience, 
since without this feature I it is impossible to even assume experiences. Since 
experiences are, in a sense, qualified or restricted – this means, they are at least 
minimally shaped – we know, by having those experiences that, apart from the 
experiential character, there is an element that shapes this character.530 I claim, 
therefore, that anyone who has E with Q cannot fail to have Q-me. Since Q-me 
essentially constitutes a phenomenal property, anyone who fails to know this, even 
tacitly, does not know what having an experience consists in. This implies, however, 
she never had one.531 
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Before continuing, there is an obvious objection that has to be refuted. For 
many who have read so far, doubt may arise about the claim that the experiencing 
subject is necessary for having an experience. Even though this seems 
phenomenologically plausible, a concern similar to Hume's532 critique – later further 
developed by Russell533 - against Descartes's cogito argument534 may be applicable. 
Imagine a severe case of schizophrenia.535 Assuming that a patient suffers from 
hallucination and thinks that what she is experiencing is not her experiences but 
experiences induced from a different individual, e.g. an alien. Is it the case, then, that 
the person suffering from this terrible condition has experiences which do not entail 
the experiencing subject? I claim no. She may identify those experiences as someone 
else's experiences, i.e. she may assume that those experiences were implanted by 
someone else and deny, therefore, a sense of agency536. This explains especially well, 
why she experiences these experiences as alien and strange. In a sense, then, it seems 
to be correct that the schizophrenic does not experience her experiences as her own. 
However, she still experiences those strange and alienating experiences from her own 
point of view, or better, in her own 'first-person mode of givenness'. She maintains, 
therefore, a sense of ownership537. Both notions of the minimal self usually go hand in 
hand. Only in special cases, like in the case of schizophrenia, they may drift apart. To 
                                                                                                                                                                          
'know' these things about the phenomenal? I have claimed in the second chapter that either option 
may constitute revelation. Without arguing for a detailed account, it seems, at a first glance, that 
revelation Q-me points to the latter. It seems that having an E with Q entails knowing that it is Q-me 
(even in a tacit sense). If one fails to know this, one could not even know that one has an experience. 
This is however only possible, if one never had had an experience. At this point, it seems, therefore, 
that one obtains this ontological/metaphysical knowledge by simply having an experience. 
  I want to point out that this is not the whole story. What was said here seems so for now! At a 
later stage we will see that the issue is slightly different. I will, therefore, maintain both notions until 
indicated differently. 
532
 Hume argues that Descartes's argument does not lead to conclusions about one's own self. For 
discussion see Hume 1978. 
533
 Russell claims that Descartes is not justified in introducing the 'I'. He is only justified to claim that 
there is thinking or thoughts, but not that there is a subjective entity which is ultimately the 
possessor of these thoughts. See Russell 1927 and 1945. 
534
 The argument states the well-known foundation for knowledge. For extensive discussion see 
Descartes 1991, 1998. 
535
 This is a modified version of Gallagher's example. See Gallagher 2000. 
536
 “Sense of agency: The sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action. For example, 
the sense that I am the one who is causing something to move, or that I am the one who is 
generating a certain thought in my stream of consciousness.” (Gallagher 2000, p. 15). 
537
 “Sense of ownership: The sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. For example, 
the sense that my body is moving regardless of whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary.” 
(Gallagher 2000, p. 15). 
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maintain the notion of minimal self, in the case of conscious experiences, the sense of 
ownership is, however, enough. All that was exposed here is, of course, not to say 
anything about what causes of this disturbance and also not on what level of mental 
life it is caused. I picked the example only to show that even in extreme cases, having 
an experience needs a subject, minimal as it may be, that experiences. 
Since the precious example may have been controversial to support my 
argument, a different example may be more appropriate. Imagine that engineering 
makes it possible to connect my mind, via wireless technology, with the mind of 
another person. This means, I have access to all kinds of mental states, including what 
that person experiences. Now, this raises the question whether or not I could 
genuinely experience the other person's experience as their experience. To put it 
differently, by accessing her experience am I capable to experience her experience 
without being the experiencing subject of whatever it is that I may be experiencing? In 
my opinion, the answer has to be no. Even though I may be able to identify this 
experience as not being my own and attribute is, therefore, to somebody else (I am 
not the agent of the experience), the fact that I am experiencing that experience 
implies that I become aware of myself as the subject of that experience, even if it 
entails the other person's experience (I still have a sense of ownership). Basically, this 
means that to experience one has to employ one's own 'first-person mode of 
givenness' or one does not experience at all. 
Now, assuming that this is true, and Q-me revelation justifies the privileged 
access to ontological/metaphysical knowledge, it is still not clear whether or not this 
fact guarantees, for concrete judgments about phenomenal properties, to have this 
kind of access as well. At a first glance, it seems somewhat strange to raise this issue. 
Since Q-me revelation already enables knowledge about the ontological and/or 
metaphysical structure of the phenomenal, one should expect that this view justifies 
privileged epistemic knowledge about e.g. phenomenal red. Knowledge about the 
ontological/metaphysical structure of phenomenal properties is knowledge about 
what defines the phenomenal in general. To put it differently, it tells us which features 
are necessary for something to count as an experience, and nothing else.538 Knowledge 
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 See Lewis 1995 for this condition. 
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about a particular phenomenal quality is, however, different. It entails in part 
knowledge about what particular qualitative property is present when I have a certain 
experience with a specific phenomenal property. Imagine I have a red experience with 
the relevant phenomenal property instantiated, then, to count as privileged self-
knowledge about that particular experience, or more precisely about the phenomenal 
red quality, there has to be a justification that my judgment about the phenomenal red 
quality is certain. This is, however, not to say that in any particular instance of a 
different experience the justification is different. There simply needs to be some 
reason why in general I am in the position to know or know with certainty which 
phenomenal quality is present. I hope it became clear that the difference of both kinds 
of knowledge involved lies in their claims, and not their knowledge type. To sum up, 
knowledge about the ontological/metaphysical structure of the phenomenal in general 
and knowledge about what phenomenal quality of experience is in a particular case 
present is not one and the same thing. 
Since the propositional knowledge employed in both cases is different in its 
intentional dimension, the question remains whether or not Q-me revelation can 
justify privileged self-knowledge about a particular presence of an experience's 
phenomenal quality. It may, however, even get worse. From the words I have chosen, 
the reader may already have guessed that this issue partly concerns whether or not 
there is also a privileged access to our representational qualitative properties. This, 
however, is a delicate matter. If what I have said so far is correct, those properties 
depend solely on the objects of experience. They are qualities in the objective sense. 
The worry, then, may be that by having an experience, qualitative properties of the 
outer world may be revealed. This, however, means that I could gain knowledge in an 
'uncommonly demanding sense' about the external world. Therefore, I would be in a 
privileged epistemic position to obtain knowledge about properties in the external 
world. From what I have said, it should have become clear that claiming Q-me 
revelation to also be the reason for privileged self-knowledge about the presence of an 
experience's particular phenomenal quality is not an easy task. 
As a consequence, it seems necessary to analyze whether or not Q-me 
revelation can fulfill this duty. The trivial reason is that if Q-me revelation does not 
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ground such an approach; the problem about privileged knowledge of the external 
world does not even arise. So far I have claimed that Q-me revelation justifies 
knowledge about the ontological/metaphysical structure of experiences. This includes 
that one is in the position to know or know that E is essentially Q-me. The reason we 
know of Q's presents in this conjunction is determined by -me. This means, by being in 
a state of pre-reflective self-awareness, which already is experiential in character, we 
immediately notice that we are not only experiencing indeterminately, but that 
something is experienced. This dimension of the phenomenal is essentially determined 
by the presence of qualitative properties or Q. Now, the question is whether or not I 
can know about those particular phenomenal qualities present in our experiences. The 
answer is either yes or no. To decide which scenario is more likely, we should consider 
the different interpretations of quality again. On the one hand, if we interpret the 
question to entail objective qualities, i.e. whether or not e.g. a red quality is bordeaux 
or flaming red on a standardized color scale, then the expected answer should be no. 
On the other hand, if one refers to the subjective aspect, i.e. how e.g. a certain red 
quality is sensed by me, then the expected answer is yes. 
What, however, distinguishes both cases? In the first reading, we assume that a 
judgment is about whether or not Q is red in a particular case. Since Q is exhausted by 
its representational properties, it is an objective quality. The second interpretation 
refers to how red is sensed by me. The question is, therefore, not about the objective 
quality Q, but about the subjective quality Q-me – or in this case red-me – which is the 
phenomenal property of that particular – red – experience. Since the present red 
quality is united with the present experiential character, or better it is inseparable 
from the subject of experiencing, one is in a position to know red-me or more 
accurately me(Rred) with certainty.
539 This has an interesting consequence, which was 
already stated to be an intuition about experiences in general. While objective 
qualities are easy to classify on some kind of objective scale, subjective qualities, being 
phenomenal, are extremely fine in grain. The reason is that, while the former classify 
or group colors with similar hues in more coarse grained classes, the latter assort 
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 This stems from the fact that phenomenal Q-me-ism inherits certain assumptions from classical 
adverbialism. In this case, we might interpret the situation in a Sellarsian way. This means, Q-me is 
ontologically not a conjunction of a subjective property and a separate qualitative property, they are 
ontologically one property only.  
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differences in color experiences via their experiential character, i.e. always as one 
particular experience different from another.540 
The explanation in the previous paragraph already entails the answer to the 
concern that, if Q-me revelation justifies the privileged epistemic position for self-
knowledge about particular phenomenal properties, it also reveals knowledge about 
the external world. Since Q-me revelation, however, only justifies privileged access to 
phenomenal qualities and therefore Q-me, it does not justify privileged knowledge 
about representational, objective qualities Q. One way to ground the latter may 
include a direct realist account of perception541. Q-me revelation is silent about this 
issue. Due to phenomenal Q-me-ism, it can be the case that Q is entirely determined 
by the objects of experience and therefore representational. Still, the thesis asserts 
knowledge about Q-me and therefore about phenomenal properties of experience 
that are in part non-representational. This follows, since the latter property is not 
identical to the former. Attaching the subject of experience, in its experiential and pre-
reflective form, is not simply an add-on to representational qualities, an entirely new 
process is created, namely an experience. The fact that representational qualities Q 
are somehow involved does not mean that there is change when integrated. 
In my opinion, then, Q-me revelation is a solid justification for the privileged 
access to particular phenomenal properties. Therefore, if my argumentation is correct 
this view grounds special epistemic position in a double sense. We have privileged self-
knowledge about the ontological/metaphysical structure of the phenomenal, on the 
one hand, and about particular phenomenal properties, on the other hand. Therefore, 
in my opinion, this approach can count as an authentic alternative to explain privileged 
self-knowledge. The remaining question is whether or not it is compatible with 
physicalism as well. 
                                                          
540
 At this point, two interesting questions arise. Since I have assumed that this is a form of certain self-
knowledge about the phenomenal, one may ask what kind of concepts this involves. Do we employ 
e.g. recognitional concepts or indexical concepts, etc. For discussion about this issue see e.g. 
proponents in footnotes 361 and 421. A second, more radical question may be whether experiences 
involve concepts or if they are non-conceptual, making it, therefore, difficult to classify them. For 
proponents of non-conceptual content see e.g. Bermúdez 1998, 2007; Evans 1982 and Peacock 1992. 
For an account of conscious experience see especially Tye 1995, 2000 and 2005. For criticism see e.g. 
Brewer 1999, 2005 and McDowell 1994, 1995. For reasons of space, I will not be able to discuss both 
issues here. 
541
 For discussion about the issue in the context of pain see Aydede 2013. 
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IV.4.2. Compatibility with physicalism 
 
To evaluate this approach to privileged self-knowledge, the decisive question is 
whether or not this view is compatible with physicalism. As an alternative, a persuasive 
argument why anti-physicalism explains this epistemic privileged position may be 
considered as well. Now, the reason we are still in need of a justification – assuming 
that there is privileged access to our own phenomenal properties – is because of the 
breakdown of the most popular and promising approach, namely acquaintance. To 
remind the reader, what we would expect from a view that grounds privileged access 
is that it explains the difference between standard epistemological positions and the 
privileged one without falling back on mysterious claims. In the first chapter, I argued 
in detail why acquaintance does not provide such an explanation. The view, or so I 
claimed, basically violates the Material Constraint by either introducing a basic relation 
or a basic property in the Levineian sense. To claim that Q-me revelation is in a better 
position, however, is to claim one of two things. Either Q-me revelation explains what 
a basic relation or property consists in or it is compatible with physicalism. 
In my opinion, we should discard the first option for now. There is, in my 
opinion, no straight forward manner in which Q-me revelation explains the 
introduction of a basic relation or property. To explain how some new property or 
relation fits in an otherwise physical universe goes beyond the scope of what is 
claimed here. This is not say that such a metaphysical undertaking is impossible. It is, 
however, simpler to decide on the basis of an already established framework, or the 
Material Constraint, the success or failure of this view. This means, if I can show that 
Q-me revelation is compatible with physicalism, there is, at least, no problem with 
mysterious entities. 
To decide whether or not Q-me revelation and the resulting view, phenomenal 
Q-me-ism, are compatible with physicalism, we may consider three options. The key 
question, in both cases, will be whether or not the existence of pre-reflective self-
awareness violates the Material Constraint. This means, for Q-me revelation and 
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phenomenal Q-me-ism to be compatible with physicalism, it is necessary that our pre-
reflective self-awareness, or better the subject of experience, is already consistent 
with this metaphysical view. 
A first approximation to make sense of the physical integration of the minimal 
self is via embodiment542; a second attempt tries to reflectively expatiate the pre-
reflective minimal self via introspection543; finally, a third strategy concentrates on the 
idea that pre-reflective self-awareness can only arise, if the right kind of 
representational mechanism is instantiated.544 All three views have their merit. To 
show how we may integrate those subjective properties into the physical world, I will 
exemplify, in general terms, the important claims of all three views and evaluate 
whether or not there is hope of success. 
I will start with the third approach. Now, Levine characterizes self-
representationalism in the following way: 
Perhaps what is special about the kind of representation 
involved in being aware of one's sensory states is that it is that 
very state that is representing itself, not a distinct state as in 
standard versions of higher-order theory.545 
This approach is especially construed to deal with the two aspects of phenomenal 
properties, namely the qualitative and the subjective properties. In this view, qualities 
are exhausted by sensory states of which we become aware in a subjective sense. The 
reason is that those states are representing themselves. From Levine's description we 
can infer that this view implies a one-level account of consciousness. 
Now, a thesis that in general terms may count as self-representationalist 
usually assumes that there are phenomenal or sensory qualities – or 'what it is like'. It 
also accepts that there is a subject of experience or a 'for me'. Apart from 
distinguishing the two different types of properties involved, however, it is necessary 
for a self-representationalist approach to claim that the subject is aware of those 
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 For proponents see e.g. Bermúdez 1998 and Neisser 1988. 
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 The main proposal is defended by Strawson. See Strawson 1997, 1999a, b. 
544
 A detailed account is suggested by Kriegel. See Kriegel 2003a, b, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009a, b for 
discussion. 
545
 Levine 2006, p. 178. 
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qualities.546 This latter claim is not any different from a similar assumption in higher-
order theory. The decisive difference is how both views describe the phenomenal 
reality. Consider the following case. I claimed so far that by having a red experience, I 
also experience myself in a pre-reflective manner. At least, this seems to be the case. 
On the one hand, higher-order theory allows for both components to be the objects of 
awareness, it fails however to integrate them. This means it fails to account for the 
intertwined relation that those acts enjoy. On the other hand, a one-level, self-
representationalist account seems to cover this issue straight forwardly.547 Kriegel 
states this difference in the following way: 
Like higher-order representationalists, self-representationalists 
hold that conscious states are necessarily represented. But 
unlike higher-order representationalists, they hold that 
conscious states are always consciously represented.548 
The essential claim of self-representationalism, then, is that a mental state becomes 
phenomenally conscious not only by representing the representational qualities 
determined by the objects of experience, but also by representing itself. 
This self-representational model, however, has attracted much criticism. One 
main critique stems from the problem of 'intimacy'. In this case, intimacy is the special 
link between a conscious state and its apprehension. To put it differently, since it is not 
clear how physical significance translates into cognitive significance, it is doubtful that 
self-representationalism accounts for something like an acquaintance relation.549 A 
further major problem is whether or not qualitative properties are not puzzling as well. 
This means, we may consider it also a mystery how a red quality arises from some 
physical structure.550 A third crucial issue criticizes that the subject has to be aware of 
those conscious states. This, however, degrades conscious states to simple objects of 
awareness, in the same sense that e.g. a red ball is.551 
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 For detailed reasoning see e.g. Kriegel 2009a, b. 
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 See Levine 2006. 
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 Kriegel 2009b, p. 359. 
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 Proponents of this argument include e.g. Levine 2006 and Van Gulick 2012. 
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 For discussion see e.g. Brogaard 2012. 
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 There are different versions of this argument. Nida-Rümelin thinks that the mistake of the self-
representationalist lies in the presupposition that conscious awareness essentially involves being 
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Even though all those critiques are clearly justified, I will concentrate on what I 
think is the general problem. This issue is closely related to the last criticism. According 
to Zahavi, pre-reflective self-consciousness may be interpreted as “[...] (i) an 
extraordinary object-consciousness or (ii) not as an object-consciousness at all […].”552 
The former notion follows Brentano's path, who thinks that consciousness has two 
intentional objects, the latter Husserl's, who claims that pre-reflective self-
consciousness is an intrinsic feature.553 Interestingly, self-representationalists are 
bound to promote an account in the former tradition. If views of the latter kind, 
therefore, are more plausible, then self-representationalism fails and with it an 
attempt to explain the compatibility of Q-me revelation with physicalism. 
I have to admit that, so far, I have assumed a view that interprets pre-reflective 
self-consciousness not in the sense of object-consciousness. The motivation for an 
object-consciousness account lies, according to Zahavi, in Brentano's idea that 
conscious perception entails two intentional objects. One of those objects is what is 
perceived and the other one perception itself. Since we are talking about a one-level 
account here, both objects form part of a single mental state.554 This means that the 
awareness involved in becoming conscious of the perception itself, also becomes 
conscious of what the perception is about. If self-representationalism is construed in 
that manner, then it is subject to a critique that was already applied to higher-order 
theories, namely that it leads to a vicious regress.555 According to Zahavi, the argument 
may be put the following manner: 
Brentano takes every psychical phenomenon to be 
characterized by a double intentional relation. Every experience 
has a primary object, and in addition, it has itself—in its 
totality—as its own secondary object. Thus, the secondary 
object of consciousness must encompass not only the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
phenomenally presented with some entity. Gertler, however, shows an alternative and argues that it 
better fits reality. For detailed discussion see Gertler 2012b and Nida-Rümelin 2011. 
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 Zahavi 2006, p. 1. 
553
 See Zahavi 2006 for detailed discussion. 
554
 This is contrary to a higher-order model of consciousness. The latter account implies that two 
different objects need two different mental states. 
555
 For this kind of criticism of higher-order theory see e.g. Carruthers 2011. For detailed discussion 
Rowlands 2001. This form of criticism applied to Brentano's account stems from Gurwitsch 1941 and 
is discussed in Zahavi 2006. 
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consciousness of the primary object, but also the consciousness 
of this consciousness. But as Gurwitsch points out, this is not 
where it ends. For the very same reason every intentional 
consciousness of a primary object must in addition include itself 
as its own secondary object, every intentional consciousness of 
a secondary object must in addition include itself as its own 
tertiary object, and so forth.556 
If true, self-representationalism fails because it construes consciousness as only 
entailing intentional objects. This solution for the compatibility problem with 
physicalism is, therefore, bound to fail. This means that this model is also of no help to 
naturalize pre-reflective self-consciousness, phenomenal Q-me-ism and Q-me 
revelation. Interestingly, this is not the only problem of self-representationalism. I 
construed phenomenal Q-me-ism in a way that it entails a different understanding of 
pre-reflective self-consciousness. The emphasis of phenomenal Q-me-ism and Q-me 
revelation lies on the fact that pre-reflective self-awareness is subjective and 
experiential in character. Self-representationalism, however, cannot explain this fact. 
This last issue has also problematic implications for an explanation of the privileged 
access. Phenomenal Q-me-ism explains the privileged access by the fact that pre-
reflective self-awareness is subjective and not simply another intentional object. This 
means, by adopting self-representationalism, we are also bound to explain the 
privileged access in a different way, making it prima facie impossible to merge both 
views. This last remark, therefore, leaves me no choice but to explore an alternative. 
The alternative I am proposing is a hybrid of the other two options. The first 
position, states that pre-reflective self-awareness may be explained by embodiment557. 
Without exemplifying a detailed approach here, the basic idea of this type theory is 
based on the view that pre-reflective self-consciousness is independent from 
conceptual capacities and therefore non-conceptual558. Gallagher shows that 
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 Zahavi 2006, p. 3. 
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 For detailed discussion on embodiment see Varela et al. 1994. 
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 For an account of non-conceptual content of conscious experience see Tye 1995, 2000, 2005. For a 
specific evaluation of the problem of non-conceptual pre-reflective self-awareness see Bermúdez 
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psychological studies of neonatal imitation559 lead to the view that neonates already 
implement a pre-reflective self-consciousness that constitutes a minimal self. This self 
is not based on concepts, but on embodiment. 
He bases this interpretation on the fact that infants, less than one hour after 
birth, are already capable to imitate other human beings. Gallagher, therefore, 
concludes that the infant must be capable to do at least the following three things: 
1) distinguish between self and non-self; (2) locate and use 
certain parts of its own body proprioceptively, without vision; 
and (3) recognize that the face it sees is of the same kind as its 
own face […].560 
If true, then the subjective, pre-reflective self-awareness is constituted by innate, 
embodied brain processes which are ecologically qualified. 
Now, the second option tries – via introspection – to explicitly grasp the main 
aspects of pre-reflective self-consciousness and make them conceptually available. In 
this case, one starts with the experience itself and, according to Gallagher561, ends up 
naturally with the description of the pre-reflective self. One important idea implies 
that this view is not restricted to humans. Since we can suppose that higher animals, 
aliens or maybe even machines have experiences, this notion of the self applies. This is 
due to the fact that the self is a decisive feature of experience. This notion, of course, 
does not entail embodiment to be essential to pre-reflective self-consciousness, it 
rather approaches the issue from a conceptual point of view, already entailing a 
concept of the 'self'. As a consequence, theories adopting this strategy are always in 
need to defend themselves against the charge of anti-physicalism. Since physical 
concepts are not essential to pre-reflective self-consciousness a priori, one has to 
introduce a posteriori reasoning for the truth of physicalism. 
Both views, by themselves, have their merit. The former naturally situates pre-
reflective self-awareness in the space of the physical by locating it in innate, embodied 
brain processes, while the latter opens the door for analysis. Phenomenal Q-me-ism, in 
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 For the actual studies see Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1983. 
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 Gallagher 2000, p. 17. 
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 Gallagher assigns this approach to the self explicitly to Strawson. For detailed discussion see 
Gallagher 2000. 
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a sense, naturally subscribes to the second view by giving an analysis of experience. 
This account concludes that the subjective character with its experiential character, or 
better the subject of experience, forms an essential part of the phenomenal. Since the 
remaining concern is whether or not Q-me revelation is also compatible with 
physicalism, we need to know, if phenomenal Q-me-ism is reconcilable with a theory 
of embodiment. 
At a first glance, it seems to be the case that phenomenal Q-me-ism is 
compatible with embodiment. Embodiment shows that pre-reflective self-
consciousness is realized by human infants already at a very early stage, therefore 
bounding it physically. This is not to say that embodiment explains, in a detailed 
fashion, how this instantiation works, this fact alone is, however, sufficient. Basically 
this means, if embodiment is correct, then, at least, pre-reflective self-awareness is 
non-conceptual, innate, embodied and qualified by its surrounding. Phenomenal Q-
me-ism can accept this view – especially that we already possess pre-reflective self-
awareness as a starting point, without forming concepts about it – and adds an 
analysis about how this form of minimal self is integrated within the phenomenal. 
Privileged epistemology, finally, is based on Q-me revelation which reveals 
phenomenal Q-me-ism as the right ontology of that phenomenal and grounds the 
privileged access to phenomenal properties via this knowledge of the ontological 
structure. 
So far goes an optimistic story about Q-me revelation and what it reveals. There 
are, however, at least two problems. The first issue concerns the positive analysis of 
Gallagher's embodied minimal self. The second, and more troubling problem, is 
whether or not Q-me revelation should reveal embodiment as well. 
The first concern may be interpreted as fundamental critique of any realist 
account of the 'self'. Following Metzinger562, it is not necessarily a fact that the self we 
so often assume is realistic. There is a no-self alternative. Metzinger concludes that 
there are four strategies to ground any anti-realist view about the self. Being an anti-
realist, therefore, means: a) to deny that the self is a substance; b) to dispute the 
alternative view that the self cannot be known, since it is an intrinsic property of an 
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individual (or better, be agnostic about such a claim); c) to claim that no scientific 
approach to self-consciousness is in need of the 'self'; or d) to deny that the indexical 'I' 
refers to an ontological independent object. He himself tries to scatter doubts about 
the self by showing why the no-self alternative usually strikes us as counterintuitive, 
just to demonstrate how this kind of argumentation goes wrong. To do so, Metzinger 
introduces the difference between phenomenal necessity and metaphysical necessity. 
He claims that while, phenomenologically speaking, we cannot conceive of worlds 
where selves do not exist, it is still not metaphysically necessary that they do. The 
reason, or so he claims, is that it is simply a functional fact that we cannot conceive of 
worlds where no selves exist, but first-person perspective is still possible. This, 
however, is a purely contingent matter of the structural organization of our brain, and 
therefore, cannot amount to metaphysical, but only to phenomenological necessity.563 
Striking as this problem may be, the question should turn to whether or not this 
has any influence on the discussion about pre-reflective self-consciousness? And the 
answer is no. Admittedly, I have assumed that pre-reflective self-awareness is the real 
deal, meaning a minimal form of the self. For me, this is rather a figure of speech, 
nothing depends on it. Metzinger criticizes complete self-models, or better, a self as 
independent fundamental ontological entity. At this point of Gallagher's analysis, this 
is, in my opinion, not the issue. Even assuming that there is no such 'self'564, there is 
still a first-person perspective. For my purpose, as long as we can assume a first-person 
perspective or a subject of experience – may it just be an 'EGO-mode'565 - in the form 
of pre-reflective self-consciousness566, it is of no importance whether or not this 
establishes a form of self. 
The second concern, about the necessity of embodiment being revealed, 
however, constitutes a real threat for Q-me revelation. This is the case due to two 
interrelated issues. On the one hand, it concerns the all over shadowing problem of 
the compatibility with physicalism, and on the other hand, whether revelation only 
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requires knowledge that this Q is F and F is, as a matter of fact, the essence of Q, or if it 
requires knowledge that F is the essence of Q.  
Stoljar discusses the question, whether revelation relies on de re knowledge 
(the former possibility) or de dicto knowledge (the latter possibility), in detail. He 
concludes that revelation has to include de dicto knowledge. The following is what he 
thinks about the issue: (This passage is embedded in the context of discussing whether 
or not Kripke567 relies on revelation in his comprehension of pain.) 
[T]o understanding pain is to have a certain kind of de re 
knowledge, that is, it is to know de re of some type of 
experience that is pain. But on that interpretation Kripke is 
evidently not relying on revelation. The reason is that (where F 
is the essence of pain) revelation is not the doctrine that if one 
has an experience one knows of F, that pain is it. It is rather the 
doctrine that, if one has an experience, one knows that pain is 
F. That is, revelation does not involve de re knowledge of a 
property that is in fact the essence of the experience. It 
involves de dicto knowledge that one's experience has that 
property.568 
The explication of this thought is given by Lewis: 
[…] there is no reason to deny that the broad, de re content of 
my knowledge does, in the strongest sense, identify the qualia. 
Hitherto, I have been denying that the narrow de se and de 
dicto content of my knowledge identifies the qualia. But broad 
content is constituted partly by my narrow de se self-
ascriptions involving acquaintance, partly by the identity of the 
objects of acquaintance. Thus I may, know de re of Fred that he 
is a burglar, but without in any sense identifying Fred. Likewise I 
may know de re of a certain physical property that it is among 
the qualia of my present experience, but without identifying 
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the property in question.569 
This type of knowledge says, in short, the following: 
 
Knowledge that property F and F is essential. 
 
The conclusion is that I may know de re that some property forms part of the type of 
phenomenal properties of an experience, but I cannot identify it as the essence. In a 
sense then, one could ask whether or not it is necessary to have de dicto knowledge of 
the property in question for a thesis to count as revelation. 
Lihoreau570 thinks that the literature is uncommonly homogeneous in agreeing 
that only the de re interpretation of the view is needed for a thesis to count as 
revelation. He, however, challenges this idea. Via uncontroversial claims about the 
relation between essentiality/necessity and accidentality/possibility, Lihoreau shows 
the truth of what he calls the 'Essentiality of Essence Principle'. This principle states the 
following: 
For any thing (or class of things) X and any proposition p, if it is 
essential to X that p then it is essential to X that it be essential 
to X that p.571 
According to Lihoreau, then, if this principle is applied to de re versions of revelation 
one gets de dicto versions as special case. He concludes, therefore, the following: 
Therefore, assuming the truth of the Essentiality of Essence 
Principle, Strong Revelation is but a special case of Weak 
Revelation. In other words, if it is in the essence of a 
phenomenal property Q that P, the Revelation Thesis requires 
not only that we know P, but requires that we know P to be 
essential to Q as well. Hence, the agreement found in the 
literature on the supposedly substantial distinction between a 
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weak and a strong version of Revelation is ill-grounded.572 
This means, if we accept the Essentiality of Essence Principle, then the de dicto 
interpretation of the thesis is required to count as revelation. 
This obviously implies the question about how to treat Q-me revelation. If, on 
the one hand, we assume that this view only requires de re knowledge, then it is no 
longer a form of revelation. However, if, on the other hand, we claim de dicto 
knowledge, then the thesis's plausibility is doubtful. Interestingly Q-me revelation is 
already construed in a way that it explicitly entails de dicto knowledge. The thesis 
claims that by having an experience E with some phenomenal property Q, I am in a 
position to know or know that E is essentially Q-me. This means the thesis does not 
state something like this: 
 
By having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I am in a position to know or 
know that E is Q-me, and as a matter of fact, this is essential. 
 
On the contrary, I claim that I explicitly know, by having the relevant experience E with 
phenomenal property Q, that Q-me is the essence of E. In my opinion, a revelation 
thesis could not be stated more strongly. 
Does this mean that Q-me revelation is implausible? In short, I do not think so. 
The two considerations that make a strong version of revelation implausible are 
Lihoreau's/Stoljar's claim that one does not need a concept of essence to have e.g. an 
itch, and Lewis's claim that revelation is not compatible with physicalism. The first 
argument considers something like this: if strong versions of revelation were true, then 
by having e.g. an itch I am in a position to know or know the essence of that itch de 
dicto. This means, I cannot have an itch without already knowing what the essence of 
an itch is. According to Lihoreau and Stoljar, this is absurd, since having an itch 
experience does not require knowledge about what makes this itch experience the itch 
experience it is. 
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There is, however, a way to block this argumentation, namely by assuming that 
conscious experiences are non-conceptual in principle. In the case of Q-me revelation, 
this means that we need to assume that phenomenal properties – which entail both 
subjective and qualitative properties – are non-conceptual. This implies a first 
(ontological) claim about what is common to all experiences. By having an itch I am in a 
position to know or know that it is an experiential mental state and not some other 
mental state. This is due to the fact that this state entails pre-reflective self-awareness, 
or subjective properties, which are revealed. Q-me revelation does, however, not 
imply that I have to know this in an explicit manner. The reason is that pre-reflective 
self-awareness is non-conceptual. This means that, even if Q-me revelation constantly 
reveals the presence of this kind of awareness, it is only when forming judgments 
about this ontological fact that I apply certain concepts. 
A second claim, then, is about particular qualitative properties. Q-me revelation 
defends that we have privileged access to those qualities. Now, there is a problem 
strong revelation raises here. Supposably, we need to have a concept of the essence of 
the particular quality present, e.g. what makes an itch an itch. I, however, claim that 
since we may assume that itchiness is non-conceptual, Stoljar's respectively Lihoreau's 
concern does not occur. 
At this point, I will try to explain why, in my opinion, this is the case. The basic 
reason, or so I claim, is that one can refine Q-me revelation further.573 A first approach 
may be the following: 
 
Q-me revelation: By having an experience E with the phenomenal property Q, I know 
that E is essentially Q-me. 
 
At a first glance, this seems to be the original thesis. This is, however, not entirely 
correct, since, strictly speaking, it cannot result in knowledge. Due to the fact that this 
interpretation of Q-me revelation involves a permanent confrontation with non-
conceptual, pre-reflective self-awareness, respectively non-conceptual qualities, we 
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should rather think of it as a form of implicit cognizance than some kind of knowledge. 
The thesis should, therefore, be stated like this: 
 
Implicit Q-me revelation: By having an experience E with the phenomenal property Q, I 
implicitly cognize that E is essentially Q-me. 
 
This means that by having e.g. an itch, since the itch is non-conceptual, I do not know 
that it is an itch. I also do not have an explicit concept of what an itch is in its essence. 
However, I claim that I already implicitly cognize the itch as an itch in its essence. This 
form of cognizance cannot be described as knowledge that I am having, but as relevant 
for the behavior I am applying. This means, even though I do not possess the concept 
of what itchiness is in its essence, I still cognize the itchiness in its essence by 
scratching the itch rather than showing pain behavior. Q-me revelation implicit, then, 
does not include conceptual object knowledge about the relevant property in form of a 
proposition, it only entails that I can experientially grasp this property to apply e.g. the 
appropriate behavior. I, therefore, do not possess a concept of essence, which makes it 
the de re version of this view. As a consequence, the Q-me revelation thesis about 
explicit knowledge should be stated the following way: 
 
Explicit Q-me revelation: By having an experience E with the phenomenal property 
Q, I am in a position to know that E is essentially Q-me. 
 
This distinction is of the highest importance. The reason is that the second 
version requires me to form conceptual judgments, which I claim are certain. Those 
judgments, however, can only be formed by actively employing introspection and 
applying the right kinds of concepts. This means that on the contrary to passive 
cognizing, I have to make an effort and practice epistemology.574 In general, the 
difference can be found in the fact that knowledge is constituted by propositions, 
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while implicit cognition is not.575 This does not mean that one cannot form concepts 
about non-conceptual properties. It is rather the case that when presented with those 
properties, they provoke the right kind of behavior rather than constituting 
knowledge. Propositional knowledge can only be obtained, if the right kinds of 
concepts are already available to me. Practicing epistemology means, in this context, 
that I am able to apply them correctly. Q-me revelation implicit puts me in the position 
to do so. However, if we want a substantial revelation thesis about knowledge, then 
we need to assume the latter, explicit version. This interpretation of the thesis implies 
also that we already have to possess some concept of essence, therefore constituting 
the de dicto version of this view. The absurd consequence this idea usually entails is 
avoided by assuming the former, implicit revelation thesis. This version does not lead 
to knowledge; it is only relevant for our behavior. Therefore, even if Q-me revelation 
explicit is correct, we can still have an experience without already possessing a concept 
of essence. 
This approach however raises at least four issues. The first matter concerns 
how we can distinguish between cognizing and knowing. Now, I have already stated 
that when we cognize, we do not employ concepts. It is, however, the case that it is 
behaviorally relevant. Consider the itch again. Even though having an itch experience 
does not necessarily cause explicit introspective knowledge, namely that I am having 
an itch, it provokes the right kind of behavior, at least in normal conditions. This 
means, when I have an itch, I scratch it. I do not show pain behavior. I consciously 
cognize that what I am having is an itch and show the right behavior, but I do not 
necessarily employ the relevant concept, namely that an itch is present. Knowledge, 
however, necessarily involves those concepts. Only when I apply such a concept, it can 
be said that I possess knowledge. 
This idea results in a second, related issue. What exactly is the relation between 
cognizing and knowing? My straight forward claim is that, in the case of phenomenal 
properties, cognition is basic and necessary for knowledge. First one has to cognize a 
phenomenal property and make it consciously available. This process is especially 
important for our behavior, but also as a basis for any kind of knowledge about the 
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phenomenal property in question. Now, if Q-me revelation is correct, then cognizing is 
as immediate or direct as a process can be. This is the case in at least three senses: a) it 
is metaphysically immediate or direct; b) it is in a sense immediately or directly 
motivated576; and c) it is existentially immediate or direct. 
According to c), by having an experience E with phenomenal property Q implies 
that I cognize that E is essentially Q-me. This means, it is not a choice or optional. The 
existence of the former is necessary and sufficient for the existence of the latter. 
Cognizing is therefore existentially immediate or direct. 
This fact by itself does not mean that it is a) metaphysically immediate or 
direct. As far as I can see, however, to cognize does not imply a separate mental 
process. Having an experience E with phenomenal property Q includes that I cognize 
that E is essentially Q-me. If it were not one and the same process, it would be quite 
mysterious how experiences could have immediate relevance for behavior, in a non-
conceptual manner. 
Since we are not talking about judgments, it seems that cognizing that E is 
essentially Q-me, is exclusively motivated by the experience E with phenomenal 
property Q, and therefore b). This means, even though one cognizes non-conceptually, 
this is the immediate way an experience motivates its relevance for a certain behavior. 
I hope it becomes clear to the reader what the difference between 
acquaintance and cognizance is. While acquaintance suffices for knowledge, namely 
knowledge by acquaintance, cognizance does not. Cognizance may claim a special 
directness relation with our phenomenal properties in the above three senses, but 
lacks epistemic directness. Without the epistemic dimension, however, it cannot by 
itself constitute knowledge. 
Knowledge, finally, rides piggyback on cognizance. By actively introspecting and 
employing the right concepts about one's experience one gains self-knowledge. This 
means, when I have an experience E with phenomenal property Q, I can come to know 
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explicitly that E is essentially Q-me. I can know this with certainty. The reason is that 
knowing entails cognizing and therefore all its virtues. In the case of phenomenal 
properties, actively pursuing epistemology of the mind means to turn implicit or non-
conceptual cognizing into explicit or conceptual knowledge, by correctly applying the 
already possessed concepts. 
A third matter can be found in Q-me itself. Q-me revelation states that I am in 
the position to know that E is essentially Q-me. Does that mean I or one is in a position 
to know Q-one? The answer is ambiguous, includes yes and no. It seems to me that 
since I know how e.g. a red experience is for me, namely red-, I can know what a red 
experience consists in, in general. This means, assuming that others have experiences, 
I can know red-one. Red-one, of course, is from my point of view only so far knowable 
that I know what a red experience consists in, i.e. that it involves the quality red and an 
experiencing subject. In this structural sense I can, therefore, know Q-one. From this 
kind of knowledge, however, I cannot know 'what Q-one is like for you'. I know that to 
be an experience it has to entail a certain structure, namely qualities and an 
experiencing subject. Still, I do not know Q-you or red-you. The reason is that I am not 
you. The experiential character of the experiencing subject, however, plays a key role. 
The simple fact that I cannot enter your first-person point of view about your own 
experiences means that I cannot know them the way you do. This, I can only infer from 
my experiences. But even if they are similar, they are not identical. 
A final concern is whether or not strong versions of revelation should reveal 
ontological knowledge as well. Lihoreau thinks that if any version of strong revelation 
were true, then we should assume to be in the position to obtain ontological 
knowledge about experiences. Independent of whether or not physicalism is true, if we 
know properties, truths, etc. that form part of the essence of experience, then they 
have to be revealed as part of the essence. This means that if strong revelation is true, 
then not only would Lewis be right and one would need to know that pain is C-fiber 
firing, according to Lihoreau one would need to know that C-fiber firing is entailed in 
the essence of pain. He concludes however that “[...] discoveries in the metaphysics of 
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mind, we might say, is not so easy either!”577 
I, however, think it is. If I am right, philosophers interested in the metaphysics 
of the phenomenal – only by having an experience – should be able to obtain 
metaphysical knowledge about the structure of the phenomenal. Since they possess a 
concept of essence to determine whether or not some ontological structure can fulfill 
the relevant conditions, those metaphysicians are in the position to know this 
structure. Lihoreau's claim that ontological knowledge, obtained that easily, sounds 
“incongruous”578 may be explained away by an example. The following claim, I assume, 
does not sound implausible: if an experience E is essentially Q-me and I am in a 
position to know, by having an experience E and a concept of essence, that E is 
essentially Q-me, then this is an ontological claim in the above sense. It is the claim 
that Q-me is entailed in the essence of E and that I can know this. I, however, do not 
think that this sounds absurd at all. I am in position to know essential properties, 
namely qualitative and subjective properties, that are constitutive to an experience, 
and I know those properties are essential. In my opinion, then, Lihoreau has no good 
reason to assume that metaphysics of the mind is not that easy.579 
The problem Lihoreau posts stems in part from Lewis's assumption that if 
physicalism were true, then – via revelation – we would need to know that pain is C-
fiber firing without empirical research. The problem of compatibility with physicalism, 
however, exists whether or not we assume strong or weak versions of revelation.580 
The final question, then, is whether or not Q-me revelation needs to put me in a 
position to know the neuro-physical correlates of pre-reflective self-awareness to be 
compatible with physcalism. 
To get this analysis off the ground, consider first anti-physicalism. It is often 
assumed that if it were true that pain is not C-fiber firing or otherwise physically 
realized essentially, then we should know it. In this version, then, we should be in a 
                                                          
577
 Lihoreau 2014, p. 75. 
578
 Ibid., p. 75. 
579
 I think that Lihoreau may underestimate what is necessary in such a case. It clearly excludes anyone 
who does not have a concept of essence. This means that even though anyone may eventually learn 
a concept of essence, until she does, she is not in a position to know the ontological structure of the 
phenomenal only by having an experience. 
580
 In general, I will use, therefore, both versions interchangeably. Where it makes a particular 
difference, e.g. the final claim about revelation Q-me, I will note it. 
 
214 
 
position to know whether or not pain is primitive or ontologically independent. I think, 
however, that such a claim is just as implausible as in the physicalism case. It only 
works, if we assume that ontological independence automatically leads to epistemic 
specialness. But this clearly needs further argumentation. The consequence is that 
revelation in general might have trouble to reveal certain essences which justify the 
thesis. The more urgent question, however, should be what revelation has to reveal to 
be plausible in the first place. 
Surely, a revelation thesis has to reveal some essences of experience. Also, in 
agreement with Lihoreau and Stoljar, it has to reveal those essences as essences. It 
seems to me, therefore, that revelation has to be qualified carefully to make sense. Q-
me revelation, for example, is a version of the thesis that is about essential properties 
involved in experience, namely qualitative properties and subjective properties. Q-me, 
therefore, is the essence of the phenomenal. This means, Q-me revelation is about the 
properties that make the phenomenal the phenomenal. There is, however, a 
difference between Q-me and C-fiber firing. While the latter is a physical property by 
definition, the former seems neutral. This idea has, at a first glance, no bearing on the 
issue. What Q-me revelation states about e.g. a red experience, are the following two 
things: by having the red experience with a phenomenal red property, I am thereby in 
a position to know that (a) phenomenal red is essentially entails qualitative plus 
subjective properties (general knowledge claim) and (b) phenomenal red is essentially 
red qualities and subjective properties (particular knowledge claim).581 Basically, b) is a 
justification for privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal. It, of course, also 
involves a) ontological knowledge about the structure of an experience, but not about 
its implementation. This is, however, a problem. Since such a claim runs the risk to be 
only justifiable by basic Levineian properties, it may lose its explanatory power. Even if 
Q-me revelation, as a strong form of revelation, opens the possibility to ontological 
knowledge about experience and privileged self-knowledge about the phenomenal, 
the thesis needs to be compatible with physicalism and therefore it must be the case 
that our pre-reflective self-awareness is embodied. 
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The remaining question, therefore, is whether or not Q-me revelation needs to 
reveal, apart from the entailed properties, the physical implementation of the minimal 
self. At a first glance, a positive answer seems absurd. Following Lewis, gaining 
knowledge in neuro-science is not that easy. The standard solution for an essence 
claim that involves knowledge of properties – as explained in the third chapter – is to 
assume a posteriori physicalism. This implies that we only have to know a property 
under some kind of concept. Revelation, therefore, does not have to reveal the 
physical concept in particular. In this case, it is not necessary to know the physical 
implementation of the minimal self; it is enough to know this property under e.g. a 
phenomenal concept. Of course, this may be considered a viable solution, but only if 
one can solve all the problems that a posteriori physicalism posts. In the end, it seems 
that this is maybe more problematic that beneficial, it may, therefore, be appropriate 
to consider an alternative solution. 
At a first glance, for Q-me revelation to reveal that pre-reflective self-
consciousness is physical; only two options come to mind. I can assume that either the 
following must be the case: if physicalism is true, then subjective properties are 
realized by specific brain processes, and due to strong revelation I have to know that 
those processes are essential; or: if anti-physicalism is true, then those properties are 
ontologically independent, and due to strong revelation I have to know that this is 
essentially that way. If what I have said so far is correct, then both cases are 
implausible and we are exactly where Lihoreaus's argument points to: metaphysics of 
the mind is not so easy! 
Is that it, or is there a solution? I think there may be a way out. Imagine that we 
take a general thesis of embodiment to be a serious alternative. This view basically 
states that pre-reflective self-awareness is bodily located. In such an alternative 
scenario one may suppose that, since physicalism is true, one is in a position to know 
that subjective properties are essentially physical, however lacks the knowledge about 
their specific instantiation. So far, it was mostly assumed that physicalism means 
mind/brain identity. This means that e.g. pain is identical to C-fiber firing and may only 
be realized in this particular way.582 One could however assume the more plausible 
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multiple realizability thesis. In this case, pain may still be identical to C-fiber firing, but 
there may be other ways it can be realized.583 Clearly, this latter idea is silent about the 
exact physical instantiation. It is, therefore, not essential to having an experience. The 
resulting view, however, is still compatible with physicalism. 
At this point, the reader may remember that this idea is not new; it was already 
introduced by Damnjanovic in a similar context and refuted. Two problems were 
posted that led to the refusal of this possibility. The first issue was based on the 
difference between strong/weak revelation and the knowledge of 'all essential 
properties'. The second problem concerned the metaphysical implications and scope 
of multiple realizability. 
In Damnjanovic's case, the former idea was supposed to solve a particular 
problem posted by the interpretation 'all essential properties'. It was assumed that if 
we need to know 'all essential properties', we need to know them 'all the way down'. 
Such an approach, however, seemed not to be feasible. To avoid this inflation of 
properties, Damnjanovic suggested that we could assume multiple realizability. In this 
case, the internal physical composition of those properties was rendered not essential 
and therefore restricted the scope of revelation via considerations that were not 
entailed by the theory. My critique was based on the idea that since the above theory 
is a weak version of revelation, one has to know all properties to include all essential 
properties anyways. I argued, therefore, that limiting the possible forms of physicalsim 
does not lead to a general solution, since one cannot distinguish essential and non-
essential properties. The problematic consequence was that the situation is similar to 
the 'all the way down' issue.  
Apart from being an ineffective form of qualification, I criticized that it is far 
from clear how to deal with the problem of one particular form of physicalism. The 
first issue was based on metaphysical considerations. Since there is an ongoing debate 
about which kind of physicalist approach may be plausible it seemed to be best to stick 
to physicalism in general, rather than a particular version. The more important issue 
reflected the problem that it is far from clear how to restrict multiple realizability 
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correctly. Even if internal composition is not essential, it seems that it is also not 
arbitrary. It was, therefore, not clear to me per se how to qualify multiple realization, 
to apply a credible physicalist account. 
Following those ideas seems to me hopeless. By now, however, we know that 
we may have to assume the strong interpretation of revelation anyway. This means 
that by having an experience E with phenomenal property Q, we are in a position to 
know for every essential property F of Q that Q is F and we have to know that Q is F 
essentially. This may easily hold for Damnjanovic's trivial case, namely that “it is 
sufficient [...] that the taste of peaches is identical to the taste of peaches.”584 Of 
course, we also have to know that this is essentially the case. This version is clearly 
compatible with multiple realizability, since if true the internal physical composition is 
not essential. However, there is no a priori reason to assume this physicalist approach 
over another. This view therefore lacks accuracy. 
In my opinion Q-me revelation can provide us with the accuracy needed. 
Allowing for multiple realizability is not simply assumed to enable the plausibility of 
the thesis. It is rather the case that Q-me revelation reveals multiple realizability, by 
revealing embodiment and functionalism. The question is whether or not there is any 
justification to support this claim. 
To answer this question, consider pain. Following Aydede585, pain may be 
interpreted in two different ways. The first interpretation of pain is the bodily location. 
We feel it as located somewhere in the body. The second notion is about pain as an 
experience, this means that it is subjective. If Q-me revelation is right, then we 
experience pain in both ways. Clearly the experience is subjective, but it also involves 
experiencing it as tissue damage of a certain bodily region. What makes the experience 
subjective is that it involves the subject of experience in its pre-reflective and 
experiential manner. So, when I feel pain, I usually experience it as tissue damage 
happening to me or the pain function me(Rpain). Since this function entails the body, it 
seems that I pre-reflectively identify this body, not as any body, but as my body where 
I am situated or embodied. Me(Rpain), however, is clearly a version of physicalism that 
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supports various possible realizations. If this is correct, then we should assume that 
there is phenomenal justification for the claim that embodiment – and, therefore, 
multiple realizability – is revealed. 
The consequential question, however, is why this view does not reveal the 
specific brain processes involved, but only embodiment in general. Q-me revelation 
suggests this is the case because the specific implementation is not essential. If it were 
essential, it would be revealed. This means, if mind/brain identity were correct, Q-me 
revelation would need to show it. Q-me revelation is, therefore, not a revelation thesis 
that proves physicalism wrong, it is rather a further argument against mind/brain 
identity. 
Now, I am convinced that my arguments for privileged self-knowledge about 
the phenomenal are solid. Since I was able to illustrate that every item on the list, 
posted in the beginning of this chapter, can be implemented, I am confident that this 
view can stand its ground. In practice, I have shown the following: 
- The interpretation as Q-me revelation is a viable version of the revelation thesis 
about the nature of experience. It qualifies the thesis as knowledge of 'the essential 
property'. 
- Q-me revelation reveals the components of that essential property, namely 
representational qualities and pre-reflective self-awareness. It, therefore, reveals 
phenomenal Q-me-ism. 
- Phenomenal Q-me-ism is a plausible ontological account of the phenomenal, 
respectively experience, since it fulfills all the necessary conditions. 
- Q-me revelation explains primarily ontological knowledge about the 
phenomenal/experience. However, based on this knowledge, it also justifies the 
privileged access to the phenomenal. 
- Finally, Q-me revelation is compatible with physicalism by revealing embodiment. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I started with the more than problematic Cartesian idea that we can grasp the 
foundation of knowledge. My claim was that, despite Descartes's ambitious goal, he 
rigorously applied the privileged access intuition to our own mental states to justify his 
view. We may, of course, profoundly doubt the Cartesian conclusion that the cogito 
argument provides us with foundational knowledge, but even today we seem to be – 
at least in certain contexts – open-minded towards the privileged access. This does not 
mean that anyone claims this kind of access to our entire mental life. Especially since 
psychology showed us how wrong we are most of the time, this folk psychological 
intuition is mostly restricted to conscious experiences and their phenomenal 
properties. 
The main task of this investigation was an attempt to justify this notion. The 
reason was the fact that we usually assume other instantiations of knowledge to be 
different in principal. Many philosophers think that, under normal circumstances, the 
knowledge relation to be causal and contingent. Privileged self-knowledge, however, is 
supposed to be direct and certain, at best. After clarifying the relevant ideas, including 
the privileged access intuition itself, self-knowledge and further ideas about the 
phenomenal, I argued that, up to this point, there is no basis for believing in this 
intuition. The main problem, or so I claim, is that basically all efforts for justification 
stem from the highly controversial acquaintance approach. I argue that this notion, 
however, does not give us any reason to believe in the privileged access. It is basically 
as mysterious as the intuition itself. At this point, I could have concluded that the 
privileged access is just another folk psychological concept that should be erased. In 
my opinion, however, my research was able to show that privileged self-knowledge 
about the phenomenal is not as lost as it may seem. We simply need to dig deeper for 
an explanation and base it on the controversial revelation thesis. 
Now, as any kind of knowledge, self-knowledge needs to be justified. If we 
assume the privileged access, however, the way to ground it is decisively different. As 
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stated in the last paragraph, we may consider Russell's acquaintance approach586. 
Knowledge by acquaintance follows from the thesis's directness claim. On the one 
hand, this account entails epistemic directness. Justification, therefore, only depends 
on the phenomenal.  Interesting, however, is that most contemporary philosophers 
thought, on the other hand, that this is the way to integrate the phenomenal reality 
and its corresponding judgments.587 By tying those judgments directly to their 
truthmaker, acquaintance also entails metaphysical directness. Independent of their 
ontological view about the phenomenal, most of those convinced by the privileged 
access tried to establish an explanation for this intuition via acquaintance. 
However, there seems to be something profoundly wrong with this idea. 
Following Levine and his 'Material Constraint'588, acquaintance cannot constitute the 
needed explanation. This is due to two reasons: i) either the thesis introduces basic 
properties/relations; or ii) it cannot be explained by the underlying physical structure. 
The former case points to the fact that an explanation should not introduce further 
mysteries. Acquaintance is supposed to make reasons that account for the privileged 
access to the phenomenal explicit. If i) is, however, true, then this view fails. In the 
latter case, the doubt stems from the consideration that, since acquaintance is a 
cognitive relation, it cannot be explained by some underlying physical relation. 
Privileged self-knowledge is, therefore, a myth. 
Even though acquaintance fails, it is a noble attempt to rescue this treasured 
intuition. At this point, one could simply drop privileged self-knowledge or find a 
different explanation.  I decided for the latter and investigated alternative approaches 
to justify the privileged access. In this context, I considered some underlying ideas that 
constitute privileged knowledge589 in general. It seemed to me appropriate to maintain 
the strongest notion, namely certainty, and, therefore, adopt infallibility and 
omniscience. 
Now, how can we establish certainty? In a first step, we need to consider 
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 See Levine 2007. 
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 For a list of what may constitute epistemic privilege see Alston 1971. 
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'epistemic principles'590 that put us in the right kind of epistemic position. Most 
principles, however, are too weak to begin with. Self-presentation tied certainty to 
what seems reasonable to a given subject, abandoning, therefore, a strong 
interpretation of the concept. Understanding merely includes knowledge in an 
ordinary sense. As a consequence, it only entails degrees of justified knowledge, 
ignoring certainty entirely. Finally, we need to consider revelation. Since this view is 
located in the intersection of infallibility and a qualified version of omniscience, namely 
self-intimation591, this thesis is clearly a candidate to constitute certainty. 
After introducing the original idea and clarifying its implications592, I turned to 
the question of whether or not the revelation thesis may count as an alternative 
explanation for the privileged access. Since the thesis is clearly strong enough, I 
considered possible interpretations. The main reason for this strategy was that an 
unqualified revelation thesis is, according to Lewis593, not compatible with physicalism 
and, therefore, prima facie not better off than acquaintance. Interesting enough, a first 
way to restrict the revelation thesis is by tying it to the acquaintance approach. This 
possibility was already introduced by Russell594. Needless to say, I concluded that 
qualifying revelation in this way is implausible. The reason is that the resulting account 
suffers from the same problems as the original approach. I concluded, however, that it 
was still necessary to discuss this account, since it establishes the independence of 
revelation from acquaintance. 
A second way to restrict revelation was to claim that it entails knowledge of 'all 
essential truths'. Many critics595 of the Russellian approach thought that this to be the 
right interpretation. The idea, however, leaves us with a fundamental problem. How 
can we secure that this version of the thesis is compatible with physicalism? Since I 
have to know all essential truths, and, therefore, possess all the relevant concepts, I 
should clearly know the phenomenal property in question, under its physical concept. 
This, however, is Lewis critique and, therefore, implausible. The only way to solve this 
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issue is to assume a posteriori physicalism and claim that we can only know the 
identity between a phenomenal property and a physical property a posteriori. 
Following Damnjanovic596, I argued that this is a problematic approach. However, I am 
convinced that I could show that the original reason Damnjanovic has in mind fails. My 
argument is based on the simple conviction that if revelation reveals all essential 
truths with the corresponding concepts, and physicalism is true, then the physical 
concept should be revealed as well. I argued, therefore, that introducing a highly 
problematic interpretation of physicalism does not justify this version of revelation. 
Being a step in the right direction, I considered a further interpretation of 
revelation, namely knowledge of 'all essential properties or facts'. In this case, we do 
not need to know those facts under every possible concept, we only need to have 
some concept of the relevant property or fact. Even though this view still entails a 
posteriori physicalism, the proponent of this view does not generally seem to be worse 
off than any other physicalist. At a first glance, this version of revelation seemed to be 
an elegant solution to Lewis's worry. Looking closer, however, revealed its flaws. The 
thesis's problem is the fact that it is unrestricted. Revelation has to reveal 'all essential 
facts'. I concluded that even if we do not follow Damnjanovic's claim - the need to 
know all essential properties all the way down – we still have to know all properties 
period. This is clearly an inflation of the essence claim and not suitable for revelation. 
As a consequence, I concluded that we have to restrict this account of the 
thesis correctly. One way was to assume only knowledge of the counterfactual 
extensions of phenomenal concepts. This view tries to limit the essential features of an 
experience to those stable in all possible worlds. To separate essential features from 
accidental features, one needs to know the counterfactual extensions of the relevant 
phenomenal concept. Those which are stable in all possible worlds define the essential 
features. My critique of this approach was based on Chalmers's 'master argument'597 
against this strategy. In my view, then, one has to limit revelation differently. 
The best way to qualify revelation is to restrict it to one essential property. This 
means we also have to break with the old dichotomic view about experiences. An 
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experience is, therefore, nothing over its phenomenal properties. Those properties 
consist in representational qualities and the subjective function, where those qualities 
are processed. The essence that revelation, therefore, reveals is that an experience E 
with the phenomenal property Q is essentially Q-me, or me(RQ). This view of 
revelation, or Q-me revelation, is based on an ontological account called phenomenal 
Q-me-ism. The decisive advantage is that there is only one essential property, namely 
Q-me-ness and Q-me revelation puts me in the position to know this. Of course, 
gaining such knowledge involves more than having the relevant experience. By having 
an experience, I can only cognize its essence. It is only after carefully conducting 
epistemology and metaphysics that I can finally know what revelation claims. 
A second advantage of this version of revelation is that it is compatible with 
physicalism. Even assuming a strong de dicto version of this view, i.e. I have to have a 
concept of essence, does not affect the thesis. Q-me revelation is divided in an implicit 
version, which allows me to have experiences without having a concept of essence, 
and an explicit version, which demands such a concept. To be compatible with 
physicalism, therefore, this account reveals embodiment. As a consequence, Q-me 
revelation does not violate physicalism, it merely represents a further argument 
against mind/brain identity. 
Assuming that my arguments for Q-me revelation were sound and the thesis is 
compatible with physicalism, how does it justify the privileged access intuition? Well, 
Q-me-ness may only be the ontological description of the structure of experience. 
However, a concrete cases, entailing e.g. red-me, present us with the solution. Since a 
particular experience simply is a red quality in the me function, or better the red 
quality is processed in me, there is only one structural property present. Therefore, if I 
can know Q-me, I can know red-me. As a consequence, my judgment about red-me is 
certain. Of course, this presupposes that I have the relevant concept. Nonetheless, 
revelation Q-me puts me in the position to know this. The privileged access to the 
phenomenal is, therefore, justified. 
Evidently, this is only a small piece of the puzzle. Many questions for future 
research are still open. Especially the role of the me function, or what the self brings to 
the table, needs further investigation. Also, related questions, e.g. 'what creatures, or 
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machines, actually have experiences?', or 'what conditions do we presuppose for the 
constitution of a self?', need to be analyzed. In my opinion, however, justifying the 
privileged access, in both an epistemological and a metaphysical sense, is a step into 
the right direction. 
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